The visit to Goma by former African heads of state offers the African Union and regional leaders an opportunity to give renewed purpose to the search for peace in eastern DR Congo. That opportunity carries responsibility. Communities enduring displacement, insecurity and repeated diplomatic disappointment need decisions that change their circumstances. On October 5, former Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, former Botswana president Mokgweetsi Masisi and former Ethiopian president Sahle-Work Zewde met leaders of the Alliance Fleuve Congo/M23 in Goma as members of the African Union’s panel of facilitators. Their engagement brought senior African mediation directly to one of the centres of the conflict. Its lasting significance will depend on the political backing and practical follow-through it receives. The former leaders can listen, clarify demands, challenge positions and help negotiate compromises. Serving African leaders must provide the authority, resources and consistency required to implement what is agreed. Responsibility for peace cannot be delegated entirely to distinguished intermediaries while governments continue pursuing incompatible policies. The Goma visit should therefore mark the beginning of a more disciplined phase of African engagement. The AU, the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region must organise their efforts around a common political objective and a verifiable programme of action. The institutional foundation already exists. In July, the AU panel and its supporting secretariat developed a six-month roadmap covering political dialogue, military and security questions, humanitarian access, natural resources and reconciliation. The roadmap envisaged measurable implementation, regular reporting and coordination with the Washington and Doha processes. African leaders should now demonstrate that these provisions have operational meaning. Eastern DR Congo’s conflicts have several interacting dimensions. There is a struggle over state authority and political inclusion within the DR Congo. There are regional security threats, disputes over land and belonging, armed commercial networks and deep failures of public protection. A credible settlement must address these relationships without allowing any one explanation to conceal the others. Reducing the crisis to a confrontation between Kinshasa and Kigali leaves important Congolese grievances unresolved. Treating it exclusively as an internal Congolese matter overlooks threats extending across borders. Explaining everything through minerals obscures political exclusion, hate speech and communal insecurity. Each dimension requires attention within a coherent settlement. Congolese and Rwanda’s sovereignty is indispensable to that settlement. Its practical expression in the DR Congo must include institutions capable of protecting citizens, administering justice and exercising accountable authority. Restoring state presence will accomplish little if communities experience returning institutions through predation, discrimination or renewed dependence on armed auxiliaries. Rwanda’s security must also be addressed seriously. We hear more of DR Congo sovereignty than that of Rwanda. Sustainable regional peace requires credible guarantees that neighbouring territory will not serve as a base for organisations threatening Rwanda. Respect for the DR Congo’s territorial integrity and respect for Rwanda’s security belong within the same diplomatic undertaking. The June 2025 Washington peace agreement provides a framework for this relationship. It incorporates the harmonised plan for FDLR neutralisation and the disengagement of forces or lifting of Rwanda’s defensive measures. It also supports negotiations between the DR Congo and AFC/M23 under Qatari mediation. African diplomacy should advance these connected commitments through coordinated verification and implementation. FDLR neutralisation must occupy a central place in that work. The organisation’s origins in networks connected to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi give the issue a historical and security significance that cannot be dismissed through diplomatic shorthand. Addressing its military capacity also requires confronting the recruitment, financing, political protection and ideological mobilisation that sustain it for over thirty years. Neutralisation must be defined through observable results. These should include the identification of units and commanders, disruption of weapons supplies, separation from any cooperating state forces, dismantling of recruitment networks, and credible arrangements for disarmament and repatriation. Reintegration of eligible former combatants must proceed alongside appropriate judicial processes for those responsible for serious crimes. The Washington framework already assigns the joint security mechanism responsibilities for identifying, locating and assessing the FDLR and affiliated groups, as well as monitoring relevant commitments. The AU should press for these responsibilities to produce evidence that can be independently examined. Rwanda’s corresponding obligations must likewise be assessed through the agreed mechanisms. From my past experiences in both Guinea Bissau and Darfur/Sudan, direct dialogue with AFC/M23 is equally necessary to a political settlement. Meeting an armed movement allows mediators to examine its demands and establish its obligations. It does not confer approval on military conquest, coercive administration or abuses. The facilitators must use access to require concrete commitments concerning civilian protection, humanitarian access, cessation of hostilities and participation in a negotiated transition. Kinshasa must engage substantively with the political questions raised by the conflict. AFC/M23 must demonstrate that its stated objectives can be pursued through an accountable political process. Neither side should use negotiations to gain time for military preparations while civilians bear the consequences. The rights of threatened communities must be central to these discussions. Let Congolese, AU and African leaders go down to the root causes of the conflicts in the eastern DR Congo. Congolese Tutsi, including Banyamulenge communities, must enjoy the protection and equal citizenship to which they are entitled. The security of other communities exposed to violence deserves the same seriousness. Collective suspicion, ethnic incitement and the denial of belonging undermine the possibility of a shared political future. From my experience as mediator, senior fellow African mediators should insist on explicit commitments against ethnic persecution and hate speech, accompanied by investigation and enforcement. Political and military leaders must be answerable for incitement within their own structures. Public institutions should establish credible ways to resolve citizenship, documentation and land disputes without allowing armed power to determine whose rights are recognised. Refugee return requires similar discipline. A declaration that people may return is insufficient when they fear attack, lack documentation or cannot recover their homes. Voluntary, safe and dignified return must be supported by protection, property-dispute mechanisms, access to livelihoods and continuing monitoring. Displaced people should have a meaningful voice in the arrangements governing their future. An agreement involving AFC/M23 will be important, but the wider conflicts of eastern DR Congo will demand further work. Other armed groups, local disputes and patterns of exploitation will remain. African leaders must connect negotiations to a broader programme of security reform, accountable local administration and justice. Such a programme should reduce dependence on armed auxiliaries whose chains of command and responsibilities are unclear. It should strengthen professional security institutions and provide credible civilian oversight. Communities must be able to report abuses without fearing retaliation from those entrusted with protecting them. The regional dimension also demands candour. States participating in mediation should align their own military cooperation, deployments and political conduct with the peace they advocate. Mediation loses credibility when governments call for restraint while their actions sustain escalation. Every external military involvement should be assessed against civilian protection, regional security and the agreed path towards de-escalation. African ownership should strengthen cooperation with international partners. Washington, Doha and the UN can contribute diplomatic influence, expertise and resources. The AU’s responsibility is to help ensure that their contributions support a coherent settlement shaped by regional realities. African institutions should maintain continuity, preserve institutional memory and identify emerging obstacles before they become another breakdown. Implementation requires a clear allocation of responsibility. Each commitment should specify who must act, what action is required, when it must occur and how compliance will be verified. Security arrangements must follow the agreed sequencing, with sufficient safeguards to prevent one party from being left exposed by the other’s failure to perform. Verification teams need access, expertise, logistical support and the ability to report inconvenient findings. Ceasefire monitoring should distinguish allegations from established violations, identify the responsible actors and require corrective action. Humanitarian agencies need dependable access, while civilians need evidence that reported abuses will receive a response. The AU Peace and Security Council should review implementation regularly and make meaningful findings available to the public. Where confidential diplomacy is necessary, it should support timely decisions. Persistent obstruction should trigger graduated political pressure and, where justified, targeted measures grounded in verified responsibility. The standards must be applied consistently. The economic foundations of insecurity must also be addressed. Mineral production, taxation, transport routes and commercial intermediaries require transparent oversight. Peace will remain vulnerable where armed actors and their partners retain strong financial incentives to perpetuate disorder. Regional economic cooperation should create lawful livelihoods and shared benefits, supported by institutions that communities can trust. Women, young people, survivors, displaced populations and local civil society must participate meaningfully in shaping the settlement. Their involvement can reveal practical failures that elite negotiations overlook. It can also help sustain agreements after mediators depart, provided participants receive protection and their contributions influence decisions. The former heads of state who travelled to Goma have created an opening for more serious engagement. Their visit should now be followed by a consolidated implementation programme, sustained dialogue and clear demands on every responsible actor. African leaders have the responsibility to make sovereignty effective for all, security reciprocal and civilian protection enforceable. The measure of their leadership will be whether families can return safely, communities can live without ethnic persecution, armed threats are dismantled and public institutions earn the confidence of those they serve. After Goma, the AU and regional leaders must carry the work through. The people of the Great Lakes region deserve a peace whose commitments survive beyond the meeting room.
