Our tour of Goma airport earlier this week took much longer than I had anticipated. There was simply too much to see, too much dangerous stuff on the tarmac and other sections to navigate, and too many emerging insights to reflect and chew on. Goma airport served as the central command centre in the war against M23 in DR Congo’s North Kivu Province. Like Kavumu airport in South Kivu, which was captured by M23 on Friday, Goma airport was the launchpad for deadly weapons in President Tshisekedi’s impressive arsenal, including Soviet-made Sukhoi SU-23 attack aircraft, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, or drones, guided mortars, among others. Most of those weapons, ammunitions and other equipment, including vehicles, are in the hands of M23. Most importantly, Goma airport was the hub of all the pro-Tshisekedi forces and militias, including FARDC troops, SADC forces (South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi), Burundian troops, Wazalendo militias as well as FDLR terrorist group which has roots in the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. The airport was also teeming with European mercenaries, while the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO, maintains its flag at the abandoned command centre compound, where all war operations were coordinated. In wartime, a command centre serves as the centralized hub where military commanders receive real-time information from the battlefield, coordinate troop movements, make critical decisions, and communicate with various units. Joint command centre At Goma airport, the command centre is named the ‘Centre Conjoint de Coordination des Operations (CCCO)’. Today, much of it is in ruins. It is a large, gated compound, surrounded by a volcanic perimeter wall with barbed wire at the top. Inside the compound, you’re greeted by a lone MONUSCO flag and three empty flagpoles on a huge platform, two large UN engines to your right, and shattered structures. The empty flagpoles used to hoist flags of DR Congo, SADC (Southern African Development Community, which deployed a mission to fight alongside the Congolese army), and Burundi, the commander of the M23 force that seized the airport told me during the partially guided tour. “But you know there is also FDLR element here, those ones did not have a flag up, but they were an integral part of this command centre, they are at the frontlines fighting alongside FARDC and all these forces backing DRC, and they provide information on possible targets in Rwanda.” Did you find any evidence of this direct collaboration with a genocidal group? I ask him. “Yes, yes, a lot of it. They provided insights about targets inside Rwanda, for instance, there were maps with designated targets in Rwanda including your main hospital in Rubavu, and your military camps in Bigogwe and Mudende.” In the battlefield... He added, “There were specific targets on maps they wanted to hit when they shelled you (Rwanda) just before we fully liberated Goma. But you see this collaboration and conspiracy even clearer, from an operational perspective, out there in the battlefield.” That prompted me to ask whether it was possible to visit some of those places for firsthand insights. “If you are still around, come back tomorrow, we will take you to Kimanyoka and Kanyamahoro.” (He did come through the next day, and I will be doing a sperate piece on what I saw there). Further inside the now-abandoned command centre, there are shattered offices from where the ‘brains’ of the coalition forces spent their time coordinating the war effort, receiving intelligence and studying maps and using coordinates to pinpoint targets on the map. One of the buildings had its roof blown as by a shell, with broken glass scattered all over. Papers and pieces of information are strewn across the compound. “We thoroughly checked all the files we found, and a lot of information was found out.” In one of the rooms, I see maps showing the positions of MONUSCO. While MONUSCO’s mandate may include specific support to the Congolese army, there will be serious questions and calls for accountability if indeed it’s proven that the UN peacekeeping force directly worked with the FDLR, blacklisted as a terrorist organization by the UN, US and regional countries due to its links to the Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda and other abuses in the region. Not the first time... Yet, it’s not be the first time MONUSCO (previously MONUC) has been linked to FDLR, with a BBC investigation in April 2008 indicating that MONUC troops had traded arms and UN rations for gold, ivory and drugs from FDLR. This longstanding friendly relationship between MONUSCO/MONUC and FDLR has been confirmed by former FDLR combatants who laid down weapons and returned home peacefully. However, for the most part, it was assumed that much of this collaboration existed at the contingent level, which means MONUSCO/MONUC elements from a specific participating country may have collaborated with FDLR and other negative groups without the blessing of the Mission’s central leadership. However, if what the M23 commander said is true, this time around the alliance was forged at the highest level of the Mission. SA minister’s FDLR hint One major hint at possible involvement of FDLR at the command centre inside Goma airport may have come from South Africa government, which has deployed combat troops under the SADC framework in support of Tshisekedi. SA minister’s FDLR hint Speaking on SABC News’ Face of the Nation on January 30, South Africa’s Minister of International Relations Ronald Lamola, was asked if South African and SADC troops in general were fighting alongside the genocidal militia. “Are you fighting alongside the FDLR?” he was asked, to which he responded, “Obviously, those are questions that, I believe, the defence forces can possibly answer, particularly on the issues on the ground, you may not be working with people, but as the situation was escalating, they had to engage with even the M23, they had to engage with all the forces on the ground, so you end up finding yourself in some instances, for tactical reasons, having to cooperate and work with the people on the ground to enable your operations to function, and that’s what has been happening, and it happens from time to time.” I referenced this response from the South African minister in my interaction with the M23 commander, a Major, at Goma airport, and he said, “he was trying to avoid the question but, in the end, he virtually admitted it, but that’s not the issue, we saw it ourselves and there is evidence of that.” President Félix Tshisekedi of DR Congo has in recent months said he was willing to cause ‘regime change’ in Rwanda and has been linked to senior FDLR leaders and other liaison people sympathetic toward FDLR. This objective was echoed by Burundian president Evarist Ndayishimiye during a speech at a youth gathering in Kinshasa in January 2024 in which he described Rwandans as “prisoners”. Ndayishimiye, who maintains thousands of troops in DR Congo in support of FARDC, earlier this week made a thinly veined criticism of the Congolese army in the wake of rapid advances by the M23. Over the years, FDLR, or its splinter groups, have launched deadly incursions into Rwanda, including as recent as 2019 when one of it’s factions RUD-Urunana killed at least 14 people in Kinigi, northwestern Rwanda. Another of its splinter groups, MRCD-FLN of Paul Rusesabagina, carried out numerous cross-border attacks in southwestern Rwanda in 2018, killing at least 11 civilians, including a 13-year-old and passengers. The MONUSCO/FARDC joint command centre at Goma airport sits across from the base of the MONUSCO contingent from Uruguay (URUBATT), the later located at the eastern flanks of the airport, not far from the M23 airport base. MONUSCO has been accused of failing to protect civilian populations, including in recent times in which Rwandophone Congolese communities have been targeted by government forces and allied militias in what has been described as a genocidal campaign. Meanwhile, at the airport in Goma, M23 commanders pointed an accusing finger at MONUSCO for sometimes going behind their backs and trying to ‘communicate or do things’ with some of the SADC troops who are restricted to their white-flag-hoisting camps at the airport. A separate story on the complex relationship between these three parties is in the works.
