History shows that good intentions do not guarantee positive outcomes. As American writer and philosopher Suzy Kassem once wrote: “To know the good from the bad, study a man or woman's history of actions, not their record of intentions.” In this article, we examine the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) through the lens of its actions rather than its stated objectives. ALSO READ: Long before AFC/M23: Remembering life as ‘Banyarwanda’ in Uvira On February 12, Vivian van de Perre, the Acting Head of MONUSCO, arrived at Goma airport on the first aircraft to land there since the facility closed in January 2025. Among her remarks in Goma, one stood out. While emphasizing the need to end the fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, she announced plans concerning “the region targeted by M23 rebels since their resurgence five years ago.” As expected, she denounced AFC/M23 as the group responsible for destabilizing the region—a position she had already expressed. On February 6, during a UN virtual conference titled “DR Congo: Volatile Situation with Risk of Escalation,” she stated that Goma was under the occupation of Rwanda and AFC/M23. ALSO READ: DR Congo crisis: Ceasefires 'will be in vain' if Kinshasa continues attacks Her visit followed President Félix Tshisekedi’s meeting with Jean-Pierre Lacroix on February 10—a meeting largely ignored by major Western English-language newspapers. This brings us to MONUSCO’s stated good intentions and their damaging consequences. The mission proposes transforming AFC/M23-controlled territories into what it calls “îlots de stabilité”—“islands of stability.” A MONUSCO publication, Echoe de la MONUSCO (November 2014), explains: “When territories in eastern DR Congo are freed from armed groups, the Government, in coordination with MONUSCO, declares these territories ‘islands of stability.’ The idea is simple: help authorities regain control of areas formerly under militia control. This process falls within Security Council Resolution 2147.” That was in 2014. When MONUSCO launched this initiative to make the Kivus “islands of stability,” at least 70 armed groups were operating in the region. By 2020, that number had risen to 130. Instead of helping authorities regain control from militias, the number of armed groups nearly doubled during MONUSCO’s tenure. Recently, the UN announced it seeks “security guarantees” from the AFC/M23 and requested that its soldiers use Goma Airport to monitor a planned ceasefire—a request made by Lacroix in his capacity as UN Deputy Secretary-General for Peace Operations. Neither Vivian van de Perre nor Lacroix mentioned the Kinshasa-backed FDLR militia or its alleged role in destabilizing eastern DR Congo. MONUSCO has consistently aimed to make the Kivus an “island of security.” Instead, according to its critics, the region has become an island of insecurity. Those unfamiliar with Lacroix might expect him to differ from his predecessors. Those familiar with his background may be less optimistic. Before becoming UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Lacroix worked at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as an advisor to French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur from 1993 to 1995. He was involved in diplomatic efforts related to France’s “Zone Turquoise”—an operation purportedly intended to save the Tutsi but actually designed to dismantle the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). He supervised, from the Élysée Palace in Paris, the escape of the former Rwandan army (Ex-FAR) and all other genocidal forces to eastern DR Congo, then Zaire. His ministry organized the flight that transported former first lady Agathe Kanzinga and her children to France. Those who fled into exile under his leadership, with the complicity of Operation Turquoise, later formed the militia groups which subsequently became FDLR. The FDLR now operates as an acknowledged component of the Congolese military (FARDC). Lacroix is fully aware of this. MONUSCO, led by Vivian—who maintains that Rwanda occupies Goma—and operating under Lacroix’s supervision, whose past actions gave rise to FDLR, cannot resolve eastern DR Congo’s crisis. Addressing eastern DR Congo’s instability requires leaders who are demonstrably neutral and impartial, refraining from taking sides or advancing particular agendas. In this regard, neither Vivian nor Lacroix meets that standard. Lacroix has stated that progress toward an effective ceasefire must occur in phases. Was he suggesting another 30 years of waiting for MONUSCO to deliver peace? Seeing MONUSCO through its actions, not its official objectives or stated long-term strategies, DR Congo will remain unstable until the end of the century. Amani Athar is a media specialist, historian and playwright.
