The Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo) is in crisis. Eastern Congo—previously liberated areas under the control of the Armed Forces of the Congo (AFC) and M23—has endured decades of conflict but has recently been threatened by a new peril stemming from Kinshasa's treacherous maneuvering. Recent assaults in Goma, North Kivu, and Kavumu, South Kivu, orchestrated by a coalition of militias known as Wazalendo, reveal the DR Congo government’s strategy of arming these factions—alongside the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and Mai-Mai Nyatura—while simultaneously denying involvement. In a blatant contradiction, Kinshasa publicly asserts that its military forces, the FARDC, are respecting ceasefire terms. This is a falsehood. President Félix Tshisekedi is effectively creating a new rebel group in Wazalendo to combat AFC/M23, with backing from Burundi. This situation is untenable. AFC/M23 represents the best hope for dismantling the plethora of militias plaguing the eastern region, and it is imperative that they act decisively to counter Kinshasa’s strategy and restore order. Kinshasa's intentions are transparent. By equipping Wazalendo, the government cultivates a proxy force that can engage AFC/M23 without implicating the FARDC. The recent attacks led by Wazalendo, in conjunction with FDLR and Mai-Mai Nyatura, demonstrate this strategy. Kinshasa’s disavowal of responsibility is a calculated ploy to maintain deniability while enabling militias to execute its agenda. Burundi exacerbates the situation by sending troops to South Kivu and allegedly supplying arms to Wazalendo. This dangerous partnership threatens to spawn a new rebel force that could surpass the control of both governments. Wazalendo is not a patriotic movement; it is a volatile amalgamation of hostile factions. The FDLR carries a legacy of genocide, while Mai-Mai Nyatura is rooted in banditry. Each of these groups introduces its own toxicity into Wazalendo’s chaotic environment, amalgamating into a force poised to exploit the region's fragility. Kinshasa's support—through arms, training, and complicit silence—transforms this volatile combination into a predatory entity, terrorizing communities through looting, sexual violence, and arson, while jeopardizing any lingering hope for peace. In contrast, AFC/M23 stands out for its discipline and commitment to stabilising the east by dismantling chaos. Historically, groups like the FDLR and Mai-Mai, including the emerging Wazalendo, have thrived on the region’s suffering. AFC/M23 has demonstrated its capability to secure ground, with the captures of Goma and Bukavu underscoring its potency. Unlike the disorder inherent in Wazalendo or the predatory nature of Mai-Mai, AFC/M23 offers a structured approach to dismantle the eastern region's rebel landscape. This reality terrifies Kinshasa, leading it to bolster Wazalendo and perpetuate regional instability. To counter Kinshasa's ploy, M23 must think strategically. The first step is to sever Eastern Congo's connections to Kinshasa's communication networks. Mobile telecommunications serve as a lifeline, with major providers like Vodacom and Airtel acting as conduits for intelligence to Wazalendo. By disrupting these networks and forcing Wazalendo to rely on radio communication—far more vulnerable to interception—M23 can weaken Kinshasa’s control. Additionally, AFC/M23 should target Wazalendo’s supply lines. Kinshasa and Burundi funnel arms through Uvira; M23 must obstruct these routes to disrupt the militias’ operations. Diplomatic resolutions won’t suffice—action must be decisive and significant. Furthermore, AFC/M23 should enhance reconstruction initiatives in the areas under its control to gain civilian support. While Wazalendo preys upon local communities, Kinshasa paints its militias as protectors. Winning the trust of these communities will lead to increased intelligence sharing that can expose Wazalendo’s movements. Grassroots support can significantly amplify M23’s effectiveness. Critics of Kinshasa may argue that the government has no option but to arm militias, given the perceived threat posed by AFC/M23. The loss of Goma was a significant embarrassment for the FARDC, and the fall of Kavumu revealed its vulnerabilities. Facing mounting pressure, Tshisekedi sees Wazalendo as a quick fix. However, this approach is shortsighted; arming militias escalates conflict and undermines peace negotiations, putting any ongoing ceasefire processes at risk. Kinshasa’s proxy war complicates diplomatic efforts further and its claims of honoring ceasefire agreements are disingenuous
