Mobilisation against the Arusha Peace Accord, signed on August 4, 1993, was driven primarily by Hutu extremists in Rwanda who viewed the power-sharing agreement with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) as a surrender to what they considered a Tutsi-led movement. ALSO READ: Habyarimana's role in planning, implementing 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi This opposition took the form of political manoeuvring, media propaganda, and violent intimidation, ultimately contributing to the conditions that led to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. ALSO READ: Kayibanda, Mugesera and Bagosora: The Tropical Nazis It would be unfair to assume that the majority of Rwandans expected a discourse of hatred or tense identity politics. The hope that accompanied the Arusha negotiations, and the joy expressed when the final peace agreement was signed reflected a general desire for a negotiated settlement. However, some Rwandans held a different view. ALSO READ: A form of genocide denial that is an insult to Hutu These actors were tempted to exacerbate conflicts and inflame passions in ways that distorted political debate. A significant part of the press devoted considerable effort to promoting this perspective. In practice, sections of the press worked to emphasise perceived threats to the gains of the 1959 and 1973 revolutions. These threats were not seen as affecting only the ruling elite, but also the broader Hutu population, who were portrayed as the principal beneficiaries and defenders of those historical changes. From around 1991 onwards, a clear shift in orientation became visible. The press moved beyond its traditional role of merely transmitting information and increasingly assumed the function of defending the interests of a specific political and social group within Rwandan society. In order to marginalise opposing viewpoints, it highlighted antagonisms between Hutu and Tutsi and amplified perceived threats facing the population. At the centre of this dynamic, two main strategies were employed. The first involved the use of labels that elevated the Hutu while devaluing the Tutsi. These designations were intended to evoke emotional identification with opposing groups. The Hutu were described as the “majority,” “children of Sebahinzi (land clearers),” fearless and strong. The Tutsi, on the other hand, were frequently labelled as a minority, enemies of the people, intruders, snakes, or double dealers, among other derogatory terms. The second strategy involved constructing a rigid ideological identity framework. The press, acting as a tool of those opposed to the Arusha Peace Accord, also attributed to moderate Hutu opposition figures labels that associated them with the Tutsi and with RPF. In this framework, “suspects” and “accomplices” were defined according to political criteria shaped by the prevailing regime. As a result, both the emergence of multiparty politics during the liberation war and the Arusha peace process itself were portrayed as steps towards the breakdown of the foundational political order in Rwanda. The so-called “Hutu Power” movement, composed of extremists within the extremist MRND and CDR parties, led the opposition. They dismissed the Accord as a “scrap of paper” and rejected the idea of integrating RPF into the national army and government. ALSO READ: Bagosora was central to Habyarimana’s demise Military hardliners also acted as spoilers. Elements within the Rwandan Armed Forces, particularly around Col Théoneste Bagosora, one of the masterminds of the 1994 Genocide, resisted the integration of RPF forces and opposed the broader demobilisation process. Media propaganda further reinforced this resistance. The hate radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines and extremist newspapers such as Kangura promoted anti-Tutsi sentiment, opposed the Arusha Accord, and labelled supporters of the peace process as traitors. Ultimately, the Accord collapsed. The writer is a historian based in Kigali.
