On April 15, 2021, Uganda’s state media, The New Vision, published an article titled “Michela Wrong wrong on Banyarwanda in NRA.” The article aimed to minimize the role of Rwandan refugees in the 1981-86 NRA liberation struggle that brought President Museveni to power. “No doubt, there were Banyarwanda among the rank-and-file members of the NRA, just like there were different Ugandans tribes among the fighters,” the writer begins as he ignorantly tries to undermine the importance of foot soldiers in an armed struggle. This is a person who is ready to downplay the sacrifices of so many people, Rwandan refugees and ordinary Ugandans, who sent their sons and daughters to a war they believed was for a good cause; for Ugandans, to liberate their country and for Rwandans, to end their persecution. Many died and they will never see them again. Yet, the people who were the beneficiaries of these sacrifices have the audacity to mock the pain of their loved ones by dismissing their deceased as “invisible rank-and-file.” It takes arrogance to dismiss as meaningless the contributions of rank-and-file soldiers who are the actual courageous fighters in a war. In fact, before and after the capture of Kampala the 1st, 7th, 11th, 13th, 19th, and 35th battalions were predominantly made up of Banyarwanda who apparently “must-have fought anonymously,” as the authorities in Kampala are now choosing to remember them. They are not only erasing the foot soldiers; the commanders too: “Who were these fierce NRA Banyarwanda ‘good fighters’ in ‘good positions of command’ on whom Museveni was ‘militarily dependent’?” Kampala suddenly asks. In conversations with five fighters who were with the NRA since 1981, they could name by heart, without needing to crosscheck any document, at least 80 of their comrades who were commanders in the NRA war. They talked about their colleagues who are still alive and remembered fondly those who were killed in battle in the NRA, describing the circumstances of their death in the line of fire. Moreover, they said that they felt a responsibility, on behalf of their fallen comrades, of refreshing the minds of the authorities in Kampala who seem to have suddenly forgotten how they got in power. “You want to know all the commanders who were in the NRA or just the most senior,” a former NRA and RPA officer, now retired, asks, before volunteering to start with the Brigade Commanders Lt Col Adam Wasswa, Major Chris Bunyenyezi, Major Stephen Ndungutse, and Major Sam Kaka, who he says (corroborated by others) was the NRA’s Military Police Commander. “They can’t forget Captain Ndamage. He commanded three battalions and was killed by enemy fire in Gulu,” he says before going into details of some of the heroics of the Banyarwanda in the NRA war. Later that day, I met another comrade of the NRA who was equally astonished that the authorities in Kampala don’t recall the Banyarwanda commanders. “They don’t remember any commanders,” he asks rhetorically before counting off a list of Commanding Officers (Cos) and their NRA battalions, including, Captains Tadeo Gashugi (9th btn), Dodo Twahirwa (21st), Mico Edison (35th), Wilson Bagire (13th), Edward Karangwa (95th), Sam Byaruhanga (6th), Wahabu (55th), and Lt Fred Nyamurangwa, the commander of the 27th battalion. Yet, there were many more, as further discussions with former NRA commanders proved. Another comrade quickly shot off a list of commanders: Cyiza Willex, Boniface Bitamazire, Thadeo Gashumba, John Gashumba, Vedaste Kayitare, Paul Katabarwa, Fred Maregenya, John Gashugi, Emmanuel Kanamugire, Matayo Twagirumukiza, and Nathan Ngumbayingwe, among so many of Kampala’s forgotten. After these discussions, I came out with the feeling that had I talked to ten former NRA commanders the list of their Banyarwanda comrades could have easily shot up to 100 commanders that the authorities in Kampala say were “anonymous.” It is one thing to forget, quite another to refer to the commanders who got you where you are as “Johnie-come-lately” a slight that Banyarwanda joined at the end of the war. But imagine an army that makes commanders people who have just joined the war instead of those who have experience. In fact, they were commanders because of their experience in battle. They have even shamelessly forgotten Col Charles Musitu who was with them since the Fronasa days in the 1970s. If they can forget him, surely this is a case of acute amnesia that won’t allow them to remember who captured Kampala, as we shall see below. Imagine the character of people who are so eager to dismiss the contributions of their comrades that they are ready to make the preposterous claim that the Banyarwanda who were at the ranks of Colonel, Major, Captain in 1986 had just joined the NRA. But what kind of army gives entry-level ranks of Colonel, or was this a special privilege reserved only for the Banyarwanda? Of course, they were fierce commanders who had earned those ranks despite, not because of, being Banyarwanda. They didn’t benefit from tribalistic favoritism as some did. How can they forget the heroism of Captain (Jo1) Ngoga who commanded the company that captured Kololo Summit View, which turned out to be decisive in the capture of Kampala as government soldiers deployed on this hill were shelling and causing major casualties to NRA’s 1st and 7th battalions that were advancing from Clock Tower towards the city center to capture Parliament and Radio Uganda? It is after the action of this Munyarwanda commander that NRA forces were able to move into the city to capture Kampala. It’s unforgettable! Who can forget the 1984 ambush in Singo that almost claimed Gen David Tinyefunza and other commanders, including Gen Henry Tumukunde, when a small unit of Banyarwanda soldiers and commanders, Kangaho and Gatsinzi, stormed to their rescue? Tinyefunza had been chief of intelligence and was left in charge of NRA headquarters and Sick Bay in Singo. In Sick Bay were Tumukunde, who had been shot in the leg, and other commanders, who the author tries to lionize at the expense of Banyarwanda. Only a small force was at the Headquarters; others had gone to attack Hoima. Tinyefunza received information of an impending enemy attack on the Headquarters. Based on this intelligence tip, Tinyefuza took a decision to immediately shift the headquarters (and Sick Bay) from Singo. As he was moving his forces and the sick, they fell in an enemy ambush. With their lives in danger, the small unit of Banyarwanda fighters stormed to scene of ambush, neutralizing the enemy. These gallant commanders were later killed in different battles shortly after. Gatsinzi fell in Gulu while Kangaho fell at Birembo, near Kabamba in Mubende, as he fiercely tried to dismount an enemy who had a machine gun and was causing serious losses to the NRA force; this was shortly after the attack on Kabamba II when the fighting between the NRA and UNLF (government forces) had heated up. These are the gallant fighters that the authorities in Kampala are erasing by saying that “they must have fought anonymously.” A touch of class would have these shameless people belittle those who are still alive but not their deceased comrades; they have even forgotten those they once sang about in the “melancholic song honoring the fallen brave comrades by name – Fellow Combatants” like the late Rwamukaga and Kangaho. As the battle heated up and courageous Banyarwanda like Kangaho were falling to enemy fire Museveni had left for Sweden. Even then, it was Banyarwanda soldiers who escorted him. “We escorted him through Kiwanguzi, Mpoma, Mabira, to Lake Victoria” where he crossed by boat first to Kenya and then Sweden. Museveni returned in 1985 during the peace talks. The NRA had reached Katonga. During his absence, the NRA was under the command of a Munyarwanda, Gen Fred Rwigema, who had consolidated the force for the final offensive to take the vital towns of Kasese, Fort Portal, Mbarara, and Masaka that basically led to the submission of the enemy. Tumwine had been at Sick Bay since 1981 after he was shot in the eye at Kabamba. In 1983 he had been evacuated to Nairobi for treatment. In his autobiography titled “Combatants: A memoir of the Bush War and the Press in Uganda,” the NRA journalist William Pike reveals that Tumwine remained in Nairobi from 1983 till 1986 when the war was over and Museveni was president of Uganda. However, Tumwine returned to take over the position of army commander that Fred Rwigema had effectively assumed during the entire period of the war, although he (Rwigema) had formally remained Deputy Army Commander throughout the entirety of the war. Stephen Kashaka is also on the list of the “gallant” Ugandan commanders that the author tries to lionize at the expense of Banyarwanda. But Kashaka, who was the commander of the 5th battalion, followed the footsteps of others who had run away when the battle had heated up. His last act on the battled field was to charge a bank and a Diana lorry before taking off, only to reappear in 1986 after the war was won. He, unlike others who reappeared when things had effectively been decided, was arrested for desertion. In short, with a force of close to 4000 Rwandans, experienced fighters and commanders at all levels, who crossed over to liberate their country on October 1, 1990, the authorities in Kampala cannot shamelessly say that Museveni didn’t rely on this force to get to power. “Rwigema is ours not theirs” Kampala has always tried to use Rwigema as a propaganda tool when the least they should do is honor him. In this campaign they have tried to oppose him to Rwanda, “but Rwigema is ours, not theirs,” a former comrade of his in the NRA and RPA observed. In the New Vision article, the author writes, “Aside from Rwigema, all the gallant commanders of the NRA were Ugandans.” First of all, Rwigema, the proud Rwandan he was, would not be happy with and would, in fact, despise this attempt to use him as a propaganda prop that diminishes the contribution of his fellow Banyarwanda. Secondly, if isolating Rwigema is meant as some form of recognition then they wouldn’t try to reduce him to a mere Museveni escort, “Museveni kept some of them, particularly Rwigyema and Kagame, as his personal bodyguard platoon in order to maintain them as soldiers.” Rwigema and Kagame were far from escorts. Their presence in the NRA struggle motivated many Banyarwanda, commanders and rank-and-file whose contributions the Kampala authorities now want to erase, into joining Museveni’s rebellion against Obote. As for Rwigema, if they truly valued his contributions the author’s paymasters would start with the acknowledgment that in 1980 he rescued Museveni from sure death at the hands of Obote soldiers at a roadblock in Kireka. Even in this story, as they have done many times, Janet Museveni tries to divert credit of Rwigema’s heroic decisiveness to Salim Saleh (Janet Museveni’s autobiography: “My Life’s Journey” page 106). Except that Muhoozi Kainerugaba recalls as a 6-year-old that it was in fact Rwigema who was the hero of the day (Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba relives his closest contact with death). Janet was a grown woman when her husband was saved from death but it is the memory of a 6-year-old that recalls with clarity what took place that day. If they were grateful to Rwigema’s contributions, instead of using him as a propaganda prop, they would at least acknowledge that they owe their lives to him; no grateful person forgets a near-death experience. Moreover, they would also admit that he was in fact the Army Commander of the NRA for the entirety of the NRA struggle; that for much of this time Museveni was away with his wife and children in Sweden. NRA and RPA wars different The ignorance of the author comes alive in the passage, “In 1991, this invincible force, that was supposedly the fiercest element of the NRA, went AWOL and launched a disastrous attack on Rwanda in which the commander and Uganda bush war hero Rwigema was killed on the first day of battle.” If the RPA commanders were naïve to launch a “disastrous attack,” how smart was the NRA’s attack on Kabamba barracks with 27 guns against a fortified defense, the attack where Elly Tumwime got incapacitated for the rest of the war? As for the terrain, Singo is actually as flat as Mutara. RPA’s reorganisation had a specific context. The RPA liberation struggle was more deadly than the NRA war for a number of reasons. One, while the Luwero war was mainly guerilla warfare of laying ambushes or attacking a pre-identified area the number of key battles can be counted. However, in the RPA war the battles are countless because it was mainly a conventional war, plus “we were fighting an enemy with the support of foreign forces; the French, Belgians, Zairians, and some of these we captured on the battlefield.” In other words, the RPA was not fighting an army that was demotivated, unpaid, and low on morale. It was a fierce force battling another until victory was secured. Anonymous but dearly missed “I still struggle and ultimately fail to find any account of these mythical indomitable NRA Banyarwanda- it appears they must have fought anonymously,” Kampala’s messenger writes. But if Banyarwanda who left Uganda in 1990 were invisible, what followed proved otherwise. Almost the whole company of soldiers protecting President Museveni after 1986 were Banyarwanda. The Presidential Protection Unit (PPU) had to be reconstituted after they left in 1990, including Captain Charles Muhire, its operations and training officer (OPTO) and Captain Charles Ngoga, the PPU Company Commander (OC). Now the authorities in Kampala want to convince people that in a country that had just come out of war, which still had the entire north in an insurgency, the Presidential Protection Unit didn’t have some of the fiercest fighters and that they selected the mediocre to protect the President! Speaking of the insurgency in the north, almost the entire fighting force that was deployed there consisted of Banyarwanda. The few Bahima officers who had been deployed there abandoned the frontline preferring the lights and sausages in Kampala. In other words, if the author wants to talk about soldiers who “went AWOL” it is these Bahima officers. At any rate, the void left by the departure of the Banyarwanda was felt by a prolonged war that lasted more than 20 years. Further, the departure of the Banyarwanda officers was especially felt when in 1995 a unit of RPA officers commanded by then Major (now Maj Gen) Andrew Kagame was sent to Uganda, at Museveni’s request, to secure key installations in Entebbe, Jinja, and Kampala. For twelve months, Maj. Kagame’s artillery and anti-aircraft battle-hardened force secured the Entebbe airport, the strategic radar at Nsamizi (also in Entebbe near the president’s residence), Owen Falls Dam, and the major sugar factories in Lugazi, including Madvhani. As installations of strategic economic importance, Entebbe airport and Owen Falls Dam were identified for special focus of RPA forces to secure with heavy firepower. Museveni had received credible intelligence that a hostile neighboring country was preparing a raid on Uganda; it would conduct an air raid on key installations while Joseph Kony’s group would match southwards towards Jinja and Kampala. Museveni didn’t want to take chances and knew where to find a fierce army, and requested for it. “If they want to share bush war stories, we have more and can expose them. They should be careful. They are opening pandora’s box because we will say these things and they won’t know where to hide,” warns a retired officer of the NRA and RPA.
