Nearly all countries, cultures and faiths, most ordinary people want the same things: the ability to earn a living, put a roof over their heads, feed their families and watch their children grow up with hope. These are modest aspirations, yet they are often sacrificed on the altar of geopolitics.

The recent U.S. sanctions targeting individuals linked to Rwanda’s security establishment over the conflict in eastern DR Congo exemplify how easily such aspirations can be disrupted. Anyone who has observed how sanctions unfold over time knows that their effects rarely remain confined to the narrow targets described in official statements.

They ripple through financial systems, trade and diplomatic relations, often affecting ordinary citizens far beyond the individuals they were intended to pressure. This global architecture is largely controlled by powerful economies to exert enormous pressure on states, particularly poorer ones.

The United States, by virtue of its dominance in global banking and trade networks, possesses an unparalleled ability to impose economic restrictions that extend far beyond its borders.

In Rwanda’s case, the consequences reach not only the RDF and its officials but also ordinary citizens who depend on stability, especially if defensive measures designed to protect national security were to be weakened or lifted.

Rwanda argues that the Congolese government itself has violated recent diplomatic arrangements, including the Washington accords, through drone strikes, ground offensives and cooperation with militias and foreign mercenaries. If such concerns are overlooked while sanctions focus largely on one side, it creates an impression that some actors to the Washington accords are being judged unevenly.

Some analysts go further, suggesting that Kinshasa may have leveraged its mineral wealth to influence Washington’s posture towards its strategic ally. In such circumstances, the pull of critical minerals outweighed the value of what may ultimately prove to be only a nominal alliance.

For Rwanda, these defensive measures exist because of the security threats posed by the FDLR, an armed rebel group linked to those responsible for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi, and which Kigali says operates with the backing of the Kinshasa government to destabilise the country.

Kigali argues that as long as such forces remain active across its border, the threat cannot be treated as distant or hypothetical.

Under the United Nations Charter, the use of force is generally prohibited under Article 2(4), except in two circumstances: individual or collective self-defense against an armed attack (Article 51), or military action authorised by the UN Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security under Articles 39 and 42.

In practice, however, international politics often works differently. Powerful countries have repeatedly intervened abroad while invoking the defense of their own national security.

This has created a persistent contradiction in global governance. The same international system that allows powerful states to justify military action beyond their borders often expects smaller countries to remain passive even when they face comparable threats close to home.

International relations scholars have long debated this strain. Classical realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau argued that states act in pursuit of national interest and survival. From this perspective, sanctions are rarely neutral moral tools; they are instruments of geopolitical influence.

This dynamic becomes particularly evident in conflicts involving strategic economic resources. Access to these resources has become increasingly important in the global competition between major powers.

American interest in infrastructure initiatives such as the Lobito Corridor railway reflects this intersection between geopolitics and resource competition, particularly as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In such contexts, sanctions cannot be understood purely through the language of principle.

African solutions should not always be outsourced. Too often, African governments appear more willing to accept mediation from distant capitals than to engage fully with African institutions or regional leaders who are equally capable of helping resolve disputes.

In some cases, an African state or leader may seem more comfortable auctioning or ceding control over critical minerals to external powers than to neighbouring African countries, even though responsible cooperation could benefit communities across borders and promote shared prosperity.

The situation in the DR Congo is telling. Its soil is among the richest in the world, yet many of its people remain among the poorest. Of course, Kigali cannot reasonably be held responsible for this.

In fact, the ongoing instability in eastern Congo has long served the interests of powerful actors who profit from disorder and opaque mineral supply chains.

In my view, Rwanda’s defensive posture inevitably disrupts some of these interests. When such interests are disturbed, political pressure often follows, and sanctions can become one expression of that pressure.

As an African proverb reminds us, a stick from a neighbour does not chase a leopard.

The author is a management consultant and strategist.