The Francophonie’s power struggle signals a new African diplomacy
Tuesday, November 17, 2026
Officials at the opening of the 20th Summit of the International Organisation of La Francophonie on Sunday, November 15. photo by Village Urugwiro

When leaders of the French-speaking world gathered in Cambodia this week, they promised to discuss the future: artificial intelligence, Asia-Pacific trade and a changing global order. Instead, they found themselves unable to agree on who should lead their own organisation.

The 20th summit of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) ended on Monday with an extraordinary compromise. Unable to resolve a bitter contest for secretary-general, member states postponed the election for a year and extended the mandate of Louise Mushikiwabo of Rwanda through 2027.

The decision avoided an immediate rupture. But it exposed a deeper reality: the Francophonie is no longer an institution in which France can quietly set the terms. An organisation founded in 1970 by post-independence African leaders, including Léopold Sédar Senghor and Habib Bourguiba, has become an arena for competing national interests. Its old diplomatic loyalties are giving way to a more transactional politics.

The deadlock revealed just that. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been locked in a confrontation with neighbouring Rwanda. Determined to prevent Ms Mushikiwabo, a former Rwandan foreign minister, from winning a third term, Kinshasa initially put forward its own candidate, Juliana Lumumba. But when that strategy appeared unlikely to succeed, it swiftly withdrew her candidacy and threw its support behind Dacian Cioloș, a former prime minister of Romania.

France, meanwhile, appeared reluctant to surrender its traditional role as the Francophonie’s power broker. President Emmanuel Macron urged Ms Mushikiwabo to step aside in favour of Mr Cioloș. Kigali refused, denouncing the intervention as a throwback to colonial-era tutelage: an attempt by Paris to determine the leadership of an organisation supposedly governed by sovereign equality.

Ms Mushikiwabo pushed back against the politicisation of the contest, warning member states against importing bilateral disputes into the organisation. As reported by The New Times, she said: "Members of the OIF must resist the temptation to make the organisation bilateral, at the risk of fragmenting it. The OIF is not a defensive alliance, and its unity does not require uniformity of positions.”

Her message was clear: the OIF should not become a theatre for disputes between member states.

The irony was difficult to miss. The DRC backed a European candidate to block a regional rival. Rwanda, meanwhile, made a demographic argument: Africa accounts for roughly 65 per cent of the world’s French speakers.

In the new Francophonie, shared history no longer guarantees political solidarity. National interests do.

The same competition for influence is visible in other international institutions. At the International Telecommunication Union’s 2026 conference in Doha, 19 African countries competed for 13 seats allocated to the continent on the organisation’s 48-member Council.

Rwanda secured a seat with 127 votes, alongside countries including Kenya, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. The contest offered a different picture of African diplomacy: rather than a leadership deadlock, countries competed through regional coalitions and electoral campaigns for a greater role in shaping global digital policy.

The underlying ambition, however, was similar — to secure a voice in institutions that increasingly determine the rules of the international order.

The OIF’s crisis is part of a broader institutional unravelling. The withdrawal of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, whose military-led governments viewed the organisation as an instrument of French influence, had already weakened its cohesion. The DRC’s threat to follow suit if Ms Mushikiwabo secured another term raised the stakes considerably.

Ms Mushikiwabo’s record deserves a broader assessment than the political controversy surrounding her candidacy. Since taking office in 2019, she has pursued an ambitious institutional overhaul, streamlining the OIF’s bureaucracy, tightening its finances and modernising its priorities.

Under her leadership, the organisation has sought to move beyond the traditional promotion of the French language towards digital innovation, artificial intelligence, youth entrepreneurship and economic cooperation. She has also worked to strengthen its diplomatic voice in international crises, including those in Haiti and Lebanon.

These efforts have helped reposition the Francophonie as more than a cultural and linguistic association: an organisation seeking relevance in a rapidly changing international order.

Yet institutional modernisation has not insulated her leadership from geopolitics. Her warning against importing bilateral disputes into the OIF thus highlights a central dilemma of her tenure: how to build a more effective multilateral institution when its members increasingly allow regional rivalries to shape its affairs.

For decades, a shared language and France’s largely unquestioned role as diplomatic broker helped sustain the OIF’s cohesion. In Phnom Penh, that formula broke down.

The organisation survived the summit. Its unity is another matter. Buying time is not the same as finding a purpose.

The writer is a legal expert and lecturer at University of Rwanda.