It has long been recognised that both oral testimonies and written sources continue to implicate France in the genocide committed against the Tutsi in 1994. Between 1990 and 1994, France played a decisive role in expanding Rwanda’s army from 5,000 to 50,000 troops through extensive recruitment and support. ALSO READ: Bisesero: Stronghold of courage during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi In June 1994, it adopted yet another strategy to prolong its military backing of the Rwandan Interim Government. This article examines how France went further; facilitating the political and military reorganisation of a genocidal regime in exile, with the aim of enabling it to regain power. ALSO READ: France fabricated reasons to stage Operation Turquoise At the UN, as at the highest levels of the French government, the massacres were viewed as a consequence of renewed fighting. Yet the massacres had preceded the fighting and, in their own logic, constituted genocide. It is therefore understandable why France considered the revival of the Arusha process a priority, even though the real urgency was to preserve human lives. French officials believed that stopping the genocide was not their responsibility. They refused to recognise its existence and did not conceal their desire to confront the RPF. READ ALSO: Habyarimana's role in planning, implementing 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi During the first fortnight of July 1994, the dual ambition underpinning “Operation Turquoise”, both humanitarian and military, failed. A new strategy with two components was then adopted. Closely linked to the creation of a “security zone,” the first component consisted of organising an exodus towards the then Zaire, now DR Congo. This movement of people was structured and coordinated. On the first night, the Rwandan army calmly took refuge in Zaire. Entire columns crossed the border with arms, vehicles, tractor-drawn artillery, light armoured cars, and armoured Panhards. The following night, officials, governors, and ministers followed. They took with them the reserves of Rwanda’s Central Bank, national radio equipment—so crucial for mobilising the population—as well as administrative cadres. The process did not end there. A withdrawal was carefully planned, and a rear base was to be established from which operations to retake Rwanda would be launched. Throughout this period, France continued delivering arms and facilitating the movement of genocide perpetrators towards the town of Goma. Even before “Operation Turquoise,” Goma had been identified as a regroupment and reorganisation centre for the Rwandan Armed Forces. In this context, the second component of “Operation Turquoise” consisted of drawing international attention to Goma, a town devastated by cholera. Although short-lived, the cholera crisis received extensive media coverage and effectively overshadowed the discourse on genocide. Faced with the massive population exodus and the high number of cholera victims, humanitarian efforts were launched to assist those affected. French officials, however, minimised the atrocities committed against the Tutsi by emphasising the suffering of the Hutu majority. This strategy portrayed perpetrators and their accomplices as victims, allowing them to adopt the image most convenient to them—that of victimhood. At the same time, as populations fled and RPF troops advanced—amid allegations of excesses—it became possible to promote the idea of a “double genocide.” All this highlights the areas in which France’s responsibility was particularly significant. A considerable body of documents and evidence sheds light on the nature of this responsibility. First, there was a military dimension. Second, there was a political dimension. During the genocide, France maintained close relations with the interim government and other key actors involved in the genocide. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, a shareholder in RTLM and leader of the extremist CDR party, as well as Jérôme Bicamumpaka, then minister of foreign affairs, were received at the Élysée Palace by Prime Minister Édouard Balladur and foreign minister Alain Juppé. The passivity of the UN and the active complicity of France obscured the planning of the genocide and facilitated its implementation. Since the end of the genocide, troubling questions remain: what drove the Rwandan population to destroy part of itself? How did such a decision emerge? Why did the genocide unfold with such terrifying efficiency? What factors enabled such widespread participation in the killings? The writer is a historian based in Kigali.
