A week after the conclusion of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4) in Seville, Spain, some encouraging news emerged from Mozambique. As reported by Bloomberg, the country’s bonds over US Treasuries fell below 1,000 basis points, making it the last country on the continent to retreat from levels widely considered to indicate debt distress. ALSO READ: ECA’s Gatete pushes for finance fit for Africa It was the first time since 2015 that no African country has a sovereign risk premium above that threshold. This suggests an improvement in the continent's overall debt situation. When a risk premium is over 1,000 basis points, countries spend more than 10 percent of their revenue on their interest payments. This is to say nothing of the debt itself, which must also be paid. But it amounts to a huge burden that drains vital resources away from critical sectors like health, education, and infrastructure. ALSO READ: IMF executive on suitable financial design, Africa debt distress Debt distress was a big issue at the FfD4 and among the outcomes in what came to be known as the Sevilla Commitment was the creation of the Borrowers Club, a platform for the countries to introspect on their debts and share experiences but also advocate for fairer borrowing terms. ALSO READ: There is room for all to benefit in re-designing global financial architecture – Kagame With Mozambique finally getting out of distress, it may appear the continent was already ahead of the game with credit for the Maputo feat being given to factors such as IMF programmes, domestically driven reforms, and renegotiation of debts with international creditors. ALSO READ: Africa demands ‘fair international finance architecture’ What this shows is that it can be done. The challenge is whether Mozambique, or indeed a number of African countries on the brink of distress, will slide into the doldrums of debt. The Borrowers Club is therefore an excellent idea, especially if it will be bolstered by proposals for a UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt to tackle unsustainable and illegitimate debt through extensive debt cancellation. Another most promising outcome for Africa was the renewed push for a more inclusive international tax system, including the endorsement of a UN framework convention on international tax cooperation. The push—long resisted by OECD countries—holds potential for African countries to begin reclaiming the billions lost annually to illicit financial flows, tax avoidance, and profit shifting by multinational corporations. Africa could gain nearly $89 billion annually by curbing illicit financial flows, according to the UN trade and development agency, UNCTAD. There were also calls for Special Drawing Rights (SDR) reallocation, with wealthier nations urged to channel more of their unused SDRs toward vulnerable economies. This could provide much-needed liquidity without the austerity conditions typically tied to IMF loans. Similarly, commitments to scale up climate finance, particularly in adaptation and loss and damage, could help African countries respond to a crisis if adequate. These are structural tools that, if implemented in good faith, could reduce Africa’s reliance on external assistance and enhance its fiscal sovereignty. So, how did Africa fare in the balancing the equation in Seville? While there should be optimism, it must be tempered by realism. Critics rightly point out that the Sevilla Commitment, while a consensus document, saw significant watering down of ambitious proposals put forward by the Global South, including Africa. The language around comprehensive reform of the global tax governance system, for instance, remains less binding than many had hoped, falling short of a full UN Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation that would truly level the playing field. This means the ability of multinational corporations to exploit tax loopholes, and thus deprive African nations of critical revenue, largely remains intact. The lack of concrete, integrated strategies to align climate finance with debt sustainability in the outcome document highlights a lingering disconnect in addressing interconnected crises. And without legally binding mechanisms, Africa may still find itself pleading for relief in future crises. The problem could also be of African countries’ own making. Domestic political and governance challenges also limit the transformative potential of any global reforms. Without greater accountability, civic participation, and policy coherence at home, the continent may not make much ground. In the final analysis, FfD4 delivered a mixed bag for Africa. The conference offered a clearer vision of what a truly equitable global financial architecture could look like, but it may not have gone far enough. If we recall the equality and equity meme in a previous installation of this column, the FfD4 equates to an attempt at removing the fence - a metaphor for the systemic barriers or structural causes that create the need for aid. If a fair amount of the Seville commitments will not have been kept, FfD4 will be judged as only having feebly chipped away at the fence. Then we shall have to start all over again at the probable next conference on financing for development in 10 years’ time.
