2.1. Author of a discriminatory Rwandan Constitution On 20 December 1978, a constitution drafted by Filip Reyntjens was adopted in Rwanda. Its author claims that it was one of the best in Africa: “I remain proud of our text, which was, at least on paper, one of the best African constitutions of the time.” Despite this praise, the Constitution that Reyntjens presented to Habyarimana contained several discriminatory provisions and violated numerous fundamental human rights and principles enshrined in international conventions. Firstly, its preamble was scandalous in its legitimisation of the killings that had targeted the Tutsi since November 1959, describing them as an act of liberation: “Considering the work of liberation undertaken by the Revolution of 1959 (...), Determined to continue the work of renewal undertaken since the memorable day of 7 July 1973, with a view to safeguarding the achievements of the Revolution of 1959 (...), Establishes and adopts this Constitution for the Republic of Rwanda.” Such constitutional recognition amounts to legitimising the exercise of power based on racism, discrimination and ethnic killings targeting the Tutsi, a section of Rwanda’s population. When drafting this Constitution, Reyntjens knew that the Rwandan regime had institutionalised ethnic discrimination and criminal practices, notably through the massacres of more than 2,000 Tutsi in Byumba prefecture in March 1962 and the genocide committed in December 1963 in Gikongoro, Cyangugu, Kibungo, Kibuye, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kigali and Bugesera, which claimed the lives of more than 35,000 Tutsi. Reyntjens was fully aware of this cruel reality and had a duty to draft a constitution that enshrined respect for human rights. Secondly, discrimination is enshrined in several provisions that establish the MRND as the sole political party and concentrate control over state affairs in the hands of a powerful president. Article 7 thus rules out any democratic opening: “The Rwandan people are politically organized within the National Revolutionary Movement for Development, the sole political formation outside of which no political activity may be carried out. (...) Every Rwandan is automatically a member of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development.” In Article 40, the Constitution drafted by Filip Reyntjens grants the president of the MRND the exclusive right to stand as a candidate for President of the Republic: “The president of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development is the only candidate for the presidency of the Republic.” The same article then excludes younger people from seeking the presidency: “The candidate for the presidency of the Republic must be thirty-five years of age.” It also omits term limits: “The President of the Republic is eligible for re-election.” This article therefore legally authorises the President of the Republic, in this case General Juvénal Habyarimana, to run unopposed as many times as he wishes. When drafting this provision, was Reyntjens unaware of the value of democratic transition? The Constitution goes further in Article 42 by consolidating power within the MRND. It establishes that, in the event of “prevention, inability to express his will, resignation, death or any other cause of cessation of his activities, the President of the Republic shall be replaced by the Secretary-General of the National Revolutionary Movement for Development until the election of a new President of the Republic.” When Reyntjens drafted the 1978 Constitution, Rwanda had laws and regulations limiting Tutsi access to secondary and higher education. In an attempt to overcome these discriminatory restrictions, some parents, mainly Tutsi, had joined forces to establish private schools such as APACOPE in Kigali and CEFOTEC in Butare. The state obstructed these efforts by refusing to recognise their diplomas. Reyntjens was well aware of this, but instead of addressing the injustice in his constitutional text, he reinforced it in Article 26: “(...) The recognition of diplomas or certificates from private education, as well as education provided, in whole or in part, shall be regulated by law.” Why did Reyntjens not remove this discrimination and draft a text that complied with international standards enshrining every child’s right to education? Filip Reyntjens continued to support these positions even when he must have realised that he had made serious mistakes in supporting an oppressive regime. In November 1990, for example, he collaborated with Belgian NGOs on a brochure entitled Rwanda. What Now?, in which he supported the ethnic discrimination practised by the MRND regime under the 1978 Constitution, arguing that it had brought peace to Rwanda: “The quota system has undoubtedly contributed to ethnic pacification in Rwanda. This is one of the merits of the Second Republic, which has been successful in this area. (...) The regime has achieved significant success in the areas of development, democracy and respect for human rights.” 2.2. Acknowledged compromises with the MRND regime Filip Reyntjens admits his close ties to senior figures in the Habyarimana regime while downplaying the notorious criminality of a government for which he served as a legal and political adviser: “The regime is an ordinary military dictatorship, as can be found everywhere in Africa, (...) it was not the worst on the continent.” Reyntjens then acknowledges his close relationships with senior figures in that regime: “The beers I shared with ministers, officers, and senior officials on their native hills may have brought me too close to them.” These ties went beyond sharing beers and brochettes; they also became a source of inspiration for his publications: “Some of these encounters are even rather peculiar. As they progress in their careers, within the judiciary and high administration, in politics, the army, or even in business, my former students also become a formidable network, with its advantages and disadvantages: the advantage of access, the disadvantage of proximity and, consequently, probably a certain leniency on my part.” The word “leniency” encompasses much that can be summed up in a single word: compromises. His subsequent account reveals this. Reyntjens acknowledges that he had obtained a special status that allowed him to impose his proposals on President Habyarimana: “I unquestionably exploit my status as a foreigner, which, in a country like Rwanda, has more latitude than that of a national. This status allows me to gain fairly easy access to the highest authorities of the country, including the President of the Republic, and to speak to them with a frankness that a Rwandan could only dream of, even to the point of bypassing a powerful and feared man like Sagatwa. I say this not only because it gives me an advantage I do not really deserve, but also because the risks I face are very limited, unlike those borne by Rwandans.” 2.3. Support for the Habyarimana regime’s communications efforts At the beginning of the war in October 1990, Reyntjens helped the Habyarimana regime strengthen its communications efforts to counter the RPF’s diplomacy. He describes his involvement in these terms: “I am associated with an initiative of the regime, which is attempting to regain the upper hand in the media war it is losing to the FPR. “In early November [1990], I am contacted by Fabien Singaye, a diplomat serving at the Rwandan embassy in Bern. He informs me that the government plans to send two missions, one to Europe and another to North America, to inform public opinion, and asks if I would agree to participate in a conference to be organized in Geneva as part of this initiative. I am obviously hesitant: although I believe that a counterbalance to FPR propaganda is necessary, I do not wish to be used by government propaganda either. I request additional information, and I am somewhat reassured by the composition of the commission. I know two of its members, the historians Ferdinand Nahimana and Emmanuel Ntezimana, who are professors at the National University of Rwanda; even though the former would later be tried and convicted by the ICTR, at that time I have no reason to distance myself from them.” Three serious points should be highlighted. First, Reyntjens was fully aware of the criminal nature of the Habyarimana regime, which he nonetheless agreed to assist. Second, he was equally aware of the character of Fabien Singaye, an agent of the Rwandan intelligence services stationed at the Rwandan embassy in Switzerland. Singaye was very close to the presidential family. He was the son of André Singaye, a prominent Gisenyi businessman and friend of Habyarimana, and the son-in-law of Félicien Kabuga through his marriage to Pauline Musanabera, one of Kabuga’s daughters. It should also be noted that two of President Habyarimana’s sons married daughters of Félicien Kabuga: Françoise Mukanziza married Léon Habyarimana, while Bernadette Uwamariya married Jean-Pierre Habyarimana. Finally, Reyntjens was well aware of Ferdinand Nahimana’s extremist anti-Tutsi stance. Agreeing to collaborate with such individuals, while stating that their participation in the anti-RPF campaign reassured him, reflects a bias inconsistent with intellectual integrity. He admits it himself: “From the beginning of the war [1990], I clearly take sides against the RPF attack. I did not know the RPF before October 1990, and my position is therefore not inspired by any pre-existing antipathy. (...) On the one hand, since the RPF is essentially composed of Tutsis (...) My ‘anti-RPF’ position at the start of the war, with its corollary—the perception of objective support for the regime—was appropriate. However, it was also uncomfortable, since I was aware of the flaws of the ruling power. (...) One could say that by taking sides against the FPR, I chose the camp of the incumbent regime.” III. Reyntjens and his treatment of the Genocide against the Tutsi: outrageous denialism Reyntjens acknowledges the Genocide against the Tutsi in principle, but completely distorts its constituent elements, thereby clearly aligning himself with denialism. To be continued in Part 3. The writer is the Minister of National Unity and Civic Engagement. This article was first published in Dialogue Review, Special Edition No. 211, “The Prolonged Genocide”.
