The United States’ withdrawal from dozens of UN-affiliated bodies and multilateral groups, following the shutdown of USAID, barely registered in Rwanda, or across much of Africa. It was noticed but hardly emphasised, yet in my view, it marked the loss of a key pillar of global development. ALSO READ: Why Africa must put its house in order For decades, U.S. engagement, imperfect, sometimes controversial, but always influential, has shaped development, climate action, governance, and conflict prevention worldwide. The sudden withdrawal is more than a budgetary or efficiency issue. It changes the very dynamics of responsibility and cooperation in a fragile global system, one in which Africa will feel the effects more than most. ALSO READ: How Rwanda is moving to address healthcare gaps left by USAID freeze These changes are often described as funding gaps. That framing misses the bigger picture. U.S. involvement in these institutions has always been about more than dollars. It has provided guidance, coordination, credibility, and political cover. USAID and U.S.-supported programmes helped manage risk in difficult environments, brought donors together around common goals, and gave legitimacy to reforms that governments could not push forward alone. Losing this support removes the glue that held collective action together. ALSO READ: Rwandans living with HIV wary of uncertainty in US funding Nowhere is this clearer than in climate governance. Africa contributes only less than 4% of global emissions, yet it faces some of the worst effects of climate change: droughts, floods, food insecurity, and displacement. Organisations like the U.N. climate conventions and scientific panels are not just offices; they are the channels through which climate funding flows, adaptation plans are built, and evidence becomes policy. Weakening these channels doesn’t reduce climate risks, it piles them onto the places least able to handle them. ALSO READ: Rwanda revises greenhouse gas emissions reduction target to 53% As climate pressures rise, so do stresses on food systems, government budgets, and social cohesion. In my view, these are not distant humanitarian problems; they are early warnings of instability that can spill across borders through migration, conflict, and economic disruption. The same pattern shows up in democracy and governance. Groups that support fair elections, rule of law, civic rights, and online freedoms barely make headlines. Yet they provide safe spaces where governments can make changes without being accused of bowing to foreign pressure. ALSO READ: Africa in America’s new worldview: Seen, needed, but not yet prioritized When these platforms disappear, aid becomes either blunt political influence or disappears entirely. I believe this doesn’t strengthen sovereignty; it weakens accountability, concentrates power, and leaves citizens with fewer protections. Trade and economic development face similar strain. Africa’s integration into global markets, including efforts like the African Continental Free Trade Area, depends on expertise, shared standards, and ways to resolve disputes that no single partner state can replace. The retreat also carries direct social costs. Thousands of Africans worked within organisations funded by U.S. programmes, and their sudden loss of support risks driving unemployment higher. At the same time, reduced investment in the already built systems will leave countries more exposed to socio-economic shocks. What disappears is not just funding, but livelihoods and safeguards that millions depended on. From this perspective, smaller and landlocked economies are likely to be pushed back toward exporting raw commodities, leaving them more exposed to price swings and financial stress. At the same time, U.S. travel and visa restrictions affecting many African countries are reinforcing this withdrawal. They also have unexpected cultural and social impacts. For example, African athletes and fans may find it harder to attend international sporting events like the FIFA World Cup scheduled to be held in the U.S, reducing exposure, opportunities, and the soft power connections that come from global participation. While these measures are often justified on security grounds, in my opinion they weaken the human ties that drive innovation, economic growth, and mutual understanding. Combined with the institutional withdrawal, they suggest a closing of doors. The United States is not leaving a vacuum though. China, Gulf states, and other powers may step in with new measures, offering infrastructure, capital, and fast results. Many African governments will welcome these partnerships, but they may come with fewer social, environmental, and governance safeguards. With these actors dominating the continent, development will become more transactional, more tightly linked to strategic or security interests, and less accountable to citizens. Some countries like Rwanda, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritius, and Botswana, with stronger institutions and clearer policies, may navigate this new reality by diversifying partnerships and leaning more on African-led institutions like the African Development Bank. But fragile states, on the other hand, may face a steeper path. This should matter for the United States, even if Africa is no longer a priority in Washington. Climate shocks, pandemics, displacement, and insecurity do not stay contained. History has shown that preventive engagement has long reduced the scale and cost of later crises. When these systems weaken, the price is not avoided, it is simply deferred. What we are seeing now is a world with less shared international rules and weaker coordination among powerful actors. Internationally, this means more uncertainty, more competition, and fewer mechanisms to prevent crises before they escalate. In a world already marked by volatility, the United States’ retreat from development programmes, coupled with tighter travel bans and restrictions, only deepens the problem, wishing away the very leverage that once made its global engagement credible and seemingly effective. In this environment, development becomes less about shared progress and more about transactional deals, with climate funding uncertain, peacebuilding reactive, and economic ties driven by short-term interests. The result is greater volatility and will most likely affect African states with fewer tools and resources to manage it. This shift does not isolate instability, it redistributes it. When early-warning systems weaken and shared institutions lose authority, shocks travel faster across borders. Africa will absorb many of these shocks first, but the consequences will eventually reach global markets, migration systems, and security environments far beyond the continent. The writer is a management consultant and strategist.
