The regional mission of former African heads of state seeking a settlement in the Great Lakes raises a question that reaches far beyond eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: will African leaders give their institutions the authority and resources to resolve the continent’s conflicts, and then implement the decisions they take?
I remain convinced that the African Union can fundamentally change Africa’s peace and security prospects. The continent possesses experienced diplomats, capable security professionals, regional institutions and a substantial body of agreed commitments. Their effectiveness depends on political determination, dependable financing and the willingness of governments to accept scrutiny of their own conduct.
African responsibility must become a practical undertaking. It means preventing violence before it escalates, protecting populations when prevention fails, confronting terrorist organisations, negotiating credible settlements and maintaining the institutions needed to sustain peace. It also means ensuring that Africa’s priorities are determined by Africans, without foreign interference.
The Great Lakes mission offers an opportunity to demonstrate that approach. Direct engagement with governments and armed actors can establish responsibilities that general declarations leave unresolved. Its significance should be judged by whether consultations produce verifiable commitments and sustained implementation.
Across the continent, however, different crises require different responses. Sudan’s war, extremist insurgencies in the Sahel, Somalia’s struggle against al-Shabaab, insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin, violence in northern Mozambique and the conflicts of eastern Congo cannot be addressed through a single formula.
A struggle over national power requires a political settlement and legitimate institutions. Communal violence demands protection, justice and resolution of local disputes. Terrorist organisations require sustained security action against their operational capacity, alongside measures that weaken recruitment and coercive control. These challenges often overlap, but policy must distinguish their causes and dynamics.
Sudan demonstrates the consequences of allowing armed competition to overwhelm public authority. Protecting civilians, securing humanitarian access and establishing a credible political process must take priority over the ambitions of competing military structures. Sudanese civilian constituencies need meaningful influence over their country’s future.
The external dimension must also be confronted. Recent UN findings and statements have drawn attention to foreign military support sustaining Sudan’s war. African diplomacy should press for accountability for those supplying the means to prolong it, while demanding that Sudanese belligerents fulfil their own responsibilities. (reuters.com)
In the Sahel, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin and northern Mozambique, counterterrorism must combine professional security operations with the restoration of trusted public authority. Regaining territory is valuable when communities can remain there safely, courts can function, markets can reopen and the state can provide protection.
An operation that dislodges militants but leaves civilians exposed to retaliation creates only a temporary advantage. Governments must plan security, administration and recovery together. The transition from military deployment to dependable local governance should be part of the mission from its beginning.
The Great Lakes presents another essential lesson: political grievances within a country and security threats across borders must be addressed together. Congolese sovereignty, the protection of threatened communities and Rwanda’s security require concrete arrangements. FDLR neutralisation and the implementation of negotiated obligations cannot remain indefinitely deferred.
The same principle applies elsewhere. A neighbouring state’s territory must not become a sanctuary or supply corridor for organisations threatening another country. African governments should accept reciprocal obligations to prevent such activity, investigate credible evidence and cooperate through agreed mechanisms.
Colonial boundaries, external intervention and unequal economic relationships form part of the continent’s historical experience. They deserve serious examination. African leaders must also confront present failures of governance, corruption, exclusion and impunity. Responsibility requires the capacity to recognise both external pressures and decisions taken within Africa.
Governments weaken their own security when public institutions become instruments of patronage or when communities encounter the state primarily through coercion. Terrorist organisations exploit such conditions, sometimes combining ideological recruitment with promises of income, protection or revenge.
UNDP’s research on pathways into violent extremism identifies livelihood incentives and grievances arising from government action among the factors influencing recruitment. These findings do not excuse violence. They show why prevention must examine how institutions treat the populations whose cooperation they need. (undp.org)
Professional security forces are therefore indispensable. Soldiers and police need reliable pay, disciplined command, appropriate training and accountability. Abuses must be investigated, and civilians must have safe channels to report them. Collective punishment can destroy trust and give recruiters further opportunities to mobilise resentment.
Political leaders must also use the term terrorism carefully. Peaceful dissent, community grievances and legitimate opposition must retain lawful avenues of expression. Misusing counterterrorism powers damages credibility and can make cooperation against actual terrorist networks more difficult.
At the continental level, the AU’s central challenge is implementation. Its peace and security architecture already includes the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, early-warning arrangements, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. These instruments need the political backing and operational capacity to fulfil their purposes. (aucapps.au.int)
Every major decision should specify a responsible institution, an implementation timetable, adequate financing and a method of verification. Member states should report against defined obligations. Where progress stalls, the AU should identify the obstacle and require corrective action rather than simply repeat the original appeal.
The relationship between the AU and regional organisations also needs clarity. Regional bodies can provide proximity and detailed knowledge; the AU can offer continental authority and continuity. Their mandates should establish who leads mediation, who monitors security commitments and how disagreements will be resolved.
Early warning must lead to early engagement. Evidence of organised ethnic incitement, deteriorating communal relations, expanding armed recruitment or obstruction of humanitarian access should trigger preventive diplomacy. Institutions must be able to raise uncomfortable concerns before governments acknowledge a crisis.
Genocide prevention deserves particular discipline. Africa’s experience, including the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, demands vigilance towards ideologies that deny communities their humanity or belonging. Leaders must confront incitement within their own political and security structures and act before threatened populations are attacked.
Dependable African financing is equally important. Essential mediation, verification and crisis response should have a funding foundation that allows African institutions to set priorities and act promptly. Member states must honour contributions and establish transparent oversight of expenditure.
The AU Peace Fund offers an existing instrument for this purpose. Its trustees have recently emphasised that credibility will depend on turning resources into meaningful results. That standard should govern both financial administration and political decision-making. (au.int)
African financial responsibility would strengthen the continent’s ability to cooperate with international partners on its own terms. Expertise, equipment and diplomatic support can be useful. Their contribution should follow African priorities, respect agreed mandates and remain subject to scrutiny.
Foreign interference must be addressed wherever it sustains armed factions, shields obstruction or subordinates peace to commercial and geopolitical competition. African leaders should examine agreements and relationships that affect security, including their own. Independence requires consistency across all partnerships.
The economic networks sustaining violence also need attention. Armed groups survive through financing, taxation, smuggling, extortion and control of trade. Governments must improve customs cooperation, financial investigation and oversight of mineral and commodity supply chains while protecting legitimate livelihoods.
Cross-border intelligence cooperation should be dependable and governed by safeguards. States need arrangements for sharing relevant information, investigating financing and pursuing lawful judicial cooperation. Political disputes must not repeatedly dismantle the channels needed to address common threats.
Justice and reconciliation must accompany security action. Those responsible for atrocities should face appropriate judicial processes. Individuals leaving armed organisations need credible assessment, rehabilitation and reintegration arrangements, with safeguards for communities. Victims must have a voice in these measures.
Young people require opportunities that connect them to a lawful future. Education, employment, access to land and political participation can strengthen prevention when they address local conditions. Women’s participation is equally essential to negotiation, protection and recovery, and must influence decisions.
Humanitarian access should remain protected throughout conflict and negotiation. Peace efforts lose moral authority when civilian survival becomes a bargaining instrument. Refugees and displaced people need voluntary, safe and dignified return, supported by documentation, livelihoods and mechanisms for resolving property disputes.
The measure of success should be concrete: fewer attacks, safer communities, functioning institutions, disrupted armed networks and commitments fulfilled. Persistent obstruction must bring proportionate consequences based on verified responsibility. Governments and movements alike should know that agreements will be examined consistently.
Africa can take responsibility for its peace and security. Doing so requires leaders to fund their institutions, honour their decisions and accept that sovereignty carries duties towards citizens and neighbours. The AU must exercise its authority with discipline, independence and continuity.
Our people deserve to live under institutions that protect them and leaders who carry commitments through. African ownership will become real when decisions taken in Africa produce lasting security in African lives.