Sasha Lezhnev’s recent piece in Foreign Policy, “Washington Should Prioritize Transparency and Sanctions in Congolese Critical Minerals Deal,” is both misguided and overly simplistic. He might get a few facts right, but his overall understanding of the crisis and the solutions required is seriously lacking. Here’s why. For context, Lezhnev appears frustrated by the lack of progress in Doha — and rightfully so. We all are. Also, to be clear, we should all oppose any unilateral sanctions imposed by Western countries. But for the sake of argument, I’ll indulge Lezhnev’s colonial impulses. At issue is the fact that the core thesis supporting his entire argument for sanctions is shaky at best. ALSO READ: Senate votes Rwanda-DR Congo peace deal into law “Peace requires respect for the DRC’s sovereignty. This means Rwanda withdrawing its troops and dismantling M23, and the DRC disarming the FDLR,” he writes. Why, in Lezhnev’s view, the disarmament of FDLR is not also framed as essential to respecting Rwanda’s territorial integrity remains a mystery — and a discussion for another day. ALSO READ: Former FDLR deputy president on how genocidal militia was formed To begin with, Lezhnev should read the Washington-brokered peace deal between DR Congo and Rwanda. It clearly outlines the steps needed to achieve many of the outcomes he calls for. Any sanctions he proposes should be based on a clear identification of the specific commitments that have been violated and which party is responsible. It should never be a blanket decision imposed on all parties merely for the sake of appearing balanced. Such an approach only breeds confusion and stalls progress. ALSO READ: Details of Rwanda-DR Congo peace agreement signed in Washington Secondly, by suggesting that Washington impose sanctions on Rwanda due to the protracted nature of the Doha process, Lezhnev fails to clearly distinguish between the two dimensions of the current crisis. On one hand, there is an interstate conflict, primarily driven by the presence and arming of remnants of Rwandan genocidal forces—namely FDLR—which he correctly identifies as backed by Kinshasa. On the other hand, there is a deeply rooted internal crisis stemming from failed governance: the collapse of state institutions, the proliferation of armed groups, and decades of systematic, hate-fueled discrimination and violence against Congolese citizens of Banyarwanda heritage, especially the Tutsi. ALSO READ: Why genocide ideology doesn’t dissolve three decades after dispersion of genocidaires While the U.S.-led initiative aims to address the interstate dimension of the conflict, the internal crisis falls under the scope of the Qatari-led mediation process, in which Rwanda is not a party but rather an observer — and perhaps a facilitator, if the negotiating parties so desire. There is simply no justification for sanctioning Rwanda due to the slow progress in Doha. ALSO READ: AFC/M23 says Rwanda-DR Congo deal ‘tiny’ part of solution Thirdly, and closely related to the second point, Lezhnev wrongly argues that Washington should impose sanctions on Rwanda to force the dismantling of the M23, believing this would help preserve DR Congo’s territorial integrity. The problem is that his assumptions are flawed on several counts. One, it is not Rwanda’s responsibility to dismantle a Congolese armed group operating on Congolese soil, composed of Congolese citizens fighting for their right to be treated as such. ALSO READ: Why fix DR Congo? Chaos pays the bills for UN experts In fact, it is not even in Kigali’s interest to dismantle the only organized Congolese force confronting the same existential threat Rwanda itself faces: FDLR and its genocidal ideology. Suggesting that Rwanda should take on this role contradicts both the principle of a people’s right to self-determination and the very notion of territorial integrity that Lezhnev and others claim to defend. Two, contrary to Lezhnev’s belief, sanctions imposed by Europeans have never produced a lasting solution. In 2012, they merely delayed the inevitable return to armed confrontation. A decade later, we are back to square one because sanctions failed to address the root causes of the crisis. This time, sanctions have only fueled further violence and pushed Europeans out of the picture as credible peace brokers. In contrast, Washington’s more reasonable approach has placed it at the forefront of the current peace efforts. What Lezhnev is proposing risks undoing the fragile progress made so far. Three, even before M23 re-emerged in November 2021, DR Congo’s territorial integrity was already in shambles. Kinshasa had already lost effective control over large swaths of North Kivu and Ituri provinces to hundreds of armed groups. That is why, in May 2021, the government declared a state of emergency in those regions and invited foreign forces, including Ugandan troops, onto Congolese soil under bilateral agreements. Worse still, instead of reasserting state authority, Kinshasa compounded the problem by arming the very militias it had initially pledged to disband. These groups were then mobilized not simply against M23 but, in truth, against Congolese Tutsi as a whole. So, when Lezhnev speaks of restoring DR Congo’s territorial integrity, he should be clear about what exactly he wants to see restored. Is it order—or is it chaos and genocidal violence? Lezhnev should be more cautious about the solutions he promotes. Perhaps he should visit the region before passing judgment, and before placing M23 and FDLR on the same moral footing. He might come to see that FDLR remains one of the central threats to peace in the region, while M23 — for all its flaws — may well be DR Congo’s only real hope for redemption.
