The former Rwandan Armed Forces' central role in preparation of 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi
Saturday, March 02, 2024
Juvenal Habyarimana former president of Rwanda meets Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR) before the genocide. File

The former Rwandan Armed Forces played a central role in the preparation and execution of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi.

This genocidal process began in October 1990 and continued through the defeat of the former Rwandan army in July 1994 and subsequent operations attempted during its exile in the then Zaïre, currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo).

After fleeing to eastern DR Congo, the genocidal army and militia kept on changing names to shed off its past. Now known as FDLR, it continues to commit various crimes in the Great Lakes region.

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During the night of October 4 to 5, 1990, the Rwandan army staged a fake attack by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in the capital, Kigali. The genocidal army fired automatic weapons throughout the night at the nearby Rwandan military camp to create a pretext for mass arrests, which targeted over 10,000 Tutsi across the country. Most of the Tutsi were taken to military and gendarmerie camps where they endured torture and inhumane, degrading treatment designed to force them to confess to crimes they did not commit.

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In Kigali, most of these interrogations occurred in Kanombe, Kigali, and Kacyiru military camps. They also happened under the leadership of French military personnel, including Major Michel Robardey and his subordinates, who trained the Rwandan gendarmerie in the ‘service’ called the Central File, commonly known as Criminology.

Although Rwandan law prohibited military personnel from participating in political activities, the mobilization to commit the genocide was prevalent within the Rwandan army. The genocide was designed by a clique of extremist military personnel from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, including senior officers such as: Colonels Théoneste Bagosora, Anatole Nsengiyumva, Elie Sagatwa, Aloys Ntiwiragabo, and Tharcisse Renzaho. Others are Lt Col Dr. Laurent Baransalitse and Nubaha Laurent; Majors Aloys Ntabakuze and Protais Mpiranya, and Lt Col Léonard Nkundiye, among others.

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This clique of extremist officers spread the ideology of genocide among the military, warning them against having relations with the Tutsi. Without any distinction, the officers attributed all of Rwanda’s problems to the Tutsi; thereby persecuting them and depriving them of their fundamental rights.

This policy of hatred is explained in a lengthy note written on September 21, 1992, by Col Déogratias Nsabimana, Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army. Addressed to all military commanders in the country, as well as the gendarmerie, this document begins by stating that the army's general staff held a meeting on December 4, 1991, chaired by President Juvénal Habyarimana himself at the Military Academy in Kigali. During this meeting, important decisions were made, including establishing a commission of 10 senior officers tasked with developing strategies to defeat the enemy through the military, media, and politics.

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In the September 21, 1992 note, Col Nsabimana stated that the commission had completed its mission and provided recommendations for implementation throughout the country. It stated that the enemy was no longer only in Uganda but was also present inside Rwanda, and its strength was increasing. Nsabimana requested that this document be disseminated in all military camps, especially the paragraphs defining the enemy, the strategies to identify them, the places where they recruit, and those with whom they operate.

Nsabimana described two types of enemies: the main enemy and supporters of the enemy. He specified that the main enemy was the Tutsi, who remained inside the country or abroad and did not recognize the revolution of 1959. The second enemy was described as anyone who assisted the Tutsi.

Nsabimana then listed the categories of enemies, including: