Surrounded and outnumbered: Why resistance failed during the genocide
Tuesday, March 24, 2026
Bisesero Genocide Memorial. Accounts from the Bisesero resistance highlight the overwhelming imbalance between the number of killers and the victims, as well as the efforts by the Tutsi to resist. Sam Ngenda

In executing the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, there was a well-articulated organization; without it, the massacres would not have reached devastating levels.

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This organization was structured into a clear hierarchy of operational levels. A critical factor, however, was the sheer number of killers compared to the victims. In this piece, we examine how survival and resistance became nearly impossible due to the overwhelming number of perpetrators.

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The way the genocide was organized and executed made many believe that survival and resistance were almost impossible. The planners and implementers had established an effective system that covered the entire country, preventing people from escaping. Acts of resistance were also doomed to fail for three main reasons.

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First, the number of individuals committed to carrying out the killings was extremely high. In most cases, victims were attacked by large groups of assailants. Those who managed to evade immediate capture were often discovered through constant day-and-night patrols.

Accounts from the Bisesero resistance highlight the overwhelming imbalance between the number of killers and the victims, as well as the efforts by the Tutsi to resist.

A notable testimony comes from Issa Bayiringire Dany, a survivor from Bisesero, who described the intense and unequal battles in which Tutsi civilians defended themselves using stones and traditional weapons against heavily armed militia and soldiers.

Other testimonies describe how the Tutsi organized themselves to resist in the hills before being ultimately overwhelmed by the sheer number of génocidaires. While many testimonies emphasize the scale of the killings, it is widely acknowledged that the resistance in Bisesero was remarkable.

In Rwanda, victims and perpetrators lived within the same communities, often knowing each other well. This reality made it nearly impossible for Tutsi to blend in and escape. One survivor from Bisesero illustrated the atmosphere of the killings by describing the numerical strength and organization of the attackers, who had been mobilized and trained by military and civilian authorities:

"On May 13, 1994, soldiers and militia arrived in eight buses, pick-ups, and trucks used in the construction of the Kibuye-Gitarama road. Several other vehicles carried soldiers and administrative authorities. Many others came on foot, holding machetes. They came singing and whistling as they drummed.

"That day, I saw the Governor of Kibuye, Pierre Kayondo, in the company of Clément Kayishema, a businessman; Eliézer Niyitegeka, Minister of Information; Obed Ruzindana, a businessman; as well as the burgomasters of Gishyita and Gisovu, among others. These individuals had camped at Bisesero Primary School to witness how soldiers and militia were killing us. That day, almost all women and children were killed.”

Another survivor from Bisesero emphasized the role of soldiers and militia, as well as their extreme determination:

"On May 13, 1994, soldiers and militia jointly launched a deadly attack on refugees hiding in the hills. Many came from Gitarama, Gisenyi, and nearly the entire country, arriving by bus and pick-ups. They surrounded us and fired relentlessly. That day, my wife, Marthe Nyirahategeka, along with my seven children and grandchildren, was killed.

"The militia often wore white clothes and carried leaves on their heads. They looked like madmen. That day, they nearly exterminated us. Entire villages were covered with bodies.”

The second reason for the failure of resistance was the strategy employed by local administrative authorities, who encouraged victims to gather in groups from the early stages of the massacres.

Under the pretext of providing protection, victims were assembled in public places such as schools, stadiums, and community centres. They were then guarded by police, militia, or soldiers to prevent escape, before being systematically killed. This strategy, driven by both civilian and military authorities, led to mass killings across the country within a matter of days.

The third reason was the use of firearms and the direct involvement of security forces. At many gathering points, militia called upon armed forces, who used guns and grenades to attack victims.

Those who survived the initial assault were then killed by other perpetrators.

Peter Ruti is a historian based in Kigali.