The latest sanctions imposed by the United States against commanders of the Kinshasa-backed genocidal FDLR militia and AFC/M23 rebels have been presented as an effort to promote peace and accountability in eastern DR Congo. The decision targets leaders of two armed groups that have contributed to decades of insecurity and human suffering. ALSO READ: Sanctions, sovereignty, and Rwanda: A small nation in the crosscurrents of global power Few would dispute that both organisations deserve scrutiny and accountability for their actions. Yet the sanctions expose a deeper problem that has long undermined international efforts in the Great Lakes region: selective accountability. ALSO READ: When the teachers fail the test: The crisis of Western human rights credibility Selective accountability is not a path to peace. When international actors punish armed groups while overlooking state actors accused of enabling, arming, coordinating with, or protecting those same groups, they weaken the credibility of accountability itself and leave the structures that sustain conflict intact. If the objective is genuine peace, then accountability cannot stop at armed groups while ignoring those who sustain them. ALSO READ: Global double standards are existential threats to Tutsi in Great lakes region The United States announced sanctions against M23 intelligence chief John Imani Nzenze and FDLR commander Gustave Kubwayo, arguing that both groups continue to fuel violence in eastern DR Congo. The message appears balanced on the surface because it recognises that M23 and FDLR remain major actors in the conflict. Yet the decision raises an obvious question: what about those within state institutions in DR Congo, Burundi and elsewhere in the West who enable, arm, coordinate with, or politically protect FDLR, CODECO, Nyatura, and other militias? ALSO READ: Selective outrage and transactional diplomacy in eastern DR Congo For years, international reports have documented the cooperation between elements of the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) and FDLR, for example. The issue is not whether every FARDC unit collaborates with FDLR. Clearly, they do not. The issue is whether documented collaboration by some elements of the state apparatus should trigger the same standard of accountability applied elsewhere. The answer should be yes. ALSO READ: Ex-FDLR leader: DR Congo's support for Genocidal militia still the biggest threat to peace Interestingly, the United States itself demonstrated this principle only months ago. In March 2026, Washington imposed sanctions not only on M23 but also on Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and several senior Rwandan military officers, arguing that M23’s military successes would not have been possible without external support. The logic was straightforward: if a state actor materially supports an armed group, that state actor can be held accountable alongside the armed group itself, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury. ALSO READ: The Great Lakes challenge: A genocide ideology and complicity Whether one agrees or disagrees with those sanctions is beside the point. What matters is the principle they established. If support to M23 justified sanctions against RDF commanders, why should support to FDLR not justify scrutiny of those within the Congolese security establishment and their Burundi collaborators who, it is reported, facilitate the terror group’s operations? ALSO READ: Why blaming Rwanda won't solve DR Congo's crisis This is not merely a legal question. It is a strategic one. The FDLR is not an ordinary militia. The USA and the world know about that. It traces its origins to forces responsible for the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. For more than three decades, the genocidal militia has survived despite repeated military campaigns, peace initiatives, UN operations, and sanctions. One reason for that resilience is that the group has often benefited from political and military relationships that have allowed it to evade complete dismantling. ALSO READ: Why genocide ideology doesn’t dissolve three decades after dispersion of genocidaires Ignoring these realities risks treating symptoms rather than causes. A sanctions regime that punishes the gunman while ignoring those who provide the ammunition sends a contradictory message. It may satisfy a demand for visible action, but it does little to alter the strategic environment that allows armed groups to survive. ALSO READ: The Responsibility to Protect was born in Rwanda. It is dying in DR Congo The broader consequence is a growing perception of double standards. Across Africa, many observers increasingly question whether international accountability mechanisms are applied consistently. When state actors linked to one armed group are sanctioned, while state actors linked to another are not, questions inevitably arise about impartiality. Perceptions matter in diplomacy. I am an experienced mediator and negotiator. Peace processes depend on trust. When parties believe that international actors apply different standards to different participants, confidence in mediation efforts erodes. Sanctions cease to be viewed as instruments of justice and become perceived as instruments of political convenience. ALSO READ: The systematic blinders of western media in the DR Congo-Rwanda narrative This perception is especially dangerous in the Great Lakes region, where mutual suspicion already runs deep. Rwanda accuses the Congolese government of tolerating or supporting FDLR. The Congolese government accuses Kigali of supporting M23. International actors often focus on one accusation while minimising the other. The result is a diplomatic environment in which every party feels unfairly targeted and every party believes its own security concerns are being ignored. Such an approach cannot produce lasting peace. A durable solution requires intellectual honesty. The international community must be willing to acknowledge uncomfortable facts wherever they lead. If evidence exists that state actors support armed groups, those actors should face scrutiny regardless of nationality, political alignment, or diplomatic considerations. The principle is simple: accountability should follow conduct, not political convenience. This does not mean that sanctions are always the answer. In some cases, diplomacy, security sector reform, judicial processes, or regional agreements may be more effective. But whatever mechanism is chosen, it must be applied consistently. The tragedy of eastern DR Congo has endured for far too long because the international response has often focused on immediate crises rather than underlying structures. Armed groups emerge, are sanctioned, weaken, reappear under new names, and continue the cycle. Meanwhile, the networks that sustain conflict frequently escape meaningful examination. Root causes of the conflict totally ignored by those who pretend to find solutions. Breaking that cycle requires courage from policymakers and honesty from diplomats. Maybe I am too honest about it. The sanctions announced this week may represent a step toward accountability. But they will remain an incomplete step if accountability is reserved only for non-state actors while allegations involving state actors are treated as politically inconvenient. Peace in eastern DR Congo will not be achieved through selective justice. It will be achieved only when the same standards are applied to all those who contribute to violence, whether they wear the uniform of a militia or the uniform of a state. Until then, sanctions risk becoming a substitute for strategy rather than a tool in service of peace. More fundamentally, selective accountability will continue to shield the networks that perpetuate conflict, deepen perceptions of bias, and undermine confidence in peace efforts. Lasting stability in eastern DR Congo requires a single, consistent standard: anyone who enables violence; whether a rebel commander, a military officer, or a political patron, must face equal scrutiny. Without that principle, accountability becomes political theater, and peace remains out of reach. The writer is a political and diplomatic analyst specialising on Africa and countries of the Great Lakes Region.
