When speaking with Burundian political analysts, they acknowledge a controversial reality: Burundi's military presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo operates not solely as a state decision but as an extension of the ruling CNDD-FDD party’s influence.
CNDD, which is a French acronym for National Council for the Defence of Democracy, was the political wing of the now ruling party in Burundi, while FDD was its military wing.
Initially, Burundian forces were deployed in eastern DR Congo under the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force, but when President Félix Tshisekedi expelled the EAC mission, Burundi’s troops simply removed their EAC berets and were swiftly integrated into the Congolese national army (FARDC).
Through this, the Burundians solidified their position in the conflict-ridden region by formally joining the unholy alliance that was at that time composed of FARDC, FDLR and a collection of extremist local militia groups which was given the name Wazalendo.
Burundi’s forces initially positioned themselves as allies of President Tshisekedi, assisting him in the coalition against the M23, which the EAC force had refused because combat was not part of their rules of engagement as facilitators of a peace process.
But what does history say about the relationship between CNDD-FDD and Ex FAR who later changed their name to FDLR?
In 1994 when the defeated then Rwandan government forces (FAR) and Interahamwe militia fled into the DR Congo after their evil plan to exterminate all the Tutsi in Rwanda was cut short, new alliances were forged.
Simultaneously, the CNDD-FDD, then a rebel movement fighting against the Burundian government at the time led by Maj Pierre Buyoya, was gaining strength with support from various outfits in the region.
Ex-FAR officers who had regrouped in eastern DR Congo with the support of European countries, did not take long to cultivate strong ties with Burundian armed groups which were already operating out of DR Congo, particularly CNDD-FDD and FLN/PALIPEHUTU. The bond was a natural one mainly because of the profound ethnic extremism ideology these outfits shared.
The relationship was solidified when Brigadier-General Gratien Kabiligi, a top ex-FAR officer, met CNDD leader Leonard Nyangoma in Bukavu. Refugee camps in South Kivu housed Burundians and Rwandans who shared an extremist anti-Tutsi ideology.
The 1995 Bukavu Agreement
On May 22, 1995, a formal agreement was signed in Bukavu between the Ex-FAR’s high command, represented by Major General Augustin Bizimungu, and CNDD, represented by Nyangoma. The document explicitly stated:
"The destiny and political future of our two countries are henceforth intimately linked... and are perceived in the same manner on the regional and international chessboard.”
The agreement laid out a shared military and diplomatic strategy, including ideological mobilisation through the media. It called for the establishment of a joint intelligence network, logistical and financial coordination, and a structured military training programme.
Throughout 1995 and 1996, these agreements were put into action. The Ex-FAR's elite Kagoma Battalion, based in Bukavu, conducted infiltration raids into Rwanda’s Cyangugu region in south west via Nyungwe Forest, while also supporting CNDD operations in northern Burundi.
Rebel strongholds in Cibitoke and Bubanza inside Burundi served as logistical hubs where CNDD-FDD fighters received intelligence, local guidance, and material support.
On September 13, 1995, another agreement was signed at Ex-FAR’s Bulonge camp in Bukavu, where radio equipment was handed over to CNDD for the creation of "Radio Democracy,”. The transaction was overseen by Lt. Col. Edouard Gasarabwe, Ex-FAR’s commanding officer of Camp Bulonge, and Amissi Ntangibingura, the security advisor to Nyangoma.
Gasarabwe was later officially assigned as CNDD’s military advisor by Gen. Bizimungu, traveling frequently to Burundi to support CNDD-FDD operations. In March 1996, Bizimungu and Nyangoma signed another agreement in Bukavu, formally integrating Gasarabwe into FDD’s command structure.
Joint Ex-FAR-FDD military training exercises soon followed in Bubanza, where the Rwandan officers trained Burundian rebels in guerrilla tactics and the use of sophisticated weaponry.
The FAR-CNDD alliance continued even after Mobutu’s fall in 1997. On May 21, 1997, just days after Mobutu was deposed, a new coalition agreement was signed in Cibitoke between PALIPEHUTU-FLN and FAR’s Kagoma Battalion.
The document called for a unified fight against "the Mututsi and his acolytes” and designated three Rwandan officers; Lt Casmir Ngarambe and Second Lieutenants Silas Mugira and Boniface Karinganire as FAR’s official representatives to FLN.
One of the intermediaries facilitating these relationships was Father Robert Athanase Nyandwi, a Burundian Catholic priest known for his extremist Hutu views. Having fled Rwanda in 1994, Nyandwi played a key role in organizing the 1994 massacre at Kaduha Parish, where thousands of Tutsis were killed.
Gacaca court testimonies later revealed that he raped young Tutsi girls before they were murdered.
Burundi’s role in the DR Congo conflict is not merely a recent development, it is the continuation of decades-old alliances rooted in shared military, political, and ideological objectives.
Today, as Burundi’s forces operate under FARDC’s command, their involvement is more than just a government decision, it is the fulfillment of historical pacts anchored on a genocide ideology that was forged decades back.