A key driver of the ongoing conflict in eastern DR Congo is the political and ideological narratives that the Congolese government associates with Rwanda. For many Congolese national political leaders, there is a deep-rooted culture of expressing hostility toward Rwanda and President Paul Kagame, which has become a core part of national political discourse.

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This phenomenon acts as a popular mobilising force to access and maintain political power, justify institutional failures, and serve as a form of political economy; through the mismanagement of funds. It also explains why DR Congo’s Minister of Communication Patrick Muyaya often appears to act more as a minister communicating about Rwanda. Similarly, President Félix Tshisekedi has made numerous international trips focused on accusing Rwanda, to the point where much of his diplomatic agenda seems centred on campaigning against Kigali. This explains why DR Congo political leaders choose such political discourse.

Anti-Rwanda sentiment as a political tool

In Congolese politics, hostility toward Rwanda has become a cross-cutting political tool. Both the government and the opposition regularly rely on anti-Rwanda rhetoric to rally supporters and bolster their political legitimacy.

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Political actors believe it is difficult to succeed without adopting this dominant narrative, and those who avoid such populist strategies risk being politically sidelined. This model of populist politics tends to stimulate and intensify ethnic tensions in the eastern part of the country, due to the imaginary ethnocentric perspectives of political elites and the historical legacy of identity-based politics. Even some Congolese social groups, such as the Banyamulenge/Tutsi—despite facing severe discrimination and persecution—are sometimes compelled to adopt anti-Rwanda rhetoric as a means to access lucrative positions in public institutions or secure protection rights. This dynamic illustrates the immense power of political and social pressures in a highly polarized environment.

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During his 2023 election campaign, Tshisekedi placed strong emphasis on Rwanda. At times, he suggested that Rwanda’s president could be personally targeted and even hinted at the possibility of regime change in Kigali. This rhetoric became a central element of his campaign message.

The anti-Rwanda narrative has proven effective in mobilizing various segments of Congolese society, including political and military elites, religious groups, social communities, and political organizations. In a country marked by deep internal divisions, weak state institutions, and ethnically driven politics, anti-Rwanda discourse functions as a powerful populist tool. For the authorities in Kinshasa, portraying Rwanda as the primary threat provides a convenient means of uniting public opinion and, at times, diverting attention from the internal challenges facing the Congolese state.

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Tshisekedi often attributes DR Congo’s history of instability to Rwanda’s interventions. However, his argument overlooks the existence of more than 200 armed groups, many fully state-sponsored, which have mobilized around tribal grievances. It also fails to recognize that multiple countries have intervened in DR Congo as a result of the country’s statelessness and governance failures - conditions that have contributed to endemic corruption and lawlessness. Finally, it does not acknowledge how these systemic failures have created an environment conducive to the development and expansion of genocidal ideologies and regional security threats.

Anti-Rwanda rhetoric as a form of political correctness

The Congolese government, aware of its vast natural resources, engages in a form of diplomatic blackmail by threatening to cut ties with powerful countries that criticize its anti-Rwanda rhetoric and ethnocentric policies, which often involve hate speech targeting Kinyarwanda speakers or Congolese Tutsi communities.

Foreign diplomatic missions experience this "blackmail” as a pressure tactic, aimed at compelling them to remain complicit in human rights abuses. International actors may fear "offending” DR Congo, concerned about jeopardizing their economic interests, while simultaneously profiting from these manipulations by selling weapons or competing for control of DR Congo’s strategic minerals.

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As a result, they often avoid challenging this ethically and ethnically charged political strategy due to their own political, economic, and diplomatic stakes in the country.

The political economy of war

A third key aspect of the DR Congo conflict with Rwanda is the political economy of war.

The war in eastern DR Congo and the ant-Rwanda rhetoric generates substantial financial flows - from military spending and international aid (United Nations troops) to the exploitation of natural resources. In a context characterized by weak institutions and pervasive corruption, these conditions create strong incentives for political and military actors to prolong the conflict or leverage insecurity for personal gain. In this environment, security crises become a means of accessing funding, justifying specific public expenditures, or consolidating political power. War thus functions not only as a security problem but also as a central factor shaping political and economic competition, creating a system that some actors rely on and reinforcing cycles of instability.

The political spaces occupied by the political elites provide access to rapid accumulation of wealth, privileges, and power, within a system of clientelism that also reinforces personal and family prestige. Competition among the DR Congo political actors often stems from the necessity to survive hardship, while a culture of corruption, conflicts of interest, and expectations of political and financial favours remains endemic.

The anti-Rwanda rhetoric is about diversionary tactics designed to minimize public outrage in DR Congo and protect the political reputations of international partners. These approaches are effective due to the polarization of the social and political environment. The aim of DR Congo political actors is to maintain control of the narrative by avoiding addressing the root causes of the conflict, as the latter remains politically and economically profitable.

Kinshasa’s main motivation in the conflict in the east is the consolidation of a political narrative built around a security threat from Rwanda. This strategy serves multiple purposes: mobilizing public support, diverting attention from government failures, and avoiding accountability for internal challenges. Many Congolese political actors use this narrative to stir resentment and, at times, encourage mobilization toward violence for electoral gain. Competing politicians often attempt to demonstrate their hostility toward Rwanda - commonly portrayed falsely as a "Tutsi regime”- in order to strengthen their nationalist legitimacy.

This political stance fuels nationalist rhetoric and increases regional tensions, making efforts to find long-term solutions to the crisis in the east even more difficult. Meanwhile, international actors are often hesitant to openly challenge the Congolese government, which is volatile and unpredictable, yet strategically important for global security interests. In this environment, Rwanda becomes the easiest and most frequent target of criticism and diplomatic pressure.

Dr Alex Mvuka Ntung is a researcher and analyst on the Great Lakes Region.