We thought change of government in Africa by military means had ended some years ago. But no, coups d’etats still happen, albeit less frequently. Their rare occurrence is not necessarily because we have become more democratic.

It’s more likely due to the tough stance taken against them by the African Union (AU) and regional organisations, especially the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS).

They have vowed to uphold the principle that government can only change through constitutional means. Any other means outside this is illegal and cannot be tolerated.

And now the two organisations are faced with precisely that problem in Mali where last week the military toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. But this one is a little different from other putsches in the past.

It has massive support of the population.

ECOWAS has been particularly hard on errant soldiers or civilian politicians in its member states who want to grab power by illegal means. The AU has been equally tough.

To the inviolability of territorial borders that it inherited from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU has now added the sanctity of constitutional rule.

So far their uncompromising stand on this principle has worked and has helped maintain stability and a semblance of democracy and constitutionalism within states and in the region. Perhaps that is some of the intention – to allow constitutionalism to take root and become part of the culture.

Not something copied or imposed from the outside.

And so, in recent years, coups have been few and far between, and when they occur, easy to put down, especially when they go against the people’s will. They cannot rely on any external backing, and the AU and regional organisations can count on the support of the people of a given country in upholding constitutionalism.

But what to do with a popular coup d’etat? Thousands of Malians continue to show their support for the coup in the streets of the capital city, Bamako. Weeks before the coup, they had held massive demonstrations to show their discontent with the government of Keita, particularly after disputed parliamentary elections.

The protestors demanded President Keita’s resignation.

Do you discount these in defence of a principle and restore an unpopular leader? As it is, the world is paying more attention to the military element in the coup and the legal position, and none to civilian protests that preceded and perhaps even caused it. It is a mistake.

The military might have its grievances that led it to mutiny and eventually overthrow the government. But it is also possible that they took advantage of growing discontent among Malians.

In this sense, they rode on the back of popular dissatisfaction to wrest power from Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. If they retain it, it will also be because of the backing of the people.

So, the AU and ECOWAS have a tough job on their hands. Have Keita restored as president and Mali could experience more instability. If that happens you can expect to see more demonstrations. Let the coup stand, and they will be accused of weakness, bias or double standards, and setting a dangerous precedent.

But there must surely be a way out of this dilemma. One is that favoured by negotiators in similar circumstances – create a consensus government of national unity. ECOWAS proposed this in June when it sought to mediate during the protests against President Keita’s government.

The proposal was rejected and in any case that was before the coup. They are now faced with a different reality.

This sort of consensus reached after the knocking of heads does not usually last. It is usually a patched up affair. At best it is a tactic for buying time while a more lasting solution is sought. More often, it is only a postponement of the problem, hardly a solution.

Another way is what the soldiers like to put forward – a transition period of military rule to put things in order before returning the country to civilian government. Normally ECOWAS will have none of that. But this time it might have to take into account the population’s backing of the coup.

The result might be some point between the soldiers’ preference and ECOWAS’ adherence to principle, probably a much reduced transition period and a majority civilian participation in it.

The ongoing rebel war in the north of the country is also a factor in the negotiations and will affect the outcome.

Whichever way the crisis in Mali ends, ECOWAS and the AU will have had to make a tough call between sticking to principle and recognition of an inconvenient local reality. They will have to strike a compromise.

The views expressed in this  article are of the author.