While the root cause of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)'s instability dates back 141 years to King Leopold II's colonial rule in 1885, this analysis centers on the key actors and events responsible for the ongoing crisis since 1994. Ask anyone about the root cause of the thirty-year conflict in eastern DR Congo, and they will point to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Over one million Rwandans fled into eastern Zaire, including thousands of civilians, 75,000 militiamen, and 35,000 former soldiers of the Habyarimana regime. This mass migration destabilized the region, sparking ethnic tensions, proxy wars, and a fight for mineral wealth. Anthony J. D'Angelo once said: When solving problems, dig at the roots instead of just hacking at the leaves. Steve Jobs made a similar point: If you define the problem correctly, you almost have the solution. Together, these ideas point to a simple truth for resolving conflict: define the problem precisely, then focus on its root causes rather than its surface symptoms. Knowing that the root cause of the thirty-year conflict in eastern DR Congo is the presence of Rwandan refugees, interahamwe militiamen, and former soldiers of the Habyarimana regime, the core solution to the conflict is simple: repatriate them back to their home country. Had this action been taken in 1995, as leaders like Mwalimu Julius Nyerere requested, the conflict would not have spanned thirty years. Because this step was neglected then and remains undone today, the crisis persists. Instead of sending them back to Rwanda, Mobutu Sese Seko helped them create the Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR) in 1995. That same year, he helped them establish the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR). This armed group combined former Rwandan soldiers and the Interahamwe militia. Their goal was to attack and retake Kigali from the Rwandan Patriotic Army. ALiR later merged with other militia groups to form the FDLR in September 2000. This raises a core question: why support their military buildup instead of facilitating their return to Rwanda? According to Mobutu Sese Seko, who confided in Prime Minister Kengo wa Ndondo, external powers preferred keeping these forces in eastern DR Congo. The dynamics of this conflict today center on four actors: the FDLR, the core issue; the host government of the DR Congo; Rwanda, the FDLR's homeland; and external powers seeking to maintain their presence in eastern DR Congo. Today's conflict dynamic differs greatly from 1995. Back then, Zaire, now the DR Congo, initially wanted to send the Rwandan militia and ex-FAR home, but foreign powers forced Kinshasa to keep them. Today, by contrast, the Kinshasa government itself backs those foreign powers. Why do the Kinshasa government and these external forces want the FDLR in eastern DR Congo? The answer is clear: to help the FDLR return to Rwanda, overthrow the government in Kigali, and revive the genocide ideology of Tutsi extermination. Should I remind my reader that this genocide ideology was first shaped in Brussels, not Rwanda? This situation reveals a clear policy contradiction. Rwanda is penalised for defensive actions, while groups such as AFC/M23 and Twirwaneho are pressured to disarm rather than resist existential threats, largely because they stand in the way of the FDLR's strategic return. This is why the FDLR gets away with crimes against humanity, including torture, looting, and ethnic violence against Congolese civilians. Failing to disarm and repatriate the FDLR will let the crisis persist, since this essential solution continues to be neglected. A final question: who will help disarm and repatriate the FDLR? As foreign powers and Kinshasa decline to act, and Rwanda cannot step in, the task falls to local Congolese communities and patriots like the AFC/M23, Twirwaneho, and others, who have endured thirty years of FDLR terror. The writer is a media specialist, historian, and playwright.
