In contemporary international relations, sanctions are often presented as principled tools of diplomacy: measures designed to defend human rights, preserve peace, or punish states accused of destabilising conduct. Unfortunately for smaller nations, sanctions can also be experienced as instruments through which powerful countries project influence, shape narratives, and assert geopolitical priorities. Rwanda’s experience illustrates the complexity of this reality.

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Over the past three decades, Rwanda has emerged from the ashes of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi to become one of Africa’s most studied examples of state reconstruction, security reform, and institutional resilience. From rebuilding shattered governance structures to contributing significantly to peacekeeping missions across its borders, Rwanda has often been recognised for stability and strategic clarity.

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However, despite these achievements, Rwanda has periodically found itself under diplomatic pressure, sanctions, or punitive measures from major powers, particularly the United States and some other Western governments, often linked to broader regional crises in the countries of the Great Lakes region. Those countries were manufactured by the same powers at the Berlin Conference who drew new maps of African countries in the absence of any African soul.

The central issue has frequently revolved around eastern DR Congo, where insecurity, numerous armed groups, ethnic persecution against Banyarwanda specifically those colonially labeled Tutsi, rampant weak governance, and unending international competition have produced one of the world’s longest-running conflicts. In this context, Rwanda has often been accused by external actors of involvement in Congolese instability, leading at times to sanctions against Rwandan officials, aid restrictions, or diplomatic pressure.

The question is not whether international scrutiny should exist: every state should be accountable under today’s ignored international law. The deeper question is whether such scrutiny has always been fair, balanced, historically informed, and consistently applied. The answer is no.

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For many Rwandans, there is legitimate concern that international responses to regional insecurity can sometimes oversimplify Rwanda’s security concerns. This is much so, regarding genocidal forces like FDLR and various armed groups operating in eastern DR Congo including Burundi’s army, and Congolese Wazalendo militia, with ideological roots linked to the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. Rwanda’s security establishment has long argued that threats from such groups are not abstract geopolitical theories, but existential concerns shaped by lived national history. Those who chose to stay idle then are the ones shamefully imposing sanctions on Rwanda. The world remembers and takes notes.

When sanctions or punitive measures are imposed without equal pressure on all destabilising actors, perceptions of double standards inevitably emerge. Why, many ask, are some state or non-state actors treated with strategic caution while Rwanda’s actions are subjected to disproportionate scrutiny? Why are historical drivers of insecurity, including the continued presence of genocidal networks in the region, sometimes minimised in international discourse?

Such perceptions matter because sanctions are not politically neutral. They influence investment confidence, diplomatic reputation, and public narratives. For developing nations, even limited sanctions can reinforce external portrayals that overshadow domestic progress and security complexities.

At the same time, Rwanda’s position in global affairs demonstrates a broader truth: small states often operate within international systems where moral language and strategic interests coexist uneasily. In my view, powerful countries may justify sanctions as normative enforcement, but geopolitical calculations are rarely absent. This does not mean Rwanda, or any nation, should be beyond criticism. Rather, it means criticism should be grounded in consistency, context, and fairness from those imposing unjustified sanctions.

Rwanda’s post-genocide journey has been defined above all by a determination never again to permit existential vulnerability. That strategic posture shapes how the country interprets regional threats, alliances, and sovereignty. International partners may at times disagree with Rwanda’s policies, but durable peace in the Great Lakes region will require more than sanctions or selective pressure. It will require honest engagement with root causes: armed extremism, ethnic persecution, chronic governance failures in countries like DR Congo since the reign of King Leopold II to Felix Tshisekedi, international resource competition, and the unfinished business of regional justice.

Sanctions, when used, should support peace rather than simplify conflict into politically convenient binaries. Otherwise, they risk becoming symbols not of international justice, but of unequal power.

Rwanda’s story is ultimately not just about sanctions. It is about the broader challenge facing smaller nations in a world where sovereignty, security, and global politics intersect unevenly. As the international community evaluates Rwanda, it must do so with the same principle that underpins credible diplomacy everywhere: justice must be consistent, and peace must be rooted in historical truth, not selective memory.

The writer is a political and diplomatic analyst specialising on Africa and countries of the Great Lakes Region.