Since gaining independence – from Belgium, on June 30, 1960, ending 75 years of colonial history and the private rule of King Leopold II – the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) has seen significant involvement from the United Nations, particularly through the deployment of three major peacekeeping missions. ALSO READ: DR Congo: The endless mirage of freedom The first was the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), established in 1960. This was followed by the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) in 1999, which was later restructured into the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in 2010. ALSO READ: MONUSCO: Leaders of the outstanding illusion Unfortunately, these missions have consistently failed to fully achieve their mandate — to protect civilians from armed groups and to stabilize the nation. Before delving into the history of UN peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is important to reflect on a significant event that occurred on this day — September 17 — in the history of UN peacekeeping. On September 17, 1961, then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (1953–1961) died in a plane crash near Ndola, in what was then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), while en route to meet Katangese leader Moïse Tshombe. ALSO READ: If Hammarskjöld was dispensed of, who is tiny Rwanda? Hammarskjöld had served as Secretary-General from April 1953 until his death at the age of 56, when the chartered Douglas DC-6 aircraft he was traveling in, registered as SE-BDY, crashed shortly after midnight on the night of September 17–18, 1961. The circumstances surrounding the plane crash remain shrouded in mystery. While early inquiries attributed the incident to pilot error, later investigations and eyewitness accounts raised the possibility of sabotage or even an aerial attack. Some have suggested that the aircraft may have been deliberately targeted by people opposed to the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga. ALSO READ: MONUSCO’s new opportunity in eastern DR Congo Before his visit, Dag Hammarskjöld authorized the deployment of the United Nations' first peacekeeping force in the country — the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC). The force arrived in Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) in July 1960, just weeks after the country gained independence, following 75 years of Belgian colonial rule. ONUC’s top priorities were to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign forces, help maintain law and order, and prevent the outbreak of civil war by supporting the Congolese government and safeguarding the country’s territorial integrity. ALSO READ: The UN’s willful blindness in DR Congo’s endless crisis The first UN operation in the Congo ultimately failed to fulfil its mandate. Rather than protecting the democratically elected government from foreign interference, the mission supported the interests of external powers—most notably the Belgians and the Americans. This failure contributed to the removal and eventual assassination of the country’s first Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, in January 1961. Lumumba’s assassination prompted the Security Council to expand ONUC's mandate, authorizing the use of force as a last resort to prevent civil war and expel foreign mercenaries. Despite its large big troop numbers — nearly 20,000 troops at its peak—and considerable resources, ONUC ultimately failed the Congolese people. By the time the mission ended in 1964, the country was still mired in conflict, facing the Kwilu Rebellion led by Pierre Mulele and the Simba Rebellion in the east, led by Gaston Soumialot and Christophe Gbenye. ONUC also allowed the entry of foreign mercenaries, including the notorious “Wild Geese” group led by 'Mad' Mike Hoare—a force composed of fighters from 19 different nationalities, mostly South Africans and Rhodesians. The mission also left behind a continued military presence of the United States and Belgium, reinforcing foreign influence in the post-independence Congo. Despite ONUC’s failure, another UN peacekeeping mission was deployed to the country. MONUC was established on November 30, 1999, by UN Security Council Resolution 1279. Its initial mandate was to plan for the observation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed in July 1999, overseeing the disengagement of forces and serving as a liaison between the parties to the agreement. The agreement was between the governments of DR Congo, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, with rebel groups of the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD). Before it completed its first year of deployment, MONUC was renamed MONUSCO, on July 1, 2010. The official reason for the name change was to reflect a shift in the mission’s focus—from peacekeeping to stabilization. In 2013, the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a unit within MONUSCO was established. Its ultimate goal being to help stabilize the eastern part by combating numerous armed groups threatening peace. After 26 years of operation, the mission with more than 20,000 soldiers, and a budget of approximately $35.6 billion spent since 1999, making it the UN’s most expensive peacekeeping mission in history, MONUSCO has never been able to fulfil its mandates. ALSO READ: 80-year-old Congolese reflects on lifetime of injustice, attacks in DR Congo It failed to implement the mandate it was entrusted with, the eradication of all armed groups, including the FDLR genocidal militia, which has operated in eastern DR Congo for the past three decades. Despite deploying significant resources, the number of armed groups in eastern DR Congo has multiplied from a handful to over 200. MONUSCO has even provided support to armed groups, including FDLR, that it was mandated to neutralize. ALSO READ: Belgian lawyer on why genocide ideology doesn’t dissolve three decades after dispersion of genocidaires Since Hammarskjöld first authorized the deployment of UN peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the mission has repeatedly fallen short of its promises. Decades of intervention have failed to bring lasting peace or stability. It is now time to acknowledge that this UN mission has not succeeded. The Congolese deserve the chance to shape their own future—no matter how uncertain that path may be. Moving forward, the hope is that the Congolese government will engage in genuine and transparent dialogue with opposition groups and civil society, with support from African-led organizations such as the African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Only through inclusive and locally driven efforts can trust be rebuilt and political grievances meaningfully addressed. The 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda should be a lesson for DR Congo. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) failed to prevent the killing of more than one million people. Only the courage of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) stopped the massacres. DR Congo will be saved by its children, not by foreign peacekeepers, who have proven for the last 65 years that they are unable to fulfil their mandate. Human progress is about learning from history—not repeating it. Simply rebranding ONUC as MONUC or MONUSCO does little more than recycle a failed model of intervention. This repetition of history, rather than a critical reflection on it, risks trapping DR Congo in a cycle of stagnation or regression. Genuine progress demands bold, new approaches informed by the lessons of history—not recycling failed strategies.
