“Blood minerals” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) commonly refer to tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold (3TG). A widely promoted narrative, advanced by several advocacy and pressure groups, holds that these minerals are extracted in conflict-affected areas of eastern DR Congo. It is frequently asserted that 3TG mining finances armed groups and fuels violence, while at the same time being essential to the production of modern electronic devices such as smartphones and laptops. ALSO READ: What are the motivations of Burundi’s military intervention in South Kivu? In early 2025, Kinshasa accused Apple of using illegally mined minerals sourced from Congolese mines. The Congolese government has consistently relied on such narratives to argue that conflict in the country’s eastern region is primarily driven by mineral looting by Rwanda. However, there is a lack of rigorous, independent analysis to substantiate these claims. This article critiques this widely publicised narrative, demonstrating first that there is no correlation between the root causes of conflict and 3TG. The formation and motivations of armed groups are unrelated to 3TG, and their human rights abuses are largely tribal in nature. These armed groups do not sustain their activities through minerals extraction but acquire their resources from the central government. Moreover, effective regional and international legal mechanisms exist to regulate mineral trade and ensure traceability. The Congolese government bears primary responsibility for enforcing these regulations to ensure the ethical exploitation of its mineral resources. When enforcement fails, this implies complicity on the part of government regulators. ALSO READ: Deconstructing the so-called recycling of FDLR Evidence-based research has not found a correlation between the root causes of conflict and illegal mineral exploitation. Conflict in eastern DR Congo is largely home-grown. Armed groups are primarily mobilised around identity politics and tribal grievances. Such factors are exploited by political leaders for ethnocentric and populist purposes. There are over 200 armed groups in eastern DR Congo. These non-state actors are now officially recognised and supported by the national government. In 2023, a senior UN representative suggested that 85% of the ammunition used by these armed groups comes from the national army. Armed groups extract minerals primarily through artisanal methods and possess limited industrial or commercial capacity to exploit and trade minerals beyond the country’s borders. While severe human rights abuses persist in the conflict-affected eastern region, these violations are not necessarily linked to mineral extraction but are more closely associated with tribalism—a form of politically induced intra-ethnic violence. Since weapons are supplied by the government to hundreds of armed groups, these non-state actors do not need to finance arms purchases through mineral trading. Corporate companies, mainly Chinese and Canadian, along with Congolese government actors, own the largest mineral concessions and trading operations. Serious human rights abuses persist in the mining sector, including the widespread involvement of children in mineral extraction, who are paid minimal wages for extremely labour-intensive work. However, these children are not necessarily forcibly recruited. Rather, this situation reflects the dynamics of an informal economy operating within one of the world’s poorest countries. Minerals are not necessarily a concept of which local populations are aware; many Congolese people are born, grow up, and die without ever seeing minerals extracted in the country. In the West, precious materials carry high social and economic value. In contrast, in DR Congo, local communities often have little awareness of, or interest in, minerals. Cattle herders, for example, are primarily concerned with access to good pasture for their livestock, while those engaged in farming focus on cultivating crops. Minerals are rarely part of everyday life for most people. Governance of minerals Between 2000 and 2007, there was strong international demand for certain minerals found in limited areas, particularly in DR Congo. These were the “three Ts” (tin, tantalum, and tungsten). Under the presidency of Barack Obama, a law known as the Dodd-Frank Act was passed to combat what were termed “conflict minerals.” ALSO READ: Rwanda’s efforts to comply with international conflict minerals frameworks debunk false narratives over DR Congo minerals This law grants authorities the power to prohibit companies involved in the illegal trade of these minerals. Numerous other international legal mechanisms have also been established, including those of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the International Tin Association (ITA, formerly known as ITRI), and the International Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCI). Before minerals are exported, exporters must hold labels from the mining sites, indicating the original concessions and their owners. Traceability systems distribute and register these labels, while the ministry of mines issues ICGLR certificates attesting to compliance. It is virtually impossible for illegal minerals to reach foreign countries unless there is a proven failure of the traceability systems. Every 3T mineral exported from the region must have met the requirements of internationally recognised traceability systems and be traceable from its origin. DR Congo has ratified these regional and international traceability mechanisms. Any large-scale illegal export would necessarily imply internal failure or complicity. If illegal minerals were to end up on the international market, Kinshasa would necessarily have facilitated this process. Due to these regulations, the country banned artisanal mining, as individual miners were unable to meet international standards. Formal structures, such as cooperatives, were established to meet these requirements. However, these cooperatives are mostly owned by Congolese political actors, who frequently collaborated with armed groups to extract minerals and smuggle them through illicit channels. Consequently, the Congolese government bears primary responsibility for facilitating the illegal mining and export of minerals. Neighbouring countries act primarily as transit hubs, or comptoirs, for Congolese minerals, but such transactions do not occur without Kinshasa acting as an enabler. These minerals ultimately end up in the glass-fronted markets of Antwerp, Tel Aviv, Dubai, Cape Town, New York, and London. The DR Congo is not the only country that produces minerals; the belief that it is uniquely endowed with such resources is a myth. Geological maps demonstrate that these minerals are present in several countries across the region, including Rwanda, which is entirely unsurprising. The idea of “blood minerals” is a narrative promoted by Western media and pressure groups as a form of equity and social responsibility framing—an oversimplification of the DR Congo conflict and a justification for the failure of UN interventions. This narrative is exploited politically by the Congolese government, fuelling violence and ethnic animosity. It serves as an effective approach to shift responsibility for failures in governance and the regulation of ethnic groups’ social relations. The root causes of conflict in eastern DR Congo are politically induced and have no correlation with illegal minerals. The Congolese government must avoid continuously playing the victim card and face its own responsibilities and challenges as a responsible state. It needs to review the capacity, needs, and compliance of licence holders, assess how they perform regarding human rights, verify whether they have all the necessary policies and procedures, ensure that mining operations have valid mining licences, and review the supply chain. Dr Alex Mvuka Ntung is a researcher and analyst on the Great Lakes Region.
