By 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) emerged as the only political and military organisation structurally intact and capable of governing Rwanda. The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, which lasted for 100 days, had entirely decimated the institutional fabric of the country, leaving a vacuum that the RPF was uniquely positioned to fill.

During the establishment of the transitional institutions in July 1994, only the RPF, MDR, PSD, PL, PDC, PSR, UDPR and PDI were officially recognised. By their weight, a number of peripheral political parties were weakened by the fact that many of their senior members had joined Hutu Power. A number of them lacked leadership since several of their senior cadres had been killed by genocide perpetrators. This is what is stated in the RPF declaration of July 17, 1994.

Given that some political parties lacked leadership and the reason for their existence had been undermined as a result of a systematic liquidation of their members by genocide perpetrators, the political climate at that time was different from what was obtaining at the time of signing the Arusha peace accord regarding the power-sharing arrangement. The educational level or political experience of political cadres of these peripheral political parties was also questionable.

The political organisation of the RPF and its military wing was intact. Its members, spread worldwide, provided an endless reservoir of leadership, ready to bring their contribution to those who were present on the ground. The RPF had ousted the regime that was responsible for the genocide and had embarked on restoring peace and security both within the country and along its borders, particularly the borders with the then Zaire (DR Congo now).

The RPF provided political education for its cadres. Throughout the civil war, its political and military cadres constantly made a political reading of events by seeking to provide solutions to the political challenges of all sorts that came about in the process of the civil war. Many witnesses who attended the Arusha peace negotiations unanimously agreed that the RPF delegation played a key role in this process, to the extent that the Arusha peace accord and all its protocols perfectly reflected RPF ideas.

For these reasons, by subscribing to the principle of power-sharing, the RPF imposed itself as a dominant political party. This position was clearly expressed in its declaration of July 17, 1994, which provoked heated debate among its political partners. They thought on one hand that the RPF declaration did not bring them on board while on the other hand criticized the modifications proposed by the RPF in the Arusha peace accord.

Some sources even talked of a coup d’état and of hijacking the democratic process, because none of their ideas were retained in the protocol. It was only when the RPF threatened to manage the transitional government alone that a number of these political parties lowered their tone or abandoned their demands, either out of conviction or out of tactical withdrawal.

The RPF had three options: governing the country alone and applying its political programme; bringing on board some politicians who were not RPF members, but who were chosen for their merit and for their spirit of nationalism and conviction regarding the RPF’s major guidelines and political orientation.

The last option was to form a broad-based government that brought together political figures identified during the Arusha peace accord on the condition that they did not get involved in crimes of the deposed regime or did not subscribe to the ideology that led the country to chaos or disaster.

This latter option was eventually adopted. It was therefore not a question of automatic inclusion in government and the transitional national assembly as provided by the Arusha Protocol on the power-sharing deal.

The writer is a historian.