Let’s first consider the expulsion of the Baluba from Katanga region. In the 1990s, Katanga witnessed the expulsion of thousands of Baluba from Kasai who were labelled non-natives by local political leaders. ALSO READ: DR Congo Tutsi labelled as ‘naturally evil’ Rather than preventing the violence, President Mobutu Sese Seko allowed the crisis to unfold while manipulating divisions among Kasai elites in Kinshasa to deflect attention from his government's role. Violence targeted Baluba communities settled in Katanga, forcing many to flee to Kasai. ALSO READ: Selective outrage and transactional diplomacy in eastern DR Congo In 1991, two prominent opposition politicians from Katanga, Jean Nguza Karl-i-Bond and Gabriel Kyungu wa Kumwanza, left the opposition coalition known as the Sacred Union, led by Étienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, and joined the Union of Federalist and Republican Forces (UFERI). Nguza became Prime Minister and Kyungu governor of Katanga. Both became associated with rhetoric and policies that fuelled hostility toward the Baluba. ALSO READ: Why EAC must counter the Tutsi-as-invader narrative Tensions intensified in 1992 when Mobutu appointed Étienne Tshisekedi, a Muluba from Kasai, as Prime Minister. Hate speech proliferated, with derogatory terms such as bilulu (insects) and bifwakiyo (sweepers) used to dehumanise Kasaians. The resulting violence displaced thousands of people. The Yaka people and the politics of indigeneity A similar dynamic emerged in 2022 in Kwamouth territory, Maï-Ndombe Province, where violent clashes erupted between Teke and Yaka communities before spreading to neighbouring provinces, including Kwilu, Kwango, and areas surrounding Kinshasa. ALSO READ: Who really benefits from the war in eastern DR Congo? Some Teke leaders claimed to be the original inhabitants of the territory and sought to impose taxes on Yaka communities they regarded as non-native residents. The Yaka rejected these demands, and tensions escalated into widespread violence, destruction of property, and loss of life. Local grievances were compounded by broader political dynamics and the involvement of actors linked to national politics. The Banyamulenge and questions of native rights Since 2017, the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu Province has faced repeated attacks, large-scale displacement, destruction of property and livelihoods, and severe humanitarian hardship. ALSO READ: Why genocide ideology doesn’t dissolve three decades after dispersion of genocidaires These attacks have been accompanied by narratives portraying the Banyamulenge and other Congolese Tutsi communities as foreigners rather than legitimate citizens of DR Congo. ALSO READ: How Burundian troops in South Kivu sparked a distinct humanitarian crisis amid DR Congo’s wider war Violence has also been accompanied by hate speech and incitement, deepening insecurity, undermining social cohesion, and contributing to a prolonged humanitarian crisis. The pattern recalls earlier episodes in Congolese history in which political elites relied on individual representatives from marginalised communities to counter accusations of discrimination while underlying tensions persisted. The “non-native” phenomenon and state failure A notable historical irony is that President Félix Tshisekedi belongs to a community that experienced exclusion and persecution under the rhetoric of non-native status during the Katanga–Kasai conflicts of the 1990s. Today, however, similar narratives of belonging and indigeneity are directed at the Banyamulenge. ALSO READ: Why blaming Rwanda won't solve DR Congo's crisis Whether or not the comparison is fully analogous, it illustrates how identity-based politics, often shaped and manipulated by actors at the central level, remains a significant driver of conflict in DR Congo. The persistence of these narratives reflects deeper governance challenges. It points not only to weak state institutions but also to the state's limited capacity to regulate social relations, resolve disputes, and provide equal protection under the law. In some regions, competing centres of authority have emerged, creating the impression of parallel systems of governance operating alongside formal state institutions. These governance failures have important implications for national and regional security. Identity-based mobilisation, exclusionary politics, and local conflicts frequently transcend provincial boundaries and affect neighbouring countries across the Great Lakes region. Addressing the root causes of conflict in DR Congo therefore requires not only security interventions but also reforms that strengthen state institutions, promote equal citizenship, and reduce the political instrumentalisation of ethnic and regional identities. The writer is a researcher and analyst on the Great Lakes Region.
