Continued from Part 6. 4.8. Rejection of investigations by qualified experts into the attack on the Falcon 50 Since 1994, Filip Reyntjens has advanced the theory that the missiles that shot down the presidential Falcon 50 aircraft on the evening of 6 April 1994 were fired from Masaka, specifically from a location called CEBOL, and that the RPF was responsible for the attack. From the outset, Reyntjens’ approach was to find every possible means of accusing the RPF. He was not interested in establishing the truth. He developed this theory without conducting any investigation on the ground and without the scientific qualifications or expertise required to investigate aircraft crashes. Consequently, as soon as expert findings contradicted his accusations, he alleged a conspiracy. In 2008, British specialists from Cranfield University conducted an investigation in Rwanda that identified the Kanombe military camp and its immediate surroundings as the launch site of the SAM-16 missiles that brought down the Falcon 50. Reyntjens denounced their scientific report despite having no expertise in the field. Meanwhile, in France, Judge Marc Trévidic had taken over Bruguière’s investigation in 2007 and undertaken a genuine effort to establish the facts. In 2010, French judges Marc Trévidic and Nathalie Poux made their first significant investigative breakthrough by visiting the scene of the crime. They travelled to Rwanda with experts in ballistics, acoustics and explosives and conducted meticulous cartographic surveys. The experts’ report, made public by Judge Trévidic on 10 January 2012, established two key points. First, the aircraft was hit by two SAM-6 missiles, which caused it to explode. Second, the missiles were fired from the Kanombe military camp, a stronghold of the government army, President Habyarimana’s presidential guard and elite commandos. Caught off guard, Reyntjens could no longer sustain his Masaka thesis and adopted an evasive position that he maintains to this day: that the French experts did not identify who fired the missiles. This is curious. Who else could have fired them, if not the Rwandan army, which controlled the camp, then the most important military installation in Rwanda? Let us recall that Kanombe housed elite units, including Major Aloys Ntabakuze’s para-commando battalion, elements of Major Protais Mpiranya’s presidential guard, the Anti-Aircraft Unit led by Colonel Bagosora and under the command of Colonel Laurent Serubuga, Major Augustin Ntibihora’s military construction battalion, and several others. Following the investigation, the investigating judges dismissed the case on 26 December 2018. That decision was upheld on appeal in August 2020 and definitively confirmed by the French Court of Cassation on 15 February 2022, putting an end to speculation about the RPF’s responsibility in the case. Yet Reyntjens refuses to accept the findings as any serious expert would. He continues to accuse the RPF without evidence. It should also be noted that, in the years following Bruguière’s arrest warrants, several key witnesses recanted their testimony, while other testimony was contradicted. Piece by piece, Bruguière’s case fell apart. Even more puzzling is a letter Reyntjens sent on 10 December 1998 to French MP Bernard Cazeneuve, rapporteur for the French Parliamentary Information Mission on Rwanda. In it, he acknowledged that British and Belgian sources had confirmed to him that the former Rwandan Armed Forces possessed SA-16 missiles of the type used to shoot down Habyarimana’s Falcon 50. He wrote: “In response to your letter of 3 December [1998], I can confirm that I have obtained the serial numbers of the SA-16 launchers from the FAR, and more specifically from Colonel Bagosora. This information was provided to me by his lawyer, Mr Luc De Temmerman. I would like to take this opportunity to confirm in writing what I told you during our last meeting in Brussels, namely that my former British and Belgian sources have confirmed (my British source adds ‘adamantly’) that, according to their information, these missiles are part of a stockpile seized by France in Iraq.” 4.9. Using genocide perpetrators to accuse the RPF Reyntjens’ relentless pursuit of the RPF by any means necessary is well documented. One example is a letter he sent on 9 May 1997 to Hassan Ngeze, editor of the genocidal newspaper Kangura. In it, Reyntjens sought Ngeze’s full cooperation in establishing the RPF’s responsibility for the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane: “Dear Mr Ngeze, “Your letter dated 18 February, accompanied by the text intended for African Rights, only reached me a few days ago. This explains the delay in my reply. I have tried several times to contact you. Please find enclosed three letters that I have tried in vain to send you over the last few months. I kindly ask you to try to answer the question I am submitting to you. It would indeed be crucial to be able to prove the RPF’s involvement in the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane. If there are RTLM employees in Nairobi, perhaps you could check with them to see if an answer to my question can be found. Furthermore, I am of course willing to meet with a journalist from Kangura. Simply contact me a few weeks in advance to arrange an appointment. “I look forward to hearing from you or meeting you soon, Mr Ngeze. “Yours sincerely,” 4.10. Reyntjens knew of Ngeze’s criminal activities Reyntjens contacted Hassan Ngeze to seek evidence against the RPF despite being fully aware of his genocidal activities. He had already described Ngeze’s role in the massacres of Tutsi in Bugesera. Writing about March 1992, Reyntjens stated: “Interahamwe and soldiers from the Presidential Guard and Camp Mayuya (a total of about 75 soldiers) were sent to Bugesera. The soldiers were in civilian clothes and armed with knives and pistols. Those who could have hindered the operation, in particular officers from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and inspectors/officers from the Judicial Police, had been transferred beforehand. The troublemakers were transported in Public Works vehicles; the petrol needed for the operation was provided by MM. Rwabukumba and Nzirorera and was reportedly transported by Hassan Ngeze and stored at Mayor Rwambuka’s house. “Upon their initial arrival in Gashora, the Interahamwe and soldiers, aided by local Interahamwe, mingled with the population. They then attacked a few pre-determined targets: Tutsi families or those belonging to the opposition; from there, the violence spread. The complicity of certain services is obvious (...) It is also worth noting the central role played by the Public Works Department; not only did it provide vehicles and petrol vouchers, but the Road Fund served as a veritable slush fund for financing a number of illegal activities. (...) The troublemakers enjoy protection from high places. Hassan Ngeze, the editor of the extremist newspaper Kangura, who played a role in the events in Bugesera, comes to visit me at my hotel.” Hassan Ngeze, whom Professor Reyntjens contacted after the genocide to enlist his cooperation in bringing accusations against the RPF, was therefore a notorious criminal. His involvement in the preparation and execution of the genocide had been known to Reyntjens since 1990. V. Challenging preventive measures aimed at securing peace After the genocide, Reyntjens actively opposed the establishment of a system to prevent genocide and combat genocide ideology. To be continued in Part 8. The writer is the Minister of National Unity and Civic Engagement. This article was first published in Dialogue Review, Special Edition No. 211, “The Prolonged Genocide”.
