In the last piece in this serialised narrative, we realised divisions within the opposition political parties. As if that was not enough, President Juvenal Habyarimana's regime embarked on violence and insecurity as a political strategy. This piece will expound more on what followed. Violence and insecurity as political strategy In the management of the war and its effects, the Habyarimana regime was preoccupied with defending those in positions of authority rather than protecting the entire population. This was seen on October 1, 1990, when Habyarimana’s government carried out arbitrary arrests of thousands of people who were suspected to be conniving with the RPF. The regime exploited ethnic identities and political positions opposed to its own. Most of the prisoners were released at the end of March 1991 because of pressure from the international community as well as local organisations fighting for human rights. Silvestre Nsanzimana, the Minister of Justice, then declared them innocent. The presidential circle talked of 'clemency from the father of the nation.' No member of the security forces was tried or punished after the October 1990 arrests for having tortured or having been involved in the inhumane or degrading treatment of detainees or suspects. At the time of arrest, the Minister of Justice declared that “homicide was a consequence of Tutsi provocations and panic by the population”. 25 people who had been arrested in October were tried and sentenced by the state security court. Seven of them were condemned to death in an unfair trial. Journalists were also another category of people who were targeted by the security operatives of the former regime. More than a dozen journalists were imprisoned for “abusing” the Head of State. The Directorate of military operations of the Rwandese Army (FAR) criticised the written press and opposition political parties, accusing them of being on the RPF’s pay roll. Remote-controlled repressions and violence which followed the Inkotanyi attack between October 1, 1990, and July 18, 1994, caused more deaths than the war itself. Those violent acts were diverse in nature and were carried out far from zones of military confrontation. Some massacres were carried out collectively. In 1990, massacres were perpetrated in Byumba, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, in the Mutara, Kibilira and Ngororero communes. In 1992, massacres were reported in Bugesera. These violent acts were mainly directed towards the Tutsi and were not spontaneous as official propaganda claimed. They did not result from old tribal hatred. They were operations calmly carried out by MRND and CDR as well as the Hutu Power factions in general. The regime also organised riots to show its opposition to the negotiations. These riots caused violence whose extent became more pronounced as the power-sharing deal became a must in the Arusha Accord framework. Every protocol that was signed was considered a failure of the regime and was greeted with more violence. During the Kigali riots of May 1992, the police killed three PSD sympathisers. These riots spread to the towns of Gisenyi (Mukamira on May 31, 1992) and Ruhengeri. It is estimated that 27 people died and many more sustained injuries. In July 1992, at the time when people talked about the start of the Arusha Accords, MRND youth caused trouble of a political nature by attacking MDR and PSD youth in Kigali suburbs. In Gikondo, two people died and others sustained severe injuries.
