Continued from Part 7. In 2001 and again in 2008, the Rwandan legislature adopted laws making acts of genocide ideology, divisionism and negationism punishable offences. Reyntjens was quick to denounce them as “political laws”, without regard for the scale and severity of the violence that was rampant in Rwanda, particularly the murders of genocide survivors. For example, in 2006, the Rwandan Senate published a detailed report demonstrating that genocide ideology remained a recurring problem despite the government’s clear efforts to eradicate it. Similarly, in December 2007, a parliamentary commission established to investigate genocide ideology in schools found that 26 out of 32 secondary schools were affected by it. Following this finding, Law No. 47/2001 of 18 December 2001 on the punishment of crimes of discrimination and sectarianism, as well as Law No. 33 Bis of 6 September 2003 punishing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, were reviewed and amended by Law No. 18/2008 of 23 July 2008 on the punishment of genocide ideology and related offences. In attacking Rwanda’s law on the punishment of genocide ideology, Reyntjens repeated the contents of a communiqué issued by Ingabire Victoire Umuhoza. She had criticised the law, claiming that it was “deliberately vague, gave unlimited discretionary power to the Public Prosecutor’s Office and paved the way for witch hunts and false accusations motivated by political considerations”. These attacks are unfounded. Several European states also punish genocide ideology, particularly Holocaust denial, and no one, including Filip Reyntjens, denies the validity of such laws. For example, on 19 April 2007, one year before the enactment of Rwanda’s law on genocide ideology, the European Parliament adopted a framework decision requiring states to legislate against racism in general, including Holocaust denial. This decision addresses acts relating to “public advocacy, denial or gross trivialization of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg annexed to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group defined by reference to race, color, religion, ancestry or national or ethnic origin, where the behavior is carried out in a manner likely to incite violence or hatred against a group or a member of such a group”. Under such legal frameworks, countries including Germany, France, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, Luxembourg and Andorra have laws criminalising Holocaust denial. One might therefore wonder why Filip Reyntjens would oppose Rwanda—a country that suffered the last genocide of the 20th century—taking similar measures to prevent and punish the ideology of hatred that led to the genocide. 5.2. Entrapment in ethnicity Since 1994, Filip Reyntjens has published an annual work, often entitled “The Great Lakes Region of Africa in Crisis”, which frequently includes a list of Rwandan leaders and officials alongside their ethnic identities. A central question is what basis Reyntjens uses to assign ethnic identities to Rwandans today, given that Rwanda removed ethnic references from its citizens’ identity documents in July 1994. Reyntjens’ relentless focus on ethnicity reflects the ethnic nostalgia evident in this “researcher-actor’s” memoirs and commitments, which are more political than academic. If I compare this with France, where I pursued my university studies, it never occurs to anyone, when a French government is formed, to scrutinise the list and count the number of Corsicans, Bretons, Burgundians, Catalans, Alsatians or Parisians in it. Even in Belgium, despite the persistent differences between Walloons and Flemings, no such counting exists. One wonders why Filip Reyntjens refuses to abandon ethnic counting in Rwanda, unless it reflects his stubborn determination to perpetuate the colonial mindset that, in the eyes of many Belgians, a Rwandan must be either Hutu or Tutsi, just as a Belgian must be Walloon or Flemish. Yet this was not the case before the arrival of Belgian missionaries and colonisers in Rwanda. We often forget or overlook how Rwandans were classified as Hutu or Tutsi according to entirely arbitrary criteria, such as physical stature or the number of cattle they owned. The most absurd example is the assignment of ethnicity according to the father’s identity. A Tutsi brother and sister, born to the same parents, who married a Hutu woman and a Hutu man respectively, would have children classified as belonging to different ethnic groups. The brother’s children would be classified as Tutsi, while his sister’s children would be classified as Hutu. Thus, first cousins would not belong to the same ethnic group. During the genocide, uncles, aunts, cousins and second cousins sometimes killed children within their own families because those children were not classified as Hutu. This colonial policy caused immense damage in Rwanda, and it was this practice that the RPF banned. Failing to recognise the value of that measure for Rwandan unity, while perpetuating the practice of ethnic classification, as Filip Reyntjens does, is a destructive manoeuvre that must be challenged. 5.3. Animosity towards the Rwandan head of state Reyntjens’ hatred of the Rwandan head of state runs so deep that he writes of having travelled to Kampala to persuade Ugandan officials to join him in his hostility. He recounts: “In November 2000, I took a chance and contacted the aide-de-camp of a Ugandan general. To convince him to cooperate, I sent him the following message: While it is perfectly legitimate for Uganda to help an ally, particularly by supplying weapons and ammunition, the situation becomes different if that ally, without your knowledge, uses those weapons to shoot down a presidential plane. Here you have a golden opportunity to deal with Kagame without exposing yourselves.” That says it all. Another example occurred on 7 February 2008 in Brussels, where a supposedly “hot” conference was held concerning the arrest warrants issued by Spanish judge Fernando Andreu Merelles against 40 senior Rwandan officials. The conference was led by Spanish denialist lawyer Jordi Palou Loverdos, a close associate of Reyntjens. Reyntjens describes his collaboration with Loverdos as follows: “I must point out (...) that I had frequent exchanges with Jordi Palau Loverdos, lawyer for the civil parties.” Taking the floor, Reyntjens used insulting language towards the Rwandan head of state: “What should be the position of a partner country of Rwanda that has to shake hands with President Kagame? (...) I am tempted to say: Kagame and the forty thieves!” His rhetoric against the Rwandan head of state goes so far as to reveal that his anti-Rwanda stance is motivated by jealousy of the president’s success and international recognition. He writes: “When I realize that the RPF has committed and continues to commit the worst crimes, the only choice available is that of activism (...). This activism is not inspired solely by a sense of justice for the victims, but also by the revolting ease with which the RPF manages to secure total impunity. Worse still, a deeply criminal regime is presented as a model for Africa, Kagame is received everywhere with full honors, he is awarded honorary doctorates, distinctions and prizes, he is applauded at the many conferences he gives around the world, and Rwanda is becoming a place where the world’s political, media and even business leaders are queuing up at the gate. Tony Blair has become Kagame’s ‘unpaid’ advisor. I have explained why this imposture has become possible, but it shocks me deeply.” It is clear that jealousy troubles Reyntjens, who swore in 1994 that the RPF government would not stand the test of time. As a former adviser to President Habyarimana, he is troubled by Rwanda’s successes, which contradict his predictions. Instead of acknowledging his mistakes, he goes so far as to deny Rwanda’s clear progress in good governance: “It is not only the RPF’s criminal past that is driving me to campaign. According to all the information I receive from Rwanda, including from the most remote hills, the lamentable political governance is a source of great structural violence, which we know will eventually lead to acute violence. So, I have the same feeling of apprehension that I had before 1994. The exclusion and marginalization of the majority of the population—and I am not just thinking of the Hutu—create and fuel frustration, resentment and hatred. The development that foreigners see is mainly concentrated in Kigali, the regime’s showcase. The disconnect with the rest of the country is enormous, and inequality, calculated on the basis of the Gini coefficient, has doubled since the RPF came to power. Despite appearances of security, cleanliness and ‘progress’, Rwanda is therefore a volcano waiting to erupt.” In September 2025, when the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs cancelled Reyntjens’ conference in Antwerp, he chose to praise and appease the Belgian foreign minister rather than examine the reasons for the decision within Belgium and learn from them. He stated: “I have respect for Minister Prévot, for his positions on Rwanda and for his role in the Democratic Republic of Congo. I think he was badly advised.” He then once again attacked the Rwandan head of state, who had no reason to intervene in a strictly internal Belgian matter. “The decision contradicts the independence of the Institute,” Reyntjens wrote on X. “It will not result in Paul Kagame’s respect, but rather his contempt, and will reinforce Kagame’s conviction that he can punch above his weight.” The writer is Minister of National Unity and Civic Engagement. This article was first published in Dialogue magazine, Special Edition No. 211, “The Prolonged Genocide”.
