The United States (U.S.) imposed sanctions against the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) and four senior army officers as punishment for actions it claimed sabotaged the peace process in the DR Congo. The announcement surprised many. Prior to the sanctions, the Wall Street Journal reported that on the request of Rwanda in late January, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham intervened at the State and Treasury (OFAC) Departments that were preparing sanctions against the RDF and senior Rwandan officials. Graham contacted the White House and Vice President James David Vance's office, cautioning that imposing sanctions would be counterproductive and undermine Kigali's participation in the peace process. Following these interventions, the U.S. administration halted the sanctions rollout, overriding objections from Treasury and State officials. The sanctions appeared shelved. However, on March 2, 2026, OFAC sanctioned the RDF and four senior commanders for allegedly training, equipping, and fighting alongside M23 rebels, violating the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity. This is not the first time the U.S. has imposed sanctions against the RDF and Rwanda's military officers. It did not work before. Understanding why requires examining the historical context. On June 26, 2006, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) was created by Laurent Nkunda in North Kivu Province, succeeding the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma). Both organisations fought against the killing of Congolese Tutsi by Interahamwe militia and former Rwandan soldiers, known today as the FDLR, who fled after committing genocide against the Tutsi. Because the CNDP fought the FDLR, a group planning to return to Rwanda and retake power, Rwanda was accused of backing them. The U.S. restricted military assistance and suspended certain aid programmes to Rwanda. In a joint Rwandan-Congolese military operation, Laurent Nkunda was arrested on January 22, 2009. On March 15, 2013, 718 rebel fighters led by Jean-Marie Runiga fled to Rwanda. On November 7, 2013, hundreds of M23 fighters led by Sultan Makenga retreated to Mgahinga National Park, Uganda. Martin Kobler, the then UN's special envoy in the DR Congo, told the Security Council that the M23 rebel movement was finished as a military threat. He declared: It is practically the military end of the M23. Kobler was wrong. The M23 could not end while the reasons for their fight remained unresolved, their right to live on their ancestral land without being rendered stateless by Kinshasa's refusal to accept them as its citizens. The group returned from Uganda, and on the night of March 27, 2022, they launched an offensive, attacking the villages of Tshanzu and Runyoni in Rutshuru. Their subsequent capture of Goma and Bukavu is now history. Systemic and historical analysis reveals why the U.S. government's decision to sanction the RDF acts as a spoiler to the peace process. These sanctions cannot guarantee lasting peace and stability. Addressing the root causes of the conflict, the refusal to grant citizenship to Congolese Tutsi and the presence of the FDLR, whose ideology demands the elimination of these Tutsi, can truly lead to lasting peace. Senator Graham was right. It would be difficult for Kigali to participate in a peace process that ignores its existential threat. When President Paul Kagame met with diplomats last Friday, he stated: Rwanda is consistently asked to ignore threats to its security and compromise its national defence. Sanctions against the RDF and its senior officers have limited effectiveness. They can be productive to a point. Once they become threats themselves, they force Rwanda into a position it seeks to avoid: fighting against that threat. To avoid the difficult choice, Rwanda is ready to lift its “defensive measures” related to the conflict in eastern DR Congo if Kinshasa fulfills its obligations under the Washington peace accord, President Kagame said. Is Kinshasa ready to fulfill its obligations? Can the U.S. approach acknowledge that sustainable peace requires addressing Rwanda’s legitimate security concerns, and demonstrates equal urgency in addressing the FDLR's presence and Kinshasa's denial of citizenship to Congolese Tutsi? Without addressing these existential threats, sanctions will remain counterproductive obstacles to genuine peace.
