I am not talking about history which deals with tales of the past, mine is a story I vividly lived during the struggle to liberate my country.

It was during the early days of this struggle, after the demise of the late RPA commandant Major General Fred Rwigema that I heard of the arrival of Major Paul Kagame at the frontline where I was at the time.

From what I had heard about him while in the NRA, he commanded respect and was a highly disciplined officer admired and respected by both his fellow military colleagues and members of the Rwandan refugee community who happened to know him.

Shortly after the launch of the liberation struggle, some of us were so scattered in the Akagera National Park and moving in wilderness without focus or purpose of any thought.

In military terms we had no strategy. We had been incommunicado (off air) for a period of a month when we finally attacked unsuspecting enemy at Nyamiyaga, in the current Kayonza District and managed to acquire communication equipment.

By this time, through his military acumen, the newly appointed Chairman of High Command of the infant Rwanda Patriotic Army, Major Paul Kagame set out to call all the scattered forces, including our 5th Column to come back for consultations with top commanders.

This meeting, chaired by the chairman himself, laid down new strategies and changed tactics for the now rejuvenated army, which was growing by day and night with new fighters joining the struggle.

It is in these meetings, that military strategies and tactics laid down eventually saw the capture of Kigali and dealt with the onslaught of the Genocide against the Tutsi, which had not been given any thought during our struggle.

Due to his thorough and meticulous planning, without leaving any shred of doubt before committing any force to attack, he commissioned the Gatuna attack on November 1, 1990.

It was successful surprise attack that overwhelmed the enemy forces and caused reverberations in the whole country. Those of us who were still in Akagera National Park roaming aimlessly had reason to celebrate this success.

After all forces were brought back within his reach, the deployment of forces was thorough, calculated to ensure minimal losses to our forces during any planned attack.

For the entire struggle, he was always with the fighting forces, against some advice from his top commanders to stay at a distance.

During various consultative meetings he chaired, it was agreed that struggle changes from conventional-like strategy to guerilla approach. This new approach was simulated through attacking Rwempasha One and Two, which were both successful.

Changing strategy again to afford a young army some cover and attack the unsuspecting enemy far from where he could expect us, he commissioned an intelligence committee of top commanders to make a thorough survey of the possibility of deploying into the Volcano Mountains.

After a careful analysis of the report, he gave orders and which battalions to venture into the bamboo canopy of the volcanoes.

The 17th battalion was the vanguard of the trek to the mountains along with 3rd, 4th, 16th, 19th and 11th. As we launched into the mountains, he was there at the entry point into the dense forest wishing us success in whatever was awaiting us ahead, for by this time we had not been briefed as to what the mission was.

After these forces moved up the mountains, he shifted his base to Gahinga Mountain to receive the last and final intelligence reports, discussed it with top commanders and finally approved the mission.

He was always particular about any intelligence reports received and before committing deployment, he had to have all the assurances of high success and minimal loss of personnel and materials.

The assignment this time was no other than the attack on Ruhengeri Prison to liberate incarcerated prisoners. By the way this liberation of Ruhengeri prisoners would be replicated in liberating the entire country a few years later.

Ruhengeri town, apart for the liberation of all prisoners, (common and condemned) was held by RPA forces for a period of 10 hours.

Back in Gahinga, the Commander was monitoring the whole exercise, intermittently giving advice to commanders here and there for the optimal success of the attack.

And indeed this attack was so successful that it caused quakes in Juvenal Habayarimana’s administration. And for the first time in our struggle, the regime accepted the fact that they had an enemy to reckon with.

The RPA’s two successful attacks of Gatuna on November 1, 1990 and Ruhengeri on January 23, 1991 marked the turning point in our struggle grace of our prudent, visionary, strategic and tactical military commander who took us through this.

After the volcano spell, he had been strategically discussing with top commanders to make an incursion into the Rwandan territory to have encampments within our country, effectively changing from guerilla to mobile type of warfare.

The RPA entered through the northern arch of the country and pitched battles were fought. Again, he moved his headquarter (at Tabagwe) to within close contact with his commanders throughout these incessant attacks on the enemy.

We entered on January 1, 1992 and by April 1992 the RPA had routed the enemy forces within a distance of about 20km away. This battle was commonly called "Gufata agasentimita” (holding and staying on a centimeter of our soil).

Always skimming ahead strategically, after capturing the Agasentimita, he changed tactics and deployed six battalions to attack the rather weakened enemy from the Byumba side entering though Rugarama hill overlooking Mulindi which is mountainous and endowed with corresponding valleys that were a source of forest cover and abundant clean water within those valleys.

Pitched battles lasted only a week and culminated into the capture of the famous Mulindi Tea Factory which later became the politico-military headquarters of the RPF/RPA – Inkotanyi.

The capture of Mulindi was around June 1992. And our commander moved to Mulindi immediately to take charge of deploying forces to deal more blows to Habyarimana’s weakened forces.

Shortly after the captured of Mulindi, he reorganised all RPA forces into oversized battalions due again to his oversight and wits while preparing for the eventuality.

When the Arusha peace talks finally were appended, Habyarimana called them ‘peace jokes’ and was adamant to implementing its resolutions.

It was during this time, towards the end of 1993, that he deployed the 600 soldiers with a mandate to protect our politicians in Kigali, who would eventually form the broad-based government that was being proposed under the Arusha Accords.

Again, due to his visionary military planning and political acumen, towards the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994, he reorganised the RPA forces and shifted their location in readiness for any surprise attack in case the Habyarimana regime bungled and refused to honour the Arusha process, which, apparently, by any measure, was headed to fail. The Chairman of the High Command of the RPA knew too well the dangers that can be meted out to our 600 entrenched forces in CND and encircled by enemy forces in case the broad-based government didn’t materialise. Habyarimana plane crash

This event took place after he had failed to put up a government of National Unity against all advice. After his death, panic, hate speeches, smearing RPA to have had a hand in the downing of the plane and concurrently starting the Genocide against the Tutsi and other vocal opposition politicians. Immediately genocide had started and our 600 forces were being attacked left, right and centre.

Our Chairman, having wittily reorganised and strategically placed RPA forces within close proximity to Kigali, gave orders of deployment to three major battalions namely;- Alpha, Bravo and 59th to move to Kigali with two clearly articulated mandates:-

-Mwende mupatiye msada miya sita.

-Mwende musimamishe mauaji ambayo anatendekwa inchini kote

Literally meaning "go and give support to our 600 soldiers cornered by enemy forces’’ and "go and stop the senseless killings that are taking place within the entire country’’.

He never mentioned anything to do with overthrowing the then hurriedly installed government led by Theodore Sindikubwabo and Jean Kambanda.

I vividly remember when the Chairman gave us orders to match after the brief. I have never seen or witnessed such excitement during our numerous successful attacks and routing the enemy at many occasions. This was frenzied!

The order was;- Alpha first, followed by Bravo and 59th in that order. ‘Alpha itatangulia, Bravo itafata, 59th itafunga msululu; in Kiswahili.

As we moved from 5pm that evening of April 8, the Miyove citizens with whom we had very cordial relationships as was always our strategy to have wanainchi made part of our struggle through correct political mobilisation and orientation, became sentimental and lined along our path cheering, some even shedding tears and all, with their arms raised firmly told us "you go and capture Kigali, we know you are capable and God is on your side, we are praying for you”

That very evening the High Command shifted from Mulindi to Miyove to closely follow on our movements until we were in Kigali fighting tough battles, rescuing people from genocidaires and treating those injured. It was a tough war indeed!

Shortly after the forces reached Kigali, the High Command again shifted from Miyove to Byumba which had fallen to our forces. He then finally moved to Musha (about 25-30 km) to organise forces for the final assault and the capture of Kigali.

So, this story is real as we all know it. He never ever let us down during our Liberation Struggle; he was always so close to his troops.

He nurtured and natured discipline within the RPA, which is still evident within the Rwanda Defence Forces, for whom he is Commander-in-Chief. The author is a retired officer who was part of the 1990-94 liberation struggle