In the last article in the series, we realised how the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) saw negotiations as an essential part in its struggle. All necessary steps were taken to ensure the success of the negotiations. Contrary to that, the Rwandan government sought to sabotage them. We will witness that as we progress through the series.

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The Arusha negotiations were of interest to countries in the region, particularly Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, which served as the facilitators. Other interested parties included Belgium, the USA, France and the United Nations. Some observers kept their neutrality while many others, notably the French and Belgian delegations, behaved like advisors of the Rwandan delegation, especially the political hard-liners of that delegation. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and Tanzanian delegations played a very positive role in conducting the negotiations.

The agreement of August 4, 1993, resulted from a series of meetings organised from October 17, 1990. A number of protocols formed an integral part of that agreement. These included tha Nsele ceasefire agreement of March 29, 1991 between the government of Rwanda and the RPF as amended in Gbadolite (Zaire) on September 16, 1991 and in Arusha on July 12, 1992.

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There was the agreement protocol between the government of Rwanda and the RPF relating to the rule of law signed in Arusha on August 18, 1992.

There was the agreement protocol on the power sharing arrangement in the framework of a broad-based transitional government signed in Arusha on October 30, 1992 and January 9, 1993.

There was the agreement protocol on the repatriation of Rwandan refugees and the resettlement of displaced persons signed in Arusha on June 9, 1993.

There was also the agreement protocol relating to the integration of the armed forces of both parties, signed in Arusha on August 3, 1993.

There was an agreement protocol regarding various questions and final provisions signed in Arusha on August 4, 1993.

Practically, during each of the signed protocols in Arusha, contradictory approaches between RPF and MRND and their companions were noticeable. Examples abound.

There was the agreement protocol on the rule of law which emphasised respect of life. However, it was observed that at the same time that collective massacres of the Tutsi were taking place. Hutu opponents to these massacres, real or imagined, were also butchered. Riots and attacks were remotely controlled by the ruling power. It was this lack of respect for signed agreements and particularly that lack of respect for life that led the RPF to violate the ceasefire on February 8-9,1993.

After several warnings to the Kigali regime and repeated calls to the international community regarding acts of violence, the RPF decided to resume hostilities. The first consequence of this decision was to show the weakness of the Rwandese army. It also caused severe disapproval of the international community, which was very sensitive to the situation of displaced persons who were near Kigali city as well as other innocent victims who were killed by the Rwandan army.

Moreover, another group within the unarmed opposition feared that despite its involvement in negotiations, RPF could take over power by force of arms. Here again, France sent a new contingent to stop the imminent fall of Kigali.

By accepting to return to its previous positions before the attack of February 8-9, 1993, and by demanding that the vacated positions be a buffer zone under the control of a neutral military force, the RPF demonstrated that it was in favour of dialogue.

Lastly, the Arusha protocol insisted on democracy, but as far as the ruling MRND party and its allies were concerned, politics was defined in terms of ethnic belonging by virtue of birth, hence emphasising the ethnic majority/minority politics.