Eastern DR Congo: When vulnerable citizens are left between armies
Tuesday, March 31, 2026
AFC M23 official Freddy Kaniki comforts members of the Banyamulenge community who fled atrocities in Uvira to Kamanyola in January 2026. Photo by Teddy Mazina

In eastern DR Congo, a troubling question is increasingly being asked by civilians living across the Kivus: if the state cannot protect its citizens, who will?

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For many communities in North Kivu and South Kivu, especially the persecuted Congolese Tutsi, protection has become uncertain, inconsistent, and largely absent. As armed actors multiply – from FARDC, Wazalendo and Mai-Mai militia, Burundian forces and other foreign mercenaries; and as front lines shift, civilians are left navigating a dangerous landscape where the institutions responsible for their safety appear unable, or unwilling, to provide it.

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The core responsibility of any government is clear: protect its citizens. That duty does not disappear in times of war. If anything, it becomes more urgent. Yet in eastern DR Congo, the reality on the ground suggests a profound failure of that obligation.

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In North Kivu, the renewed confrontation between the Congolese army coalition and the AFC/M23 movement has intensified fighting in and around populated areas. The increasing use of heavy weapons and drones by the government forces is raising serious concerns about civilian safety. Military operations are unfolding in proximity to communities that have already endured decades of displacement and instability.

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But the crisis is not confined to North Kivu.

In South Kivu, particularly in the highlands of Minembwe, Uvira, and Fizi, the situation illustrates even more clearly the consequences of weak and fragmented or zero protection. Communities such as the Banyamulenge have faced repeated attacks and displacement while multiple armed groups operate across the same territory. Local militias, self-defense groups, and mobile armed factions now function alongside or in parallel with state forces. This overlapping of armed actors is not a sign of strength. It is a sign of a state struggling to maintain authority and control.

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Instead of reinforcing clear chains of command and accountability, reliance on irregular militias and foreign forces has blurred responsibility for security. For civilians, this creates a dangerous ambiguity: those who claim to defend them may also contribute to their insecurity.

The continued presence – in eastern DR Congo – of the genocidal FDLR militia from Rwanda further exposes the limits of the state’s strategy. Decades after its emergence in the aftermath of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, the militia group remains active in eastern DR Congo. Its persistence highlights a long-standing failure to resolve one of the central security challenges facing the region.

A government cannot claim effective sovereignty while armed groups, both domestic and foreign, continue to operate freely within its territory. The consequences are borne by civilians. Villages are attacked, houses burnt down by Burundian forces, communities displaced, and cycles of retaliation deepen mistrust between populations. In many areas, protection arrives late, if at all. For residents of the Kivus, the state is often visible during military offensives but far less present when sustained security and governance are needed.

This is where the criticism of the Congolese government becomes unavoidable. The problem is not only the existence of armed threats, many other states face security challenges. The problem is the repeated failure to establish durable protection mechanisms for civilians despite decades of conflict, international assistance, and numerous military campaigns.

Security responses remain largely reactive. Political solutions remain slow and postpone correct conflicts resolution. State institutions remain weak in many rural and urban areas. Meanwhile, the conflict continues to evolve, becoming more fragmented and more dangerous for those caught in the middle.

The United Nations peacekeeping mission – MONUSCO – continues to, allegedly, support stabilisation efforts, but even the largest peacekeeping operation cannot replace the fundamental role of the state. It becomes worse when both institutions fail lamentably to protect the persecuted Congolese Tutsi. And the world remains conspicuously silent. Protection ultimately depends on national leadership, coherent security strategy, and accountable institutions.

Without those elements, civilians remain exposed.

Eastern DR Congo now faces a critical test. If the current trajectory continues with expanding armed alliances, unresolved regional tensions, and growing community fears, the conflict risks hardening into deeper identity-based violence, which history shows is far harder to reverse. And when genocide is committed against the Congolese Tutsi as it appears, those very institutions will start sarcastically blaming the victims as it happened in Rwanda over 30 years ago.

Preventing that outcome requires more than military action. It requires the Congolese government to confront the central issue that has defined the conflict for years: rebuilding the capacity and credibility of the state as the primary protector of its citizens. Because in the end, the legitimacy of any government rests on a simple measure: whether its people feel protected or abandoned.

Today, too many civilians in eastern DR Congo feel the latter.

Amb Joseph Mutaboba is a political and diplomatic analyst specialising on Africa and countries of the Great Lakes Region.