It is important to distinguish between the underlying causes of conflict and its consequences. The trilogy of ethnic identity, customary power, and land lies at the root of conflict in DR Congo. This is a legacy of colonialism. However, this issue has been exploited by the governance system since DR Congo's independence in 1960. ALSO READ: Who really benefits from the war in eastern DR Congo? The central government has failed to establish a rule of law capable of regulating social relations between ethnic groups and restoring state authority. In this vacuum of responsible institutions, political elites exploit identity politics, carried out through claims by certain groups who call themselves indigenous, rejecting other groups on the grounds that they are non-indigenous. This situation is now a common political practice in DR Congo and forms the core basis of the current crisis in eastern DR Congo. ALSO READ: Mineral rivalry, geopolitics and the imperative of peace in DR Congo Since the 1970s, the central government has been preoccupied with efforts to contest the rights to citizenship of Congolese Tutsi. Political actors argue that these Congolese communities “do not have the right to Congolese land because they lack customary power, speak a language similar to Kinyarwanda, and possess phenotypes that are not typically Congolese.” ALSO READ: ‘Blood minerals’ in DR Congo: Myth or reality? As such rhetoric has become normalised and mainstreamed in political thoughts and actions, certain ethnic groups perceive themselves as homogeneous, purely “Bantu,” and therefore should enjoy inalienable rights to indigenousness and land occupation. One of the many ways to claim an “indigenous” right to land is to oppose another ethnic group perceived, social constructively, as “non-indigenous”. Divergent interpretations of this phenomenon have been inspired or enhanced by regional dynamics with racial and genocidal ideologies involving hatred against the Tutsi. Indeed, the ideas of “othering” and ethnic hatred were the central reason that led to the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. ALSO READ: Genocide without borders: An ideology In the following section, the analysis demonstrates the creation of a parallel system used to justify this governance structural issue. Link between rights to ethnic identity and duality of legal system in land management Access to and control of land rely on a combination of traditional, informal, and formal legal systems, often based on ethnic and political identity, as well as customary rights. National legislation, based on the Bakajika Law of 1966 and the 1973 law, grants the state ownership of all land within the territory of DR Congo. It suggests “le sol et le sous sol appartienent à l’etat congolais”. ALSO READ: How colonial engineering shaped different destinies in the Great Lakes Based on this law, the state can award concessions and exploitation rights to individual entrepreneurs and authorize multinational corporations to acquire and market land. However, while such powers exist, there is contestation by customary authorities to exercise the related rights at local level in the context of ethnic identity. These customary authorities consider themselves the rightful holders of land rights. The state sees itself as having overall power over land, but the private and personal interests of political elites at both central and provincial levels support the customary authorities’ grievances and their power to contest national law. How such structural problems create a culture of armed groups This legal framework has given rise to conflicting systems, which, in turn, have generated a cycle of violence in the two Kivus. Armed groups emerge at the local level, fuelled by structural problems and the mismanagement of identity issues. They share the same sentiments as state actors. Others are initiated by political elites or manipulated by private actors in urban areas. However, all armed groups share common characteristics: ethnic exclusion and mobilization based on ethnic identity and related interests – particularly control of land and customary power. By translating these demands into action, they align themselves with the idea of defending their communities, their land, or their customary powers, and fuel their activism by targeting social groups deemed other. These armed groups are closely linked to traditional leaders (Mwamis, village chiefs, group leaders), provincial and national political elites, and economic actors. The state itself exploits this dynamic of armed group mobilization—often framed as ethnocentric politics—as a mode of governance. Armed groups have become resources for political elites seeking power, even when their origins lie in local grievances. In many cases, these groups receive substantial support from elements of the national army. In short, the crises of violence are fundamentally Congolese in origin. First, they stem from the trilogy of customary power, ethnic identity, and land. Secondly, there is a failure to reform the duality of laws on land issues. This ambiguity is not accidental but reflects a political choice by the Congolese state, enabling the instrumentalization of identity to mobilize popular support. Hence why there is an enabling environment to the emergency of armed groups. These groups mobilize in a state vacuum and structural failure: institutional fragility and an inability to secure the territory and the entire population equitably. External solutions to conflicts are based on the consequences of distant factors (regional security). For the pursuit of lasting peace, all solutions must take these factors into account and the state as the main social actor in the crisis. Dr Alex Mvuka Ntung is a researcher and analyst on the Great Lakes Region.
