How Burundi troops, FDLR provoked M23’s march on Mubambiro, Goma

“They (rebels) have seen their adventure come to a halt by the FARDC,” Lt Col Guillaume Ndjike Kaiko, the then Congolese army spokesman for North Kivu province told Al Jazeera on Sunday, January 12, 2025. He was speaking after the pro-Kinshasa coalition attacked M23 positions in the hills overlooking Minova, Bweramana, Sasha, Kirotshe, Sake and Mubambiro localities in South and North Kivu regions. “All over there, they have been pushed back,” Kaiko said, naming some of the reclaimed areas as Lumbishi, Ruzirantaka, Kamatale, Bitagata and Kabingo. What Kaiko did not say, however, was that this offensive was led by Burundian troops, with support from elements of the genocidal FDLR. FDLR is a UN and US-blacklisted terrorist organization founded by military and paramilitary extremists linked to the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. The group lies at the heart of the long-running dispute between Kigali and Kinshasa. The Burundian troops and FDLR militia, along with FARDC, had mounted the offensive from their bases in Minova, including on the raised grounds of Gatare, Bombandana (Golgotha), Shingika, Buhamba and Kasunyu. ALSO READ: Minova residents rebuild their lives after defeat of Burundian ‘invaders’ The offensive came at a time the M23 were observing a unilateral ceasefire designed to encourage President Felix Tshisekedi’s government to agree to peace talks. “It was a huge offensive,” an M23 commander admitted to this reporter during a tour of Minova on March 22, the eve of the M23 anniversary. “What we did was to retreat strategically and lure them in, allowing ourselves a tactical advantage.” For a few days, this Burundi-led coalition, including the FDLR, occupied some localities previously occupied by M23. ALSO READ: Inside FDLR’s frontline base 3km from Rwanda border ALSO READ: DR Congo: How FDLR recruits, holds children hostage “Yeah, they did take a few places like Bitagata, Ngungu and Murambi, but held them for just a few days, maybe three,” the officer, who fought in these battles, said on condition of anonymity as he had not been authorised to discuss the matter. Once they had reorganised and received reinforcements, the M23 launched their own counteroffensive. Burundian troops, FDLR flee in face of M23’s counteroffensive And it proved to be decisive. By January 17, the rebels had retaken the villages they had lost a few days earlier, going on to expand their territory and to pursue the enemy force southwards, beyond Minova, and deep into South Kivu. “The Burundians, FDLR and FARDC all retreated and fled in disarray,” the source said. “They did not only lose the areas they had briefly occupied, but they also lost Minova and headed southwards, towards Kavumu,” the M23 commander said. ALSO READ: Tshisekedi’s vast armoury in Goma and plan to invade Rwanda Minova is a strategic town on Lake Kivu, some 45km by road south of Goma, the capital of North Kivu province. It’s the locality that supplied Goma – via the lake – with essential products, including foodstuff, in the months leading up to M23’s capture of Goma in late January, with most of the other supply routes cut off by the rebels. For months, Burundian troops dominated the high grounds of Minova having displaced its farmers, and it was from here they hoped to dislodge M23 from the imposing range of hills north of Minova, including Rukara, Muremure and Ndumba. Their main objective was to go on and recapture Rubaya in Masisi territory. Rubaya, which the M23 seized in May last year, had somewhat become an obsession for the Burundian forces “because protecting Rubaya was their main task when they first deployed to North Kivu,” a former FDLR combatant who lived in Minova said. M23 has previously dismissed suggestions it took Rubaya owing to its vast mineral deposits, saying the locality had long become a haven for violent armed groups and militias, and a major source of insecurity for civilian populations. Protecting Rubaya, the ex-FDLR fighter said, was the main reason “why Tshisekedi had agreed to pay the Burundian president heavily, it was more like a mercenary deal.” However, the Burundi and FDLR-led offensives from Minova ended up playing into the hands of the M23, with the rebels striking back decisively. A decisive, phased rebel advance The subsequent rebel advance was planned in a phased approach. Phase I including mounting a counteroffensive against the Burundians and their allies, including FDLR, and pursuing them far beyond their previous lines in Minova. Indeed, having briefly dislodged M23 units in Ngungu and surrounding areas, the coalition forces were afterwards forced to retreat to locations tens of kilometres south of Minova, handing the rebels the initiative. Around January 20, the M23 went on to capture Minova and Bweramana in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces, respectively, and a string of other South Kivu locations, including Lumbishi, Numbi and Shanje. To the M23, things were going according to plan. And the stage had been set for phase II. “When we took Minova and fully controlled the road from Sake to Minova, we were able to send a force across to Buzi-Bulengo peninsula, with artillery capabilities,” an M23 soldier involved in these operations said. “It was now time to finally take Sake and Mubambiro.” The deployment of the M23 unit on the peninsula would prove instrumental, as it overlooked the coalition forces at Mubambiro barracks to the northeast. It helped distract and even actively engage the enemy forces there, mostly the artillery-armed SAMIDRC/SADC units, as an M23 mobile force advanced on Mubambiro from the hills north of locality. The M23 units in the elevated grounds northeast of Minova that strategically overlook Sake and Mubambiro (or Bambiro) would split into three mobile forces, or battalions, in their advance from the hills. That was around January 23. “Each of the battalions had a specific mission,” the M23 officer, at the rank of Major, who commanded the force that took Mubambiro barracks, said. The fall of Mubambiro The first battalion had the task of seizing Mubambiro. In a rapid predawn offensive on January 23, this mobile force advanced through the hills of Nkingo, Mwambariro, Ngumba, Kiruku, Matcha, and Sake, on its way to Mubambiro – trying as much as possible to avoid unnecessary confrontations along the way. It took control of Mubambiro/Bambiro barracks at around 9a.m on the same day before it was joined by the second battalion the following day, on January 24. The second battalion had advanced through Kwa Madimba, Kimoka and Majagi hills, which overshadow Sake. “The mission of the second battalion was to provide support to the force that had advanced to Mubambiro, while also clearing enemy pockets on their way,” an M23 soldier, at the rank of Captain, said. The third mobile force, or battalion, advanced in the direction of Shove (once home to FDLR overall commander Pacifique ‘Omega’ Ntawunguka), bypassing Sake and Mubambiro to the south. This force advanced through Kimoka II, the northern flanks of Majagi, via the foothills of Shove Mountain, and through to Kasengese on Goma-Mubambiro-Sake road. As with the other battalions, this mobile force was forced to engage a myriad of enemy forces along the way, including FDLR deployments. ALSO READ: New footage suggests FDLR fighting alongside DR Congo army ALSO READ: FDLR urged to shoot on sight fleeing DR Congo soldiers A former FDLR combatant who has since returned to Rwanda told The New Times last month from the Mutobo transit camp in Musanze that he had taken part in battles with M23 around Sake. SAMIDRC joins the fray Meanwhile, the M23 force that had taken Mubambiro on January 23 was forced to deal with two major developments; the coalition reinforcements from Goma and the last-minute direct involvement of South African troops under SADC Mission in DRC, or SAMIDRC. “Our initial understanding was that SAMIDRC would not take part,” the M23 commander told this reporter. However, the South African troops at Mubambiro broke out of their base, took positions and opened fire at the M23 soldiers at around 2p.m on January 23. That was about five hours after the rebels thought they had taken control of the military barracks, with little resistance. ALSO READ: My visit to a force 'welcome to Soweto' but unwelcome to DR Congo ALSO READ: M23 agrees to facilitate SADC troops withdraw Earlier that day, a coalition of FARDC special forces (Hiboux), regular FARDC troops, FDLR militia fighters and European mercenaries had fled from battle here, the officer said. Aside from the South Africans entering the fray, coalition reinforcements arrived from Goma, including infantry units, tanks and fighter jets. As fierce fighting ensued, M23 reinforcements arrived, in the form of the 2nd battalion, on January 23. Fighting continued until around 5a.m on January 25 when the South African SAMIDRC troops raised the white flag, which signifies defeat in the context of war. “The coalition suffered heavily, both in terms of causalities and equipment,” the M23 officer said, adding that at least a dozen South African soldiers lost their lives in the process. “We thought SAMIDRC wouldn’t get involved this time around, even though they had attacked us in May 2024 in what they called Operation Caterpillar I,” he said. “We were surprised to see them join the fighting, in a close-quarters battle, at the last minute.” Notably, the M23 unit that had gone behind the enemy lines taking the Buzi-Bulengo peninsula ahead of the advances of the larger group from the hills north of Mubambiro was instrumental in the defeat of the coalition forces here. Outnumbered in personnel and inferior in terms of military equipment, the M23 has largely relied on guerrilla war tactics, overstretching the coalition forces through opening multiple fronts, and sending units behind the enemy lines. During the battle of Mubambiro, the coalition lost two tanks. One was burnt, with at least one soldier inside (its wreckage still stood in front of the entrance of the military installation when we visited last month), one overturned and was seized by M23, while the coalition managed to evacuate the other. The coalition also abandoned a lot of weapons and ammunitions, with the South Africans alone leaving behind RPGs, SPG 9s, anti-tank grenades, LG5 grenades, MG chains, loaded magazines, among others. This reporter saw these weapons during his earlier visit to Mubambiro in February. Gen Chirimwami’s body evacuated Once the M23 took full charge of Sake and Mubambiro, it was time for phase III. With the 1st battalion staying at Mubambiro, the 2nd and 3rd proceeded in the direction of Goma, linking up at Kasengese near Mugunga, outside of Goma. Notably, in one of the battles around Kasengese, on January 23, the M23 killed the then North Kivu provincial governor Gen Peter Chirimwami, who had come to the frontlines to help raise the morale of the coalition forces. “We didn't even know he was there, let alone knowing that he had been shot,” an M23 commander said, adding their attention was only drawn after they saw FARDC personnel quickly bundling a body into a white land-cruiser and trying to run away with it. “We knew there was something unusual about that particular causality, because FARDC don’t usually evacuate their fallen comrades,” he said, adding that the M23 shot the tyres of the car forcing the occupants to hurry out and run with the body. “They managed to escape with the body, we only recovered communication devices from the car,” he said. “It was only later that we learnt that the casualty in question was Chirimwami.” Phase III, he said, saw the second and third battalions to advance eastwards, en route to Goma, engaging in battles and taking localities along the Goma-Sake axis, including Nzuro, Kasengese, Lac Vert, Mugunga, Kyeshero, Ndosho, Terminos and Katindo, home to a major military base. Special force opens a new front Meanwhile, at around the same time, an M23 special force advanced from around Sake, opening a new front on its march towards Goma to the east. This fourth (special) mobile group, which peeled off the M23 units along the Goma-Sake axis, bypassed Shove, rapidly advancing through Gikopo and areas around Nyiragongo Mountain, and then via Nkyakagina and Rusayo towards Goma. For long, villages along this axis had been a haven for FDLR, a militia that has been at the heart of President Tshisekedi’s war against the M23. The special force, along with the 2nd and 3rd battalions would later link up with the M23 units that had advanced along the eastern axis (Goma-Kibumba) in the provincial capital of Goma. The capital, where tens of thousands of coalition fighters had been retreating to after suffering defeats along the various frontline axes, eventually fell into rebel hands on January 28.

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How Burundi troops, FDLR provoked M23’s march on Mubambiro, Goma