1993: How RPF's withdrawal from captured territory surprised even its sympathisers
Monday, October 13, 2025
Rwanda Patriotic Army fighters during the Liberation War in 1990s. File

In the previous article in this serialised narrative, it was realised that RPF gave several conditions that were to be met before resuming the suspended negotiations with the Habyarimana government. One of these was for the government to dismantle death squads. When the conditions were rejected by the government, RPF resumed the hostilities on February 8, 1993, in Kinihira. In this piece, we shall witness how and what happened after that attack.

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The International Community was of the opinion that RPF had violated the accords, but at the same time recognised that insecurity was a reality. They persistently asked that RPF stop hostilities and return to its former positions. In a communiqué dated February 21, 1993, RPF declared an immediate unilateral ceasefire and said that it was ready to return to its former positions so that peace negotiations could be resumed. But in turn, it demanded that the Rwandan Army (FAR) stay in their new positions and that an intervention force be put in place to supervise the buffer between the two forces.

To justify its decision, RPF said that it had achieved its objective. The regime had learnt a lesson. There was pressure exerted from all sides. The OAU Ministers of Foreign Affairs who met in Addis-Ababa asked for an immediate end to hostilities and a return to negotiations. Pressure also came from big powers that were involved in the Rwandan crisis. The Belgian minister of foreign affairs blamed RPF and the Kigali regime. He blamed RPF for the resumption of hostilities and said that it had to withdraw to the lines that it occupied before the attack of February 8, 1993.

The Kigali regime was blamed for the overwhelming responsibility of the resumption of the civil war. The USA also condemned the resumption of the war and demanded a ceasefire. As for France, it was concerned about RPF’s victory because, according to the French government spokesman, it would create disequilibrium in the region as the Tutsi would be in power in Rwanda and Burundi.

RPF then accepted to pull back, but on three conditions. The government force had to be maintained in its new positions. RPF had to continue operating politically in the newly liberated zones, a condition that was not ratified by the Kinihira Accords. RPF also demanded a complete change in the local administration of the zone. The decision to withdraw to the initial positions particularly surprised many observers and even RPF sympathisers.

The first consequence in military terms was that FAR could not contain the RPF’s big offensive. Their allies had to come to their rescue. France sent a reinforcement of an extra 150 troops in order to prevent the total collapse of the FAR. That attack also caused a serious humanitarian crisis and one wonders whether the RPF had weighed its extent and effects. The number of displaced persons increased dramatically to the extent that the first camps were near Kigali (Nyacyonga). The displaced persons were about 1,000,000 after that attack, up from 200,000 in August 1992. Humanitarian support reached Rwf1.7 billion per month.

The funds were contributed by donors and NGOs. Part of the amount ended up in the pockets of government officials and administrative agents. The living conditions in the camps were deplorable. They were characterised by insufficient food, promiscuity, high levels of criminality and many deaths because of diseases, among other factors.

According to some analysts, RPF’s attack alienated its sympathy from some politicians of the Democratic forces for change who saw in that initiative the desire on the part of RPF to impose its rule by force. It is more probable that the February 1993 attack scared the political class, which felt threatened for the first time. It did not believe in the military victory by RPF. The attack showed that the RPF could become victorious.

It was for that reason that some politicians and representatives of the Civil Society were alarmed and started reacting out of fear and for spontaneous self-protection. The political class claimed that there was a big risk for the country to fall into a dictatorship which was worse than what it had known for the last 20 years.