When sanctions become strategy: The limits of economic pressure in eastern DR Congo

The decision by the United States to sanction Kigali-based Gasabo Gold Refinery Ltd has once again brought economic coercion to the forefront of international policy toward the Great Lakes region. ALSO READ: Who sanctions the sanctioners? The missing accountability in international affairs Washington presents the measure as part of a broader effort to disrupt financial networks believed to sustain the conflict in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Like similar measures adopted earlier by the European Union, the sanctions are intended to reinforce accountability by restricting access to the international financial system. ALSO READ: Nduhungirehe: Rwanda ‘disappointed by biased US mediation’ in DR Congo crisis The objective is understandable. Armed conflicts require resources, and disrupting the economic channels that sustain them is often presented as an indispensable component of modern conflict management. Yet the effectiveness of such measures ultimately depends on a more fundamental question: do they address the forces that drive the conflict, or merely the mechanisms through which it is financed? ALSO READ: Selective accountability will not bring peace to eastern DR Congo After nearly three decades of recurring violence, eastern DR Congo has become one of the world's most complex security crises. It is sustained not by a single armed movement or commercial network, but by the convergence of several structural realities: the chronic weakness of the Congolese state, the persistence of more than 200 armed groups operating across the country’s eastern provinces, unresolved regional security concerns, and decades of failed political settlements. These realities interact to produce cycles of violence that repeatedly outlive military offensives, peace agreements, and international initiatives alike. ALSO READ: We are misreading the FDLR threat: It is dangerous incubator of genocide ideology, not just an armed group Against this backdrop, sanctions directed at individual companies or economic actors inevitably raise questions about proportionality and strategic purpose. They may increase the financial cost for specific entities, but they do little to alter the political calculations that perpetuate the conflict itself. The European Union's decision to sanction the same refinery earlier in 2025 illustrates this dilemma. The expectation was that increased economic pressure would contribute to de-escalation. Instead, the conflict persisted, diplomatic efforts stalled, and military confrontation continued. If the objective was to create incentives for peace, the evidence so far remains inconclusive. ALSO READ: Following the money: Inside FDLR's war economy and the networks that sustained it This is not to suggest that sanctions are inherently illegitimate. They have long occupied an important place within the international diplomatic toolkit. Properly designed, they can constrain illicit financial activity, signal international resolve, and impose costs on actors who violate established norms. Their utility, however, depends on being integrated into a broader political strategy. Economic pressure alone cannot substitute for diplomacy. ALSO READ: Global double standards are existential threats to Tutsi in Great lakes region The danger arises when sanctions evolve from being one instrument among many into the defining feature of policy itself. Eastern DR Congo has repeatedly demonstrated that violence is fundamentally political before it is economic. Armed movements emerge within environments characterized by governance failures, contested citizenship, unresolved questions of state authority, regional security anxieties, and competition over political power. Mineral wealth undoubtedly finances parts of the conflict, but it did not create the conflict. Nor will restricting mineral commerce, by itself, resolve it. ALSO READ: When the teachers fail the test: The crisis of Western human rights credibility There is another consequence that deserves greater attention. Sanctions inevitably alter incentives among the parties to a conflict. When international actors are perceived as increasing pressure on one side while reducing the urgency for comprehensive political negotiations, they risk unintentionally reinforcing the belief that military or diplomatic compromise is unnecessary. Peace processes succeed when all parties conclude that negotiation offers greater benefits than continued confrontation. Policies that reduce those incentives may prolong rather than shorten conflict. ALSO READ: The Great Lakes challenge: A genocide ideology and complicity This question becomes particularly relevant at a moment when renewed diplomatic efforts have sought to establish a framework for lasting regional stability. Any peace initiative ultimately depends upon maintaining confidence that negotiations, not external pressure alone, remain the principal avenue through which disputes will be resolved. ALSO READ: Why genocide ideology doesn’t dissolve three decades after dispersion of genocidaires The Great Lakes region does not suffer from a shortage of sanctions. It suffers from a shortage of sustainable political settlements. This distinction matters. Sanctions can interrupt transactions. They cannot rebuild institutions. They can complicate financial flows. They cannot restore trust between governments that view one another through decades of accumulated insecurity. Nor can they compensate for the absence of effective state authority across vast territories where armed groups continue to proliferate. If the international community seeks lasting peace in eastern DR Congo, it must resist the temptation to mistake economic measures for comprehensive strategy. Sanctions may serve as useful supporting instruments, but they cannot become policy's center of gravity. The question, therefore, is not whether sanctions should exist. It is whether they are advancing a coherent political strategy capable of addressing the conflict's underlying causes, or whether they have gradually become a substitute for one. The writer is a political analyst.

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When sanctions become strategy: The limits of economic pressure in eastern DR Congo