Several months before Goma fell to AFC/M23, in January 2025, the city experienced an intensive over-militarization. There were more than 22,000 of the Congolese government’s sponsored militia known as Mai-Mai and the Rwandan genocidal FDLR militia, 40,000 Congolese soldiers, 1,500 Rumanian mercenaries, over 10,000 Burundian soldiers, and over 4,800 South African, Tanzanian and Malawian soldiers deployed under the Southern African Development Community Mission in Congo (SAMIDRC) to support Kinshasa in combating the AFC/M23 rebellion. These forces were supported by Sukhoi jets, CH-4 drones, and helicopters. They also benefited from sophisticated logistical support provided by UN mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO). ALSO READ: Mediators face criticism over silence during attacks on Banyamulenge For President Felix Tshisekedi and SAMIDRC forces, a military solution appeared to be the only option. He made clear his ambition to attack Kigali and boasted about his military capabilities. Tshisekedi warned that the President of Rwanda was his target. One SAMIDRC commander also vowed that the war would not be confined to Congolese territory and could extend elsewhere. Given the Congolese president’s stated intentions, “elsewhere” was understood to mean as far as Kigali. ALSO READ: Kanyuka: Kinshasa's drone strikes continue in violation of ceasefire Peter Cirimwami, then the military governor of North Kivu, was killed amid a chaotic situation within the army. According to internal sources, he was allegedly shot by a lower-ranking officer, Sgt. Kasongo of the Guépard Battalion, at a time when the force was grappling with internal tensions and allegations of embezzlement that were reportedly contributing to repeated battlefield losses. ALSO READ: What are the motivations of Burundi’s military intervention in South Kivu? Initially, Tshisekedi reportedly vowed that the front would be secured without any Tutsi officers. However, following Cirimwami’s death, demoralized Burundian forces allegedly demanded that battle command be entrusted to Tutsi officers, believing that others lacked discipline. Tshisekedi then supposedly concluded that two Tutsi generals, Olivier Gasita and Pacifique Masunzu, could contain the front. Both officers were reportedly known for being hostile to Rwanda and even to their own community, as a means of being accepted as Congolese “patriots.” Gen. Gasita was deployed to the front line in South Kivu, but the Mai-Mai militia opposed his command due to his ethnicity. While Gen. Masunzu managed to assume his new role, he reportedly narrowly escaped detention twice, before and after the fall of Bukavu. Despite the over militarization of Goma and its surroundings, the city was captured by AFC/M23. Consequently, the front shifted south. However, Bukavu, the provincial capital of South Kivu, was reportedly not considered a defence priority. The target no longer appeared to be the control of Goma or an offensive against Kigali, but rather Minembwe, a small locality in Fizi Territory that hosts thousands of Banyamulenge internally displaced persons (IDPs) in what appears to resemble a Congolese form of concentration camps. The Congolese government and allied Mai-Mai militias have destroyed 85% of their homes. They ended up in Minembwe. Forces that were on the front line in North Kivu redeployed and are now concentrated in Minembwe. It began with a blockade of the Highlands area of South Kivu, the ancestral homeland of the Banyamulenge. There were about 4,000 Burundian soldiers between Kaziba and Gashama, another 7,000 behind Uvira Highlands toward Mwenga, 6,000 in the Minembwe area, and more than 20,000 FARDC soldiers and Mai-Mai militia positioned on various fronts around Minembwe. All these forces withdrew from the Banyamulenge areas (territories of Fizi, Mwenga and Uvira). As soon as the Burundians realized that Uvira would be ceded by AFC/M23, they intensified their redeployments and attacks on Minembwe. No other localities in South Kivu were targeted. The over militarization of Minembwe For the past four weeks, Minembwe has been bombarded with 140 bombs per day (by warplanes or CH-4 drones), as well as 12 kamikaze drone attacks every 20 minutes. The bombardments are reportedly supported by approximately 25,000 fighters from the Burundian forces with, according to some sources, logistical support from Belgium, Mai-Mai militias, FDLR, Tanzanian technicians, and western private military companies. Minembwe lies more than 300 kilometers from the main front line. The Congolese army coalition could have prioritized securing areas near Uvira, particularly along Lake Tanganyika, which hold clear strategic importance but its operations appear concentrated in areas predominantly inhabited by the Banyamulenge. The Congolese army coalition maintains that it is targeting an armed group known as “Twirwaneho,” which originally emerged as a community self-defense initiative. However, eastern DR Congo is home to more than 150 armed groups, many of them affiliated with specific local communities. These other groups have not faced comparable military action. On the contrary, there are longstanding allegations that some continue to receive ammunition or operational collaboration from elements within the state. The overmilitarization of Minembwe, in a context such as that of Goma, suggests that this conflict has a strong ideological dimension linked to ethnicism. Burundi's involvement complicates conflict resolution Burundi’s involvement in the conflict has further complicated prospects for resolution. Political dynamics in Burundi remain deeply shaped by the country’s history of Hutu–Tutsi tensions. Some regional analysts argue that elements within the ruling CNDD–FDD perceive the presence of Tutsi communities in the region through a security lens, viewing it as a potential threat to regime stability. Therefore, targeting Minembwe is in line with a plot to destroy this imaginary potential “threat”. Neighbouring Rwanda experienced a tragic period during which thousands of its people were forced to live abroad for 35 years due to ethnic hatred. They returned after the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, directly linked to the events of 1959 that forced many Rwandans into exile. Burundi's alliance with DR Congo is an attempt to revive old regional dynamics, which would further complicate the conflict in eastern DR Congo. In this case, it could force Rwanda to consider this situation as an existential threat. These factors, according to this interpretation, should be considered by international partners. Dr Alex Mvuka Ntung is a researcher and analyst on the Great Lakes Region.
