Almost 32 years after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi, Rwanda remains defined by a single top priority: Never Again. This principle is more than just words; it is the foundation on which all other national priorities are anchored. It is institutional, constitutional and existential, influencing how Rwanda interprets threats both within its borders and across the wider Great Lakes region. One such threat is the continued presence of the Kinshasa-backed genocidal FDLR, a group formed by those who directly participated in the 1994 genocide and others connected to those perpetrators. ALSO READ: 2025, a year without FDLR threat on Rwandan border For Rwanda, this is not some distant debate or hypothetical risk. It is a painful and unresolved legacy of the genocide, one that still carries real security implications beyond its borders. In response to this persistent threat, Rwanda has pursued a measured strategy that combines careful defensive measures with proactive diplomatic and multilateral engagements. Critics, argue that any defensive measures risk undermining Congolese sovereignty and destabilising the region. This concern, while understandable, presents the issue as more clear-cut than it is. ALSO READ: Inside FDLR’s frontline base 3km from Rwanda border Sovereignty, and respect for international law are foundational principles of the international order, but so too is a state’s right to protect its citizens when persistent threats go unaddressed. International law does not require a country to remain passive while armed groups organise and operate just across its borders. Grounded in its experience of the human and social costs of conflict, Kigali understands that lasting security depends not only on vigilance but also on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and multilateral engagement to prevent violence spill over. ALSO READ: Full text of Washington Accords signed by Kagame, Tshisekedi However, when the state on whose territory armed groups operate cannot neutralise the threat, the state under threat has the right to defend itself, and this must be carefully considered in terms of strategy and law. Even if one were to assume, for the sake of analysis, that Rwanda was collaborating with AFC/M23 as part of its security strategy against FDLR, such a position would not be conceptually novel in international practice. States with far greater military and diplomatic leverage have long argued that when an armed group operates across a border and presents a sustained threat, the right of self-defence cannot simply stop at the boundary line. Whether one agrees with that doctrine, or not, it has shaped international security debates for decades. ALSO READ: Long before AFC/M23: Remembering life as ‘Banyarwanda’ in Uvira The issue, therefore, is not whether sovereignty matters – it unquestionably does – but how can sovereignty and a state’s right to self-defence be reconciled when persistent cross-border threats remain unaddressed. If powerful states invoke doctrines of self-defence beyond their borders under comparable circumstances, then analytical consistency requires that similar reasoning at least be examined, rather than dismissed outright, when a smaller state articulates its own security concerns. In my view, the same analytical standard should be applied to Rwanda and carefully weighed by the UN Group of Experts and other relevant actors when assessing the situation. A state cannot rely solely on the language of territorial integrity while persistent armed groups operate within its borders and threaten neighbouring states and its people. Sovereignty is credible when states assert effective authority over their territory and address the structural drivers of insecurity. In the eastern DR Congo context, this is not the case. Marginalisation, contested belonging, and cycles of communal mistrust have long provided fertile ground for armed mobilisation. Addressing these underlying tensions should not be a concession to external pressure; it should be central to stabilising the region itself. Without addressing these fault lines that armed groups exploit, appeals to sovereignty alone, whether invoked domestically or in response to external pressures, are unlikely to produce lasting peace. ALSO READ: AFC/M23 leader states four reasons why his movement is fighting Tshisekedi govt Rwanda’s “Never Again” doctrine frames the lens through which Kigali interprets regional dynamics. All Rwanda accusers, should understand that the memories of the genocide continue to shape Rwanda’s vigilance, not only toward organised armed groups but also toward the language and narratives that echo the ideologies and structures of past violence. While this historical experience does not automatically validate every security assessment, it helps explain why networks linked to genocide-era actors, and the ideas they promote, are perceived not as distant irritants, but as potential existential threats. The way forward cannot rest on hardened positions or selective readings of international norms. Stability cannot come from privileging sovereignty at the expense of a neighbours’ security concerns or the ongoing human rights abuses against Kinyarwanda-speaking Congolese. Recent diplomatic milestones illustrate a constructive path. The Washington Accords signed in December 2025 by the Presidents of Rwanda and DR Congo, reaffirm commitments to end conflict, and other agreements foster economic cooperation, and lay a foundation for lasting peace. Such instruments provide frameworks but they cannot be substitute for addressing the lived realities of communities in eastern DR Congo or the underlying drivers of insecurity. Left unaddressed because of external pressure, it will be like putting a band-aid on a bullet wound. The writer is a management consultant and strategist.
