On 15 April 2023, tensions between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), centred on the integration of the RSF into the national military, escalated into a full-scale armed conflict that continues with no clear resolution. This date has marked the beginning of a country’s civil war, the worst displacement crisis, the largest humanitarian crisis and soon threatens to become the largest hunger crisis in recent history. A humanitarian crisis at unprecedented scale The war has displaced approximately 14 million people, majority of whom women and children. Nearly two-thirds of the population, around 33.7 million people, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, accounting for 10% of global humanitarian needs. Civilians continue to bear the brunt of the conflict, with indiscriminate attacks on civilians contributing to an estimated 400,000 death. Ongoing military confrontations and deliberate strikes on civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, have decimated the country’s health system. An estimated 70% of the health facilities have been destroyed, significantly increasing the risk of disease outbreaks such as cholera, dengue fever and malaria. The country’s food production capacity has been destroyed. Agriculture, once the mainstay of the economy dismantled. The scale of famine in Sudan alone exceeds that of the rest of the world combined. More than 19 million people face acute hunger, with famine conditions already confirmed in some regions on the country and several other on the brink. A humanitarian situation that has been8 further exacerbated by deliberate obstruction delivery of humanitarian aid and siege-like tactics by warring factions, deepening the suffering of millions. A war marked by systematic human rights violations “Our findings leave no room for doubt: civilians are paying the highest price in this war,” Mohamed Chande Othman, chair of the Fact-Finding Mission. Both warring parties have been accused of war crimes, in a conflict that has been characterized by heavy use of drones. The UN Human Rights Council-established Fact Finding Mission found that both SAF and RSF are responsible for targeted civilians through attacks, summary executions, arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman treatment in detention facilities. These abuses include denial of food, sanitation, and medical care. The warring parties have also deliberately carried out the extensive destruction of infrastructure essential for civilian survival, including medical centres, markets, schools, places of worship food and water systems, and displacement camps. The RSF have also been accused of crimes against humanity and genocide, including large-scale killings and widespread sexual and gender-based violence. The paramilitary group and its allied militias have reportedly carried out targeted attacks against non-Arab communities in Darfur, including the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, and Tunjur, with women and children among the primary victims. Sexual and gender-based violence, including rape, gang rape, forced marriage, sexual slavery and other forms of brutal sexual violence has been widely documented, with women and girls from these communities, some as young as 12-year-old, disproportionately targeted. The RSF and allied militias have reported carried out systematically killings of men and boys, even infants, on an ethnic basis. Similarly, they have targeted fleeing civilians, killing those attempting to escape the conflict, and have obstructed access to lifesaving humanitarian assistance for those who remain. As the direct successor to the Janjaweed militia responsible for atrocities in Darfur in the early 2000s, the group operates within a deeply entrenched, decades-long cycle of impunity that has emboldened perpetrators and enabled repeated violations across the country. While neighboring countries such as Chad, Ethiopia, Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan have received Sudanese refugees fleeing the conflict, their limited resources constrain their ability to adequately respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of new arrivals without sustained international support. Across the region, needs continue to outstrip available assistance, and host communities that have demonstrated significant solidarity are increasingly under strain, heightening the risk of further instability. Sudan’s fragmentation into parallel authorities Port Sudan serves as the seat of the SAF-controlled de facto authorities under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. In May 2025, the SAF established its own civilian-led administration in the city and appointed former United Nations official Kamal Idris as prime minister. Seeking to bolster international legitimacy, Idris subsequently announced the formation of a new technocratic administration known as the “Hope Government.” In its fight against the RSF, the SAF has mobilised and armed a range of allied militias, including former Darfuri rebel groups, Islamist factions some linked to the Bashir-era establishment, and various tribal forces. Its alignment with Islamist actors raises serious questions about its role as a potential partner in democratic transition, particularly given these groups’ efforts to suppress civil activism, reassert military-Islamist rule, and undermine grassroots revolutionary movements. SAF’s recapture of Khartoum in 2025 marked a major turning point in the war, carrying both symbolic and strategic significance. Regaining control of key institutions, including the presidential palace, the airport, and army headquarters, bolstered the SAF’s claim to state sovereignty. SAF has since been keen to project an image of normalcy in Khartoum, positioning itself as the force responsible for protecting and rebuilding the country as reflected in the resumption of the capital’s first internal flight in 2 years. This is reflected in efforts to pressure humanitarian agencies to relocate to the capital and to move government ministries back to the city. However, a continued threat of violence from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) looms, further amplified by the risk of drone attacks. The RSF under Mohamed Dagallo “Hemedti” is reported to control approximately 40% of Sudan’s territory. In 2025, an alliance of armed and political groups backed by the RSF announced the creation of a parallel “government of peace and unity” under the Tasis alliance, outlining key elements of a post-war government, including secularism, democracy, a decentralized structure, and a unified national army. The coalition’s promise of a decentralised political system granting Sudan’s regions significant autonomy over local governance and resources has gained traction among communities such as the Fur, who have endured decades of exclusion by Sudan’s political elite. According to its leaders, the Tasis administration intends to establish an independent civil registry, print its own currency, and pursue economic stability in areas under its control. The coalition has made Nyala, Central Darfur its base. The city serves as a key transit hub with an airport and railway terminus, and is also a major trading centre for gum Arabic, one of Sudan’s principal exports and a key ingredient in food, beverages, and pharmaceuticals. The alliance has reportedly completed the third stage and has effectively begun implementing the fourth, which involves the appointment of an executive government. This is part of a broader five-phase plan to establish a governance structure, starting with the formation of the coalition, followed by the signing of a political declaration and transitional constitution, the creation of a presidential council, the appointment of an executive government, and finally the establishment of a legislative council. This move further entrenches the group’s control over its western strongholds as the conflict continues and risks cementing a de facto division of the country. In the wake of accusations that its affiliated forces have committed ethnically targeted killings, atrocities, and acts amounting to genocide in Darfur, the alliance faces significant challenges in gaining recognition and legitimacy. Its ambition collides with a highly complex reality. Darfur and Kordofan, its main base, lack the financial infrastructure required to support state-like governance. Establishing a functioning banking system would require integration into a domestic or international monetary system, an outcome that remains highly unlikely in the absence of international recognition of any parallel government. This situation raises critical questions about the capacity of the parallel administration to exercise centralized command and control, particularly in regulating financial flows and unifying tax collection. These challenges are compounded by fragmented loyalties and the multiplicity of armed actors operating in territories under its control, as well as the absence of even minimal regional recognition. Together, these constraints further undermine prospects for broader legitimacy and the development of effective economic institutions. Sudan’s multi-billion-dollar gold trade both sustains and shapes the conflict. As the most significant source of revenue for the warring parties, SAF and RSF. it fuels a broader cross-border network of actors, including armed groups, producers, traders, smugglers, and external governments, that facilitate movement of illicit gold, frequently sourced from artisanal and small-scale mining communities, to finance rearmament and sustain their military campaigns. Sudan’s multi-billion-dollar gold trade both sustains and shapes the conflict. As the most significant source of revenue for the warring parties, it fuels a broader cross-border network of actors, including armed groups, producers, traders, smugglers, and external governments, that facilitate movement of illicit gold, frequently sourced from artisanal and small-scale mining communities, to finance rearmament and sustain their military campaigns. A conflict without a clear path to peace As the war enters its fourth year, Sudan’s outlook remains increasingly bleak, with little indication of a near-term resolution. The war has outgrown its borders and been complicated by the myriad of external actors. Diplomacy remains largely stalled, as both SAF and RSF leadership have limited incentives to reach a settlement, given that they, and their respective regional backers continue to derive benefits from the ongoing conflict in Sudan. The Jeddah agreement in April 2023 marked an early attempt to secure a ceasefire and humanitarian access between the warring parties, but it ultimately failed to produce a sustained or enforceable settlement. Since then, there has been no comparable high-level negotiation that has brought both sides back into a structured peace process, and diplomatic efforts have largely stalled amid continued fighting and deep mistrust. The Quad, comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United States, and the UAE, remains the primary mediation initiative, but its members are often perceived as holding divergent positions and varying alignments with the warring parties. The limited inclusion of civilian actors further reflects a broader reluctance to engage meaningfully with a post-conflict political settlement, or more specifically, a transition beyond SAF- and RSF-dominated power structures. Peace initiatives advanced by the African Union and other regional blocs have repeatedly faltered, with proposed plans ultimately collapsing. Several countries in the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions including Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya, and South Sudan have engaged in mediation efforts in an attempt to address the crisis, but these have so far yielded limited results. Any future peace process must center pro-democracy civilian actors to build a durable, justice-based settlement. Inclusive peace initiatives that meaningfully engage civilian groups are essential, and any genuine move toward a post-conflict Sudan will require honesty, accountability, and reconciliation from all sides of the war. The continued exclusion of civilian actors signals not only a reluctance to engage with a post-conflict vision, but an unwillingness to imagine a future beyond SAF/RSF dominance. A military victory by either side would likely entrench autocratic rule at the cost of countless lives, reinforcing patterns in which military elites negotiate and sign agreements they repeatedly fail to implement. Only a bottom-up model of governance that dismantles entrenched systems of elite power offers a credible path toward lasting peace. The Cost of Inaction Despite being one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises, Sudan’s emergency has outpaced international response capacity. The scale of need has strained aid systems already burdened by concurrent conflicts, including those in the Gaza Strip and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Today, the United Nations-led appeal remains drastically underfunded, at only around 17%, raising the risk of prolonged conflict, deeper regional instability, and escalating displacement across fragile borders. Looking ahead, the ongoing war in Iran is likely to further exacerbate Sudan’s economic crisis. Disruptions to energy flows and shipping through key chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz have already driven up global fuel prices and constrained fertilizer supplies, both critical inputs for agricultural production. At the same time, rising transaction costs and economic strain in Gulf countries threaten to reduce remittance flows to vulnerable economies in Africa. For Sudan, these pressures could translate into higher food prices, reduced agricultural output, and a deepening “war economy” that further complicates peace efforts and accelerates long-term economic decline. Without urgent and sustained action, Sudan risks becoming an entrenched, multi-dimensional crisis with far-reaching regional consequences. To alter this trajectory, ssustained commitment, combining humanitarian relief, economic recovery, and credible diplomatic engagement, will be critical to breaking the current trajectory and laying the foundation for a just and lasting peace.
