Genocide ideology in eastern DR Congo did not begin with the arrival of the FDLR after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda but can be traced back to colonial rule, according to Congolese researcher Alex Mvuka. ALSO READ: The unfinished colonial agenda: Rwandan researcher on Belgium’s influence in Rwanda and DR Congo Speaking in a detailed discussion on The New Times’ The Context podcast, Mvuka outlined a historical and political trajectory of the ideology, linking its evolution to colonial administration, post-independence politics, and the entrenchment of armed groups in eastern Congo. He warns that the situation today is not only severe but has reached dangerous levels, describing it as “a time bomb” that continues to shape insecurity in the region. ALSO READ: How the West frustrated DR Congo peace talks Mvuka points to a critical historical foundation often overlooked: Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo were once administered as a single colonial entity under Belgian rule. From 1916 to 1962, following Germany’s defeat in World War I, Belgium took control of Ruanda-Urundi (modern-day Rwanda and Burundi) under a League of Nations mandate, while also governing the Belgian Congo (now DR Congo). Although administratively distinct, the three territories were closely linked under Belgian colonial policy, with shared governance structures, identity classification systems, and racial theories that would later fuel ethnic divisions. ALSO READ: A historical timeline of Belgium's divisive politics in Rwanda “In 1959, this is not a long time ago, Kigali had Congolese police,” Mvuka noted. “These were not separate realities. The three countries were under one authority. That historical context answers many of the questions we see today.” According to Mvuka, the colonial administration institutionalised identity-based divisions across the region, embedding narratives that later evolved into genocide ideology. He cites the use of racial classifications and theories such as the Hamitic hypothesis, which framed Tutsis as outsiders, as part of the ideological groundwork. ALSO READ: How genocide ideology was built, spread and executed Ideology driving conflict in eastern Congo Mvuka argues that genocide ideology is not just a background factor but the central driver of ongoing violence in eastern DR Congo. “I would say it is at its peak time, it is a time bomb,” he said. “If you remove all other conflict dynamics that have evolved over the last 30 years, you find this huge virus that has not been treated but instead has been given the right conditions to grow.” ALSO READ: Former preacher lifts lid on FDLR’s use of religion to spread hate He draws parallels with the period leading up to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, highlighting patterns such as arbitrary detention based on identity and the integration of non-state armed groups into state structures. “There are today thousands of people imprisoned simply because of who they are. People are born a crime,” he said. ALSO READ: The devil you feed: How the West fuels genocide ideology in DR Congo He added that “We are seeing the same phenomenon, but at a much greater intensity. Non-state actors have been normalised, integrated, and even outnumber the national army.” According to Mvuka, more than 200 armed groups operate in eastern DR Congo today, many of which have been brought together under the Wazalendo umbrella and supported by the state. “Official reports suggest over 200 armed groups,” he said. “You could be talking about numbers exceeding the national army, together, around half a million armed men and women.” A United Nations assessment, he noted, indicated that 85 per cent of munitions used by these groups are supplied by the national army, further blurring the line between state and non-state actors. ALSO READ: Outcry as DR Congo army spokesman spreads anti-Tutsi tropes Shared ideology among armed groups Mvuka stresses that the defining feature of these groups is not merely their military activity, but a shared ideological objective. “They may change alliances, recruit independently, but they share one thing: They do not have political grievances, except the genocide view. The idea is to exterminate Tutsis, exactly as was done in 1994.” He argues that this shared ideology extends beyond groups traditionally associated with the FDLR. “When we talk about FDLR, we must expand the definition,” he explained. “It is about who shares the same vision, a vision of Hutu supremacy and the extermination of the Tutsi.” ALSO READ: Veteran US diplomat urges action on Tutsi persecution in DR Congo Dehumanisation and mobilisation Mvuka highlights the continued use of dehumanising language as a key indicator of genocide ideology. “We are seeing the same narratives, calling people ‘snakes’, ‘vermin’, ‘poison’. The moment you animalise your victims, it becomes a green light,” he noted. He pointed to statements by political leaders and historical speeches that have reinforced such narratives, noting their consistency over time. “It becomes a culture, an attitude, embedded within the mindset of people,” he said. He also described how victims are systematically portrayed as threats. “There is a process of accusing the victim to the point where victims themselves begin to feel like criminals,” he said. “You create fear and justify violence as self-defence.” ALSO READ: Rising genocide ideology in Great Lakes demands urgent action – experts From ideology to violence According to Mvuka, the consequences of this ideology are visible in patterns of violence across eastern DR Congo. “These groups are not at the borders as they claim,” he said. “They are inside the country, following communities, burning people alive, lynching them.” “We have even seen acts of cannibalism, not as something cultural, but as an expression of extreme hatred. Even a body without life can be targeted. That is the language of genocide.” He emphasised that genocide is not spontaneous, but a process supported by systems and institutions. “Genocide is a crime of the state,” he said. “It requires narratives, justification, planning, and a system to sustain it.” ALSO READ: Genocide ideology trends linked to DR Congo-based FDLR Origins before the FDLR Mvuka challenges the widely held assumption that genocide ideology in Congo began with the influx of perpetrators after 1994, arguing instead that its foundations were laid much earlier. “I often say the ideology of the FDLR arrived in DR Congo before the FDLR itself,” he said. “Genocide ideology knows no borders.” He links its spread to decades of cross-border political and social integration shaped during colonial rule, when Rwanda, Burundi and Congo were administered under a shared Belgian system. ALSO READ: Banyamulenge protest in US, Kenya amid rising calls for action on Minembwe crisis He notes that questions about why Tutsi are specifically targeted in eastern Congo cannot be separated from this historical context, where the three territories were governed as a single colonial space. “These three countries Rwanda, Burundi and Congo were managed as one under colonial administration,” he said, adding that identity policies applied across them laid the groundwork for later divisions. “I think identity policies were exactly used across these three countries,” he said. “The identity card system and racial classification all came from Belgian colonial narratives.” ALSO READ: Politics of identity, genocide ideology in eastern DR Congo hinder regional peace He added that similar practices extended into eastern Congo through the restructuring of traditional leadership. “They removed Tutsi chiefs and kings, just as they did in Rwanda,” he said. Citing the example of Rwanda’s King Yuhi V Musinga, Mvuka noted that his exile to Congo reflected the fluidity of colonial boundaries. “Exiling him to Congo was like moving him from one room to another, it was the same colonial space,” he said. Similar patterns were observed in South Kivu, where local leaders were removed and communities reorganised along imposed ethnic lines. ALSO READ: 80-year-old Congolese reflects on lifetime of injustice, attacks in DR Congo Mvuka argues that these early interventions entrenched divisions that later evolved into genocide ideology, long before the arrival of the FDLR. Following the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, an estimated 1.5 million Rwandan refugees fled into eastern Congo, compared to 400,000-500,000 to Tanzania, reinforcing networks that allowed the ideology to persist. “This was not random,” he argued. “Congo offered a welcoming environment politically, militarily, and socially.” He added that over 40 refugee camps were established in eastern Congo at the time, creating a base from which armed groups could reorganise. Today, he estimates that around 500,000 Rwandans remained in eastern Congo, forming a potential recruitment base. “But even that number is simplistic,” he said. “Because the ideology has transformed the society. You can multiply that influence across the population.” Mvuka suggests that addressing insecurity in eastern DR Congo requires confronting the ideological roots of the conflict. “If you do not dismantle the political thought, the genocide ideology, then you cannot resolve the instability,” he said. “What we see is not just a security crisis. It is a much deeper, more complex problem, a virus of genocide ideology that has evolved over decades.”
