In the last piece of this series, we looked at the circumstances that led to the Inyenzi attacks in the 1960s. In this piece, the effects and repercussions of the Inyenzi struggle as well as its failure will be understood. Like the northern and eastern parts of the country that saw a repressive campaign against the Tutsi population in the wake of Inyenzi attacks, Gikongoro Prefecture, in the south, faced the same problem. It registered the highest number of victims. A Catholic missionary who was in a parish in the same region made the following remark: “The massacre seems to have been organized by the government itself and it was perhaps the most sinister event.” ALSO READ: How PARMEHUTU sold out Rwandans by relying on Belgian colonialists The governor who coordinated those operations won legislative elections in his constituency thanks to his performance during the period of the massacres. The total number of victims was estimated to be between 25,000 and 35,000 dead. Foreign observers, such as Vaillemin, a Swiss, and Luc de Heusch, a Belgian and even Radio Vatican talked of “Genocide.” No political, administrative or military authorities were charged with participating in the massacres of the Tutsi. The government exonerated itself by saying that the repression was carried out by grassroots leaders, Members of Parliament and civil servants. The government contended that this was done due to fear because, among the Tutsi, especially the civil servants, there were accomplices of the Inyenzi. Nevertheless, it went ahead to say that there was no malice of the Tutsi against Hutu ever proved while they were still in power. The question is: were all Tutsi in power? ALSO READ: How Hutu and Tutsi masses hang between elites and Belgian colonialists After Bugesera, the last large-scale attack of the Inyenzi took place in Cyangugu prefecture, in the west, in Bugarama in 1964, Nshili and Bweyeye in 1966. From 1967, there were no more Inyenzi raids, but until 1972, there were rumours of possible attacks even though the government knew very well that the Inyenzi movement had completely crumbled. Reasons abounded for Inyenzi’s defeat. The most important among them was the lack of unified leadership and clear political line. The Inyenzi were not born of the UNAR party. The party had been divided into internal and external wings. It no longer had the political monopoly in refugee camps outside Rwanda since the advent of new political parties. King Kigeli was never the chief of the Inyenzi even if some groups wanted him to become one. The Inyenzi did not have the same understanding of the role of the monarchy. Some had opted for the republic. Secondary, the Inyenzi were not a united military force. They were scattered groups with various leaders, such as Mudandi, Ngurumbe, Kayitare, Sebyeza and Hamud. Yet another reason was that the Inyenzi did not have enough military equipment. They only had what had been obtained from Belgian Congo. No country is said to have provided military aid to that movement until then. Burundi sheltered them. They were allowed to recruit and train but were never armed by the country. As for Uganda, since 1962, Milton Obote’s government had warned the Inyenzi not to attack Rwanda from its territory. President Mobutu of Zaire fought the Inyenzi because they supported the Mulelists. In August 1963, they were expelled and some faced violence in Goma and Bukavu. In 1964, around 800 Rwandan refugees were expelled from these two towns. They were settled in Tanzania, then under President Julius Nyerere accommodated them. This facilitated their movement and even sent some youth abroad for military training. The last nail in the coffin saw conflicts and misunderstandings among Inyenzi military chiefs during their operations. An example is given as to what happened between Mudandi and Ngurumbe during Nshili and Bweyeye operations. Mudandi retreated without warning his fellow combatants. The next piece in this series will feature diplomatic initiatives by President Gregoire Kayibanda to consolidate power and what followed that.
