In Part I, I argued that the tension between state and society is not new. Since the French Revolution institutionalised the idea that legitimacy flows from society, governance has been a balancing act: strategic decision-making on one side, democratic consent on the other. That balance is most fragile when long-term economic necessity collides with short-term public sentiment. Nowhere is this more visible than in the debate over immigration, the rise of populism, and the strain these places on the transatlantic alliance. Switzerland offers a telling case. Long admired for stability and prosperity, it now faces mounting domestic pressure to curb immigration. Referendums and parliamentary debates have focused on limiting inflows, tightening asylum procedures, and prioritising national labour. Yet Switzerland’s economy is deeply integrated into European and global markets. Its pharmaceutical, financial, and advanced manufacturing sectors depend on skilled foreign labour and seamless cross-border mobility. Restricting immigration too sharply would not just alter demographics; it would directly undermine productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. This is the dilemma: the state recognises immigration as an economic requirement, particularly in ageing societies with shrinking tax bases and strained pension systems. But society, confronted with rising housing costs, infrastructure pressures, and identity anxieties, demands restraint. Across Europe, similar dynamics unfold. Far-right movements from Italy to the Netherlands have gained traction by capitalising on frustration over migration, globalisation, and sovereignty. In North America, parallel currents question trade agreements and open borders. What began as economic discontent has morphed into cultural scepticism. This resurgence tests the transatlantic alliance which on the surface appeared to be all about the NATO military alliance. Despite the looks of it, at its core, the alliance was never just military, it was economic. Trade flows between Europe and North America remain among the largest in the world, underpinned by regulatory cooperation and shared institutional commitments. Yet when domestic politics turn inward, protectionism becomes attractive, and international organisations are painted as distant constraints rather than guarantors of fairness. The irony is that retreating from trade does not insulate societies from global pressures; it magnifies them. History offers a warning. The interwar fragmentation of trade deepened depression and intensified rivalry. Post-war leaders embraced interdependence not out of naïveté but strategic calculation: interconnected markets reduced conflict and increased prosperity. Today’s populist currents risk repeating elements of that pattern. But trade also offers a way forward. The problem is not trade itself, but distribution and trust. When societies feel excluded from globalisation’s benefits, resentment grows. When industries collapse without transition strategies, communities blame the system. When immigration is managed without transparent integration policies, fear replaces confidence. The answer is not withdrawal, but recalibration. States must communicate more honestly about economic realities. If immigration is necessary to sustain welfare systems and growth, that case must be made transparently, with policies that expand housing, align labour markets, and ensure integration. Trade agreements must protect vulnerable sectors during transitions. Investment in education, reskilling, and digital infrastructure must accompany openness. In short, the state must bridge the gap: aligning long-term strategic policy with short-term societal reassurance. Switzerland’s experience shows that institutional trust remains strong where direct democracy allows society to voice concerns. Yet repeated referendums on immigration reveal persistent unease. This is not just about economics; it is about belonging. The state calculates GDP growth; society calculates identity and cohesion. Reconciling the two requires leadership that neither dismisses societal concerns nor abandons strategic reasoning. The rise of the far right signals a broader psychological shift: fatigue with complexity. Globalisation, digitalisation, and migration create challenges that resist simple slogans. Political movements offering clarity, even if costly, gain traction because they resonate emotionally. Yet structural facts remain: ageing populations require labour, innovation depends on collaboration, supply chains cannot be fully nationalised, and energy transitions demand cooperation. Trade, therefore, remains the instrument capable of reconciling state and society, if framed not as abstract doctrine but as tangible mutual benefit. The transatlantic alliance must rediscover its social contract: shared economic growth that visibly improves domestic welfare. If trade agreements are seen as elite bargains detached from local realities, society will rebel. If, however, trade is linked directly to job creation, technological opportunity, and generational mobility, trust can be rebuilt. The tension between state and society will never vanish; it is inherent in democracy. But tension need not become rupture. Trade is not the enemy of sovereignty; it is one of its instruments. The challenge before Europe, North America, and beyond is to ensure that openness delivers benefits that are visible, equitable, and trusted. If that balance is achieved, the transatlantic alliance will endure. If not, the fault line between state and society may widen into something far more destabilising. The writer is a WTO Young Trade Leader 2025 with an interest in advancing inclusive trade for youth and women-led MSMEs especially under the AfCFTA, and exploring how digital trade and sustainability can open new paths for entrepreneurs in Africa and beyond.
