The capture of Goma, the capital of North Kivu Province, on Monday, January 27, by the Congo River Alliance (AFC), which includes the M23 rebels, has demonstrated everything wrong in the ongoing conflict in eastern DR Congo. It has shown that a peaceful eastern DR Congo remains a dream, due to different interests of different actors that are involved.
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As the city was being seized, we saw and heard of a crumbling mixture of international and national armed groups including several thousands of the Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (FARDC), Wazalendo, a ragtag conglomeration of irregular militia groups, the genocidal forces from Rwanda, also known as FDLR, the South African Development Community (SADC) Mission in DR Congo (SAMIDRC), Burundi’s National Defence Force, European mercenaries, and the UN Mission in DR Congo (MONUSCO), all united in fighting the AFC/M23.
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The purpose of this contribution is to remind ourselves of the importance of a peaceful eastern DR Congo to the people of Rwanda. In that process of capturing Goma, the vast Congolese government coalition fighting the rebels directed their attacks towards Rwanda, specifically to the neighboring city of Rubavu, killing some civilians and injuring others in addition to the destruction of property. The Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) quickly arrested the situation.
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The manifestation of different interests can also be seen in different statements countries and individuals have been making about the situation. The Congolese government has perpetuated a narrative that Rwanda is responsible for the fall of Goma despite the presence of the AFC/M23 leadership. Different regional and international groupings and some countries, apart from the East African Community (EAC), issued statements with unkind words towards Rwanda. Whereas we can arguably claim that most of the actors’ varied interests of seeing a chaotic DR Congo can be presumed, it is important that we put Rwanda’s security interests into perspective. I would like to use the 2002 Pretoria Agreement signed between the DR Congo and Rwanda to explain the latter’s security concerns. Reflecting on the Pretoria Agreement is important today as it also shows how interests and roles can keep shifting in the period of a long conflict. The process that resulted in the signing of the Pretoria Agreement was under the leadership of South Africa. But currently, South Africa is a belligerent, fighting on the side of the Congolese army coalition, and vigorous in the condemnation of Rwanda.
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On July 30, 2002, DR Congo and Rwanda signed an Agreement "on the Withdrawal of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Dismantling of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Pretoria, South Africa. As it is in title of the agreement, Rwanda promised to remove its troops from the territory of DR Congo, and Kinshasa was expected "to assemble and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe in the whole of the territory” of DR Congo. DR Congo promised to ensure that its territory does not become "a base for attacks against its neighboring countries.” The contracting parties (DR Congo and Rwanda) agreed that the third parties, those that were to facilitate the implementation of this peace agreement, were the Secretary-General of the United Nations and South Africa.
More than 20 years later, the million-dollar question that we are unable to answer is: where did it all go wrong?
Rwanda withdrew its troops, but the ex-FAR and Interahamwe (the current FDLR) got integrated into FARDC.
More interestingly, the facilitators of the Pretoria Agreement, the UN Secretary General (through MONUSCO) and South Africa/SANDF (through SAMIDRC), are fighting in collaboration with all anti-Rwanda elements, on the side of DR CONGO, against the AFC/M23 rebels.
The M23 rebellion was created following a mutiny of some FARDC solders in April 2012. The mutineers complained of mistreatment and the failure to implement the Peace Agreement between the Government and the Congress National Pour La Defense du Peuple (CNDP) which was signed in Goma, on March 23, 2009, hence the name M23. In 2013, under pressure by the UN’s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), a special unit in MONUSCO, the M23 rebels retreated to neighboring Uganda and Rwanda. The agreement among others referred to "the quick return of Congolese refugees and displaced people from neighbouring countries to their original environments.” This is where Rwanda becomes a natural supporter of the M23.
When the ex-FAR and Interahamwe (the current FDLR) got into DR Congo, then Zaire, they continued their genocide ideology, and started targeting the Congolese Tutsi communities. This created the situation of refugees in neighbouring countries including Rwanda. The communities in eastern DR Congo are not only at the border with Rwanda, but their social-economic and cultural makeup is similar to that of Rwanda. The fact that Kinshasa has failed to protect the Congolese Tutsi against FDLR, and often times collaborates with FDLR to fight M23, concerns Rwanda.
It cannot be said that Rwanda’s concerns are unreasonable because FDLR’s threat towards Rwanda’s foundational values is not hypothetical. The group espouses an ideology of genocide, divisionism and discrimination that caused the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It has attempted, on several occasions, to attack Rwanda. Therefore, however much Rwanda may be pressured into abandoning its defensive position, as long as the FDLR is still active in eastern DR Congo, that posture cannot change. It is a common practice that countries cannot be expected to enter into agreements that are detrimental to their survival. A nation is not only about the physical (geographical) space; it is also about its values.
The unity of Rwandans is fundamental to the existence of post-genocide Rwanda. Therefore, any political ideology that is considered as a danger to the social cohesion of Rwandans cannot be tolerated.
For reasons that are less obvious, international actors seem not to understand that this concern is important to the survival of Rwanda. This is not a question of math. It is not about whether FDLR is militarily weak, or whether the majority of its members did not participate in the genocide.
Its genocide ideology is detrimental to the reconstruction of Rwanda’s social fabric. The Government of Rwanda is compelled to ensure that such a tragedy never occurs again.
Rwanda’s demand is simple; remove the threat of FDLR. This is not to say that their removal is going to happen overnight. No. According to the Pretoria Agreement, the parties acknowledged "that the resolution of this matter will be a process and not an event.”
They acknowledged that the Congolese government "will continue with the process of tracking down and disarming the Interahamwe and ex-FAR within the territory of the DRC under its control.”
Kinshasa has sometimes collaborated with Rwanda, but on several occasions, it has been rearming them.
International actors ought to know these facts. Unfortunately, spoilers among them are the most vocal. We cannot underestimate the choice of a nation under threat. I would like to end with a reference to the Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996, concerning the "Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed that "it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake.”